by Tammy Lynch
Ukraine announced yesterday that Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko will meet her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin next month in Warsaw, Poland. The announcement came on the same day that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev brusquely denounced Ukraine’s “leadership” during a press event with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Sochi. Medvedev also claimed that “normal relations” would not be possible until “new leadership” takes over in Ukraine.
Days earlier, Medvedev had released a harsh video blog criticizing everything from Ukraine’s treatment of Russian speakers to its “resistance” toward Russian business to its gas deals with the EU. (An English text of Medvedev’s video blog is here.)
Medvedev’s remarks have created numerous questions. The Putin-Tymoshenko meeting could begin to provide some answers.
The video blog appears to be an attempt to undermine Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko in advance of the upcoming presidential election, while increasing support for “pro-Russian” candidate Viktor Yanukovych (and possibly others considered “pro-Kremlin”). However, Medvedev included harsh words for “Ukraine’s political leaders” who “do deals with the European Union on supplying gas.” The Russian president’s use of the plural in his video blog, as well as an ambiguous reference to Ukraine’s “leadership” during his recent press event, should not be overlooked.
In fact, it was Prime Minister Tymoshenko – not Yushchenko – who negotiated and signed the Joint EU-Ukraine Declaration on the Modernization of Ukraine’s Gas Transit System. The Declaration provided for a framework to modernize Ukraine’s transit pipelines in order to increase transit capacity for Russian gas to Europe. This has the potential to undermine competing transit pipelines planned by Russia that would bypass Ukraine and led to a loud, threatening – and effective – response from Moscow.
So, is Medvedev’s wording a sign that Moscow does not understand the diarchy of power in Ukraine? Or simply doesn’t care? The Russian President clearly is proceeding as if there is one unified power center in Ukraine – and suggesting that Russia will oppose anyone associated with that center.
Or, is Medvedev perhaps signaling that concessions will be necessary from Tymoshenko if Russia is to either back the Prime Minister in the election (assuming she wants this backing) or stay out of the election?
This last question in particular will undoubtedly come up at the Putin – Tymoshenko meeting on September 1st – a meeting which was initiated by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
Tymoshenko and Putin have maintained a cordial, if sometimes strained, working relationship. In fact, Tymoshenko first began working with Putin while he was president; at that time, he clearly showed an understanding of the significant power held by the prime minister’s position in Ukraine.
The implication by Tusk that a meeting between Putin and Tymoshenko may ease tensions is a significant repudiation of Medvedev’s claim that “normal relations” with Ukraine are not possible. And the fact that both prime ministers have agreed to take part is more interesting.
Given Tymoshenko’s strained relationship with Yushchenko, she is happy to appear statesmanlike and effective at his expense. But are Medvedev and Putin working together? Will Tymoshenko meet the good cop in Warsaw? Or, is Medvedev attempting to use Ukraine as a demonstration of his own power? If so, will he be allowed to succeed?
Stay tuned......
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
A Mystery Surrounding The Arctic Sea: More Questions than Answers
by Giorgi Kvelashvili
On August 18, 2009 the official website of the Russian president made an announcement about a meeting between Dmitri Medvedev and his Defense Minister Anatoly Sedyukov (www.kremlin.ru, August 18, 2009). Mr. Serdyukov informed the president of the Russian Federation on “the details concerning the freeing of the cargo vessel Arctic Sea.” During the operation eight people were arrested – citizens of Estonia, Latvia, and Russia.
According to the Russian version of the story, on July 24 “these people boarded the ship and threatening with weapons, demanded that the crew change the course. Afterwards the vessel was pursuing the route ordered by the hijackers in the direction toward Africa, switching off the navigational equipment.” Earlier the Kremlin website stated that “there was a crew of 15 Russian citizens on board of the lost vessel loaded with timber and headed toward Algeria.” On August 17 the same official website posted the information that “the vessel connection with which had been lost since July 28 was found in the vicinity of Cape Verde Islands” (www.kremlin.ru, August 17). “The members of the crew are alive; they had been taken to the Russian anti-submarine vessel Ladny and are being questioned,” Defense Minister Serdyukov reported to President Medvedev during “a working meeting” in the city of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea during the president’s trip to the Southern Federal District. The Russian president ordered the minister to “thoroughly investigate and report back.”
According to the Russian news agency Interfax, the ship loaded with timber, worth more than one million euros (1.41 million USD), left the Finnish coast on July 22 and should have arrived in Algeria on August 4. Two weeks after its disappearance “the Russian military fleet notified the ships and vessels of its disappearance” (www.interfax.ru, August 18, 2009,
The Kremlin-controlled English language TV channel Russia Today that broadcasts for the international audience reported on August 18 that “while the crew is being questioned by naval officials…the speculations are beginning to run wild; there is even talk that there may have been nuclear materials on this ship, and they might have something to do with this mystery” (Russia Today, August 18). In his interview with Russia Today, Wayne Madsen, an investigative journalist, said that the vessel loaded with timber left Finland for Algeria after “undergoing repairs in Kaliningrad” and in Swedish waters the vessel was boarded by “masked policemen.” According to the journalist, “They held the crew hostage for a while” and after asking them “very detailed and probing questions,” “they left all of a sudden.” According to Mr. Madsen, there are some jurisdictional issues involving Finland and Sweden and “we have NATO getting involved.” Madsen also talked about the possibility that “nuclear materials could have been onboard.” Interfax, on the other hand, reported that “NATO forces helped [the Russians] in the search operation.”
According to Russia Today, the only available information concerning the people arrested in connection with “the hijacking” is their nationality, but the same TV channel reported that “the vessel may have gone through two hijacking attempts – one in Swedish waters” and another “after the ship passed the English Channel.” Interfax also came up with the speculation about two separate incidents.
In his interview to Russia Today, Dmitri Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO, highly commended the operation of “freeing the vessel,” saying that “all stages of the operation were excellently managed…the Russian vessels took over the ship that had been captured by pirates at the planned time and place preventing it from getting close to the African coast. ”Mr. Rogozin’s commentary could be read as Russia emerging a great naval power, which is capable of conducting successful anti-piracy operations. Interestingly enough the Russian journalist, Oxana Boyko, who covered the story for Russia Today added that “it may have been NATO forces that actually seized the ship.”
There are several issues in this story that are difficult to explain. It is striking that the Russians did not officially announce the disappearance of the vessel until August 12, although, according to the official Russian sources the connection with the vessel had been lost on July 28 and the people “threatening with weapons” boarded the vessel on July 24. The Russians would have detected the change of course or some irregularities from July 24 to July 28. Needless to say that piracy in the Baltic Sea is almost unheard of for at least several centuries and if independently confirmed, this case would be truly sensational. And why is the state-controlled Russian media talking about “nuclear materials” allegedly being on the cargo vessel? It is difficult to imagine that they are doing this without consent of the Russian government.
It remains unclear who owns the vessel and why the Russians were so nervous about its disappearance, not reporting for two weeks and after having reported the president of the country himself right away got involved. Was this due to the fact that the crew of the vessel was comprised of Russian citizens exclusively? According to the Russian website navy.ru, the cargo ship Arctic Sea, operated by Solchart Arkhangelsk Ltd. and owned by the Latvian company Aquachart SIA, was built in 1991 and it has the deadweight of 4706 tons.
According to Interfax the vessel is registered in Finland and the Finnish authorities “are waiting for an official notification from the Russian side on the seizure of the cargo ship and want to investigate this case of hijacking together with the Russian side.” Finnish President Tarja Halonen visited Russia and held talks with her Russian counterpart in Sochi on August 11, one day before Russia officially announced the “disappearance” of the Arctic Sea. At the moment it is virtually impossible to make a connection between Mrs. Halonen’s visit and the breakout of the vessel story but what we can safely state is that by the time of the visit the Russians did have at least some information and they might discuss it with the Finnish president.
The Russians are saying that among the hijackers who are now in Russian custody “there were four Estonians, two Latvians and two Russians” although, interestingly enough, neither Estonia nor Latvia has been officially notified about the involvement of their citizens in “the hijacking.”
Unless the Russian Federation reveals a complete picture of the mysterious disappearance of the Arctic Sea, its seizure and the investigation of the incident, there will be even more speculations about “the secret cargo” on the vessel ranging from the already mentioned “nuclear materials” to “four X-55 Russian missiles whose destination was Iran” – the operation was allegedly thwarted by “a major Western power.”
On August 18, 2009 the official website of the Russian president made an announcement about a meeting between Dmitri Medvedev and his Defense Minister Anatoly Sedyukov (www.kremlin.ru, August 18, 2009). Mr. Serdyukov informed the president of the Russian Federation on “the details concerning the freeing of the cargo vessel Arctic Sea.” During the operation eight people were arrested – citizens of Estonia, Latvia, and Russia.
According to the Russian version of the story, on July 24 “these people boarded the ship and threatening with weapons, demanded that the crew change the course. Afterwards the vessel was pursuing the route ordered by the hijackers in the direction toward Africa, switching off the navigational equipment.” Earlier the Kremlin website stated that “there was a crew of 15 Russian citizens on board of the lost vessel loaded with timber and headed toward Algeria.” On August 17 the same official website posted the information that “the vessel connection with which had been lost since July 28 was found in the vicinity of Cape Verde Islands” (www.kremlin.ru, August 17). “The members of the crew are alive; they had been taken to the Russian anti-submarine vessel Ladny and are being questioned,” Defense Minister Serdyukov reported to President Medvedev during “a working meeting” in the city of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea during the president’s trip to the Southern Federal District. The Russian president ordered the minister to “thoroughly investigate and report back.”
According to the Russian news agency Interfax, the ship loaded with timber, worth more than one million euros (1.41 million USD), left the Finnish coast on July 22 and should have arrived in Algeria on August 4. Two weeks after its disappearance “the Russian military fleet notified the ships and vessels of its disappearance” (www.interfax.ru, August 18, 2009,
The Kremlin-controlled English language TV channel Russia Today that broadcasts for the international audience reported on August 18 that “while the crew is being questioned by naval officials…the speculations are beginning to run wild; there is even talk that there may have been nuclear materials on this ship, and they might have something to do with this mystery” (Russia Today, August 18). In his interview with Russia Today, Wayne Madsen, an investigative journalist, said that the vessel loaded with timber left Finland for Algeria after “undergoing repairs in Kaliningrad” and in Swedish waters the vessel was boarded by “masked policemen.” According to the journalist, “They held the crew hostage for a while” and after asking them “very detailed and probing questions,” “they left all of a sudden.” According to Mr. Madsen, there are some jurisdictional issues involving Finland and Sweden and “we have NATO getting involved.” Madsen also talked about the possibility that “nuclear materials could have been onboard.” Interfax, on the other hand, reported that “NATO forces helped [the Russians] in the search operation.”
According to Russia Today, the only available information concerning the people arrested in connection with “the hijacking” is their nationality, but the same TV channel reported that “the vessel may have gone through two hijacking attempts – one in Swedish waters” and another “after the ship passed the English Channel.” Interfax also came up with the speculation about two separate incidents.
In his interview to Russia Today, Dmitri Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO, highly commended the operation of “freeing the vessel,” saying that “all stages of the operation were excellently managed…the Russian vessels took over the ship that had been captured by pirates at the planned time and place preventing it from getting close to the African coast. ”Mr. Rogozin’s commentary could be read as Russia emerging a great naval power, which is capable of conducting successful anti-piracy operations. Interestingly enough the Russian journalist, Oxana Boyko, who covered the story for Russia Today added that “it may have been NATO forces that actually seized the ship.”
There are several issues in this story that are difficult to explain. It is striking that the Russians did not officially announce the disappearance of the vessel until August 12, although, according to the official Russian sources the connection with the vessel had been lost on July 28 and the people “threatening with weapons” boarded the vessel on July 24. The Russians would have detected the change of course or some irregularities from July 24 to July 28. Needless to say that piracy in the Baltic Sea is almost unheard of for at least several centuries and if independently confirmed, this case would be truly sensational. And why is the state-controlled Russian media talking about “nuclear materials” allegedly being on the cargo vessel? It is difficult to imagine that they are doing this without consent of the Russian government.
It remains unclear who owns the vessel and why the Russians were so nervous about its disappearance, not reporting for two weeks and after having reported the president of the country himself right away got involved. Was this due to the fact that the crew of the vessel was comprised of Russian citizens exclusively? According to the Russian website navy.ru, the cargo ship Arctic Sea, operated by Solchart Arkhangelsk Ltd. and owned by the Latvian company Aquachart SIA, was built in 1991 and it has the deadweight of 4706 tons.
According to Interfax the vessel is registered in Finland and the Finnish authorities “are waiting for an official notification from the Russian side on the seizure of the cargo ship and want to investigate this case of hijacking together with the Russian side.” Finnish President Tarja Halonen visited Russia and held talks with her Russian counterpart in Sochi on August 11, one day before Russia officially announced the “disappearance” of the Arctic Sea. At the moment it is virtually impossible to make a connection between Mrs. Halonen’s visit and the breakout of the vessel story but what we can safely state is that by the time of the visit the Russians did have at least some information and they might discuss it with the Finnish president.
The Russians are saying that among the hijackers who are now in Russian custody “there were four Estonians, two Latvians and two Russians” although, interestingly enough, neither Estonia nor Latvia has been officially notified about the involvement of their citizens in “the hijacking.”
Unless the Russian Federation reveals a complete picture of the mysterious disappearance of the Arctic Sea, its seizure and the investigation of the incident, there will be even more speculations about “the secret cargo” on the vessel ranging from the already mentioned “nuclear materials” to “four X-55 Russian missiles whose destination was Iran” – the operation was allegedly thwarted by “a major Western power.”
Erecting a Wall inside Georgia
by Giorgi Kvelashvili
On August 14 the head of the legitimate government of Abkhazia, Gia Baramia, addressed the Abkhaz people from a bridge on the Enguri River, which now separates Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. He made his appeal to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the beginning of hostilities in 1992 between the authorities in Tbilisi and Moscow-backed anti-government forces in Abkhazia.
Born and reared in Sokhumi, Mr. Baramia invoked a long tradition of “brotherhood between the Georgians and the Abkhaz who throughout the centuries lived on the same land in peace and harmony - united by identical traditions and customs and by bonds of friendship and intermarriage.” Recently appointed to this post, Baramia, the head of the Abkhaz government in exile, who is not even allowed to travel to Sokhumi and whose house in Abkhazia is currently occupied by strangers, tried to avoid mentioning political issues and concentrated mainly on humanitarian aspects of the unsettled conflict. Nonetheless, he did say bitter words about the “ignominious third force that had intruded into our lives… and had separate relatives, friends, neighbors, and classmates.” At the end of his speech the leader of more than 300,000 Georgian citizens, victims of ethnic cleansing who are not permitted to return to their homes in Abkhazia, called on “the Abkhaz compatriots to engage in bilateral dialogue that will restore confidence and renew old ties.”
On the same day the very same bridge on the administrative border was crossed by a man who said he lives in Gudauta, a town near Sokhumi, and “asked for Georgian citizenship.” In his interview to the Georgian TV channel Rustavi 2, Tengiz Lakerbaia, an ethnic Abkhaz, explained the motivation to make such a move: “It is very hard to live in Abkhazia…people have no jobs…and our president [Sergei Bagapsh] sells everything to the Russians. Many people want to leave Abkhazia but they are afraid…We will have unrest in December.”
There are signs that the situation in Abkhazia is indeed deteriorating. Opposition factions constantly accuse the de facto regime of increasingly heavy reliance on Russia and abandoning the cause of independence. Following the interview to the Moscow radio station Ekho Moskvy on July 15 in which Sergei Bagapsh did not exclude the possibility that Abkhazia, in the future, might become part of Russia through a “referendum of the people” the de facto leader’s critics came out with a statement condemning “the incompetent authorities whose actions pose a real threat to the statehood and the people of Abkhazia.”
On August 12 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin traveled to Abkhazia to give new impetus to already heavy Russian presence there. During his visit two bombs were detonated in Sokhumi and Gagra, killing two people and injuring seven. Shortly afterwards, the Russian occupational forces intensified their efforts to strengthen the “border” between Abkhazia and Georgia proper. According to Rustavi 2, “the bridges on the Enguri river are being mined” and the Russians “are putting in place fortifications and barbwire fences along the 85-kilometer border.” Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister David Jalagania said on August 17 that “this is a continuation of the Russian policy of aggression and occupation.” President Saakashvili of Georgia repeatedly called the Moscow-drawn lines separating Abkhazia and Tskhinvali from other parts of Georgia “a new Berlin Wall in Europe.”
While Georgian officials are trying to reach out to the populations on the other side of the “wall,” Moscow is doubling its efforts to militarize the two occupied regions and fortify the “borders” in order to minimize contact between ordinary Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossetians.
On August 14 the head of the legitimate government of Abkhazia, Gia Baramia, addressed the Abkhaz people from a bridge on the Enguri River, which now separates Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. He made his appeal to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the beginning of hostilities in 1992 between the authorities in Tbilisi and Moscow-backed anti-government forces in Abkhazia.
Born and reared in Sokhumi, Mr. Baramia invoked a long tradition of “brotherhood between the Georgians and the Abkhaz who throughout the centuries lived on the same land in peace and harmony - united by identical traditions and customs and by bonds of friendship and intermarriage.” Recently appointed to this post, Baramia, the head of the Abkhaz government in exile, who is not even allowed to travel to Sokhumi and whose house in Abkhazia is currently occupied by strangers, tried to avoid mentioning political issues and concentrated mainly on humanitarian aspects of the unsettled conflict. Nonetheless, he did say bitter words about the “ignominious third force that had intruded into our lives… and had separate relatives, friends, neighbors, and classmates.” At the end of his speech the leader of more than 300,000 Georgian citizens, victims of ethnic cleansing who are not permitted to return to their homes in Abkhazia, called on “the Abkhaz compatriots to engage in bilateral dialogue that will restore confidence and renew old ties.”
On the same day the very same bridge on the administrative border was crossed by a man who said he lives in Gudauta, a town near Sokhumi, and “asked for Georgian citizenship.” In his interview to the Georgian TV channel Rustavi 2, Tengiz Lakerbaia, an ethnic Abkhaz, explained the motivation to make such a move: “It is very hard to live in Abkhazia…people have no jobs…and our president [Sergei Bagapsh] sells everything to the Russians. Many people want to leave Abkhazia but they are afraid…We will have unrest in December.”
There are signs that the situation in Abkhazia is indeed deteriorating. Opposition factions constantly accuse the de facto regime of increasingly heavy reliance on Russia and abandoning the cause of independence. Following the interview to the Moscow radio station Ekho Moskvy on July 15 in which Sergei Bagapsh did not exclude the possibility that Abkhazia, in the future, might become part of Russia through a “referendum of the people” the de facto leader’s critics came out with a statement condemning “the incompetent authorities whose actions pose a real threat to the statehood and the people of Abkhazia.”
On August 12 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin traveled to Abkhazia to give new impetus to already heavy Russian presence there. During his visit two bombs were detonated in Sokhumi and Gagra, killing two people and injuring seven. Shortly afterwards, the Russian occupational forces intensified their efforts to strengthen the “border” between Abkhazia and Georgia proper. According to Rustavi 2, “the bridges on the Enguri river are being mined” and the Russians “are putting in place fortifications and barbwire fences along the 85-kilometer border.” Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister David Jalagania said on August 17 that “this is a continuation of the Russian policy of aggression and occupation.” President Saakashvili of Georgia repeatedly called the Moscow-drawn lines separating Abkhazia and Tskhinvali from other parts of Georgia “a new Berlin Wall in Europe.”
While Georgian officials are trying to reach out to the populations on the other side of the “wall,” Moscow is doubling its efforts to militarize the two occupied regions and fortify the “borders” in order to minimize contact between ordinary Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossetians.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Governments of Abkhazia, South Ossetia Hire US PR Firm
By Roman Kupchinsky
The governments of the break-away Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have hired the Pasadena, California - based public relations firm of Mark Saylor LLC to promote their image in the West. The two governments will pay Saylor $30,000 a month for their services.
News of this was first reported on the website of the Russian newspaper Kommersant on August 14.
In documents filed with the US Department of Justice’s Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) on July 28, 2009 Saylor stated that it will aim to: “Underscore the importance of maintaining a close relationship with Russia (by their client), including the need for a Russian military presence within its borders, to protect Abkhazia from military aggression by Georgia.”
In the filing for South Ossetia, Saylor included a letter sent on June 17, 2009 to David Sanakoev, the human rights ombudsman for the republic, outlining the services which Saylor was prepared to offer to their client. Among others, Saylor wrote:
“Explain how the Russian military saved the civilian population of South Ossetia from Georgian military forces, and the necessity of continued Russian military support to protect the Republic of South Ossetia from another attack by Georgia.”
Yet, on the FARA website the Saylor filing is found under “Georgia” as the “country or location being represented”! In effect, Saylor will, with the go-ahead by FARA, help protect Georgia from military aggression by Georgia and show that Russian troops stationed in Georgia are vital to accomplish this mission!
The United States, as most of the world community, does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states; therefore they are not listed on the FARA website as countries or locations.
It might be useful to convince the U.S. Justice Department to create new categories of locations for FARA: “Countries invaded by the Russian Federation,” “Break Away Regions”, “Islamic Militant Organizations” and so on. This would help clarify who is being represented by U.S. public relations firms and to what end.
Friday, August 14, 2009
Kadyrov Pleads he is an Innocent Warrior
By Yuri Zarakhovich
The interview that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov gave to U.S. international broadcaster Radio Liberty on August 9, 2009, evokes a famous line by a Russian playwright Evgeni Shvartz: “Pray, hush, Princess! You’re so innocent, you can say awful things!”
Kadyrov blames the West for the war in Chechnya: “The West…wanted to break up the sovereign Russian state through Chechnya.”Why, then did Kadyrov chose to fight the sovereign Russian state at the tender age of 17?
“Because the people were against (Russia). They were forced by Yeltsin, Beresovsky and the like, who sought to break up the Russian Federation the way they had broken up the Soviet Union.”
It was Putin, Kadyrov says, who helped the Chechens see the light and turn sides. Still, Putin publicly pays homage to Yeltsin.. His hatred for democratic reform, rightly or wrongly associated with Yeltsin, is the Kremlin’s inner matter, not to be mentioned openly. Kadyrov just let slip what’s on Putin’s mind.
What else did Kadyrov pick up in the hallways of power?
Says Kadyrov: “They (the West) attack. We defend. The time will come, when we’ll attack, too.”
“Why should we give away South Ossetia, or Abkhazia?” Kadyrov wonders. Well, why, indeed, if Moscow can keep them under whatever disguise: “Let them be sovereign states, independent states, but for Russia they will be allied states,” Kadyrov spells out.
“One thing I really know how to do well is making war. I’m a very good strategist,” Kadyrov adds dreamily. Neighbors, beware!
On July 16, 2009, Natalya Estemirova, a human rights activist, who had angered the authorities with reports of torture, abductions and extrajudicial killings, was discovered with two close-range gunshot wounds to the head in the woods. The human rights community laid the responsibility for the murder on the Chechen President, who claims he is responsible for everything that happens in Chechnya. This is how he comments both the murder and the charges:
“Why should Kadyrov kill a woman whom nobody needed? She never had any honor, dignity, or scruples. Still, I appointed her Head of the (Public) Council. She wouldn’t attend the meetings, or would merely talk all kind of nonsense…So I dissolved that Council. So what is my fault, if they killed Estemirova?”
Is it any wonder then, that on August 11, just two days after Kadyrov said that, two more human right activists--Zarema Sadulayeva and her husband Umar Dzhabrailov—were murdered in the same fashion: abducted and later found in the woods with gunshot wounds to their heads?
Kadyrov emphasizes that he is Putin’s man: “I’ll die for him!” Kadyrov wants to see his idol as Russia’s President for life. “Still…our President is Dmitry Medvedev, a strong, wise and proper politician. If he were not, the team would not have elected him.”
The Constitution, which Kadyrov swears by, says it’s the people who elected him President. He must have missed a nuance.
This Prince is hardly innocent -just uncouth and unsophisticated. Hence, he blurts out inadvertently what is on his mind. Or does he?
Yuri Zarakhovich is an analyst for the Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, August 13, 2009
In Ukraine, Campaigning to Avoid the Crises
by Tammy Lynch
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was kind enough earlier this week to kick off Ukraine’s election campaign by attacking his Ukrainian counterpart. Therefore, this appears as good a time as any to look at how Ukraine’s likely candidates are attempting to convince voters to show them some love at the ballot box.
Despite election-day being five months away, the domestic political scene is awash with odes to the Ukrainian people. From property giveaways to billboard competitions to promises of fraternal love to the Russian people, politicians in Ukraine are campaigning (informally) with gusto. Unfortunately for Ukraine, this political posturing means that few political “leaders” have risked responding to the severe economic problems and foreign policy questions facing the country.
There are four major political figures expected to compete in the election on 17 January 2010: President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych and former Speaker of Parliament Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
According to a recent poll, Yanukovych, the man who would have been president in 2004, sits atop the field with 26%-30%. Tymoshenko’s rating is around 16%, with Yatsenyuk at 12-13%. Despite Yushchenko’s apparent belief that he remains popular – his rating hovers at 5%.
From his lofty perch, Yanukovych generally has maintained radio silence, with periodic bursts of activity to remind voters he exists. The strategy is understandable. Tymoshenko is taking the brunt of voters’ ire over the current economic situation; why interfere with her fun?
Following Medvedev’s broadside, Yanukovych predictably appeared. When he takes office as president, Yanukovych said his “first job” will be “a restoration of normal, neighborly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with our strategic partner, Russia."
Tymoshenko has ignored Medvedev’s statements, but donned her martyr costume. “Today I am fighting one-on-one with the crisis. Everyone else is being irresponsible …,” she said.
Simultaneously, a billboard/banner campaign suddenly appeared in Kyiv. Each advertisement contains the tag line “She is working,” while suggesting, “They are interfering,” “They are obstructing,” or “They are talking.” The “she” and “they” aren’t identified, but does anyone really wonder?
Meanwhile, Arseniy Yatsenyuk debuted a billboard campaign, which features the modest statement: “To Save the Country: Arseniy.” Still, Yatsenyuk has yet to detail major economic policy initiatives to “save the country.” Perhaps, like Yanukovych, he understands that it’s best to save the country after the election.
In fact, this seems to be understood by most Ukrainian politicians. The parliament spent most of its spring session beset by internecine battles. As a result, a series of economic anti-crisis measures sat largely undiscussed. In the end, the government simply enacted the most desperately-needed legislation by direct decree of the prime minister.
The government also unveiled some old pre-election rhetoric, topped with a few treats; free apartments, an investigation of producers for setting consumer prices too high, promises to help companies upgrade their equipment, promises to pay wage arrears, etc.
All the while, Russian pressure over everything from the Black Sea Fleet to gas deliveries receives limited practical response, as does an agreement with the EU to implement energy reforms in exchange for a $1.7 billion loan. But what can we expect? There’s campaigning to be done, after all.
Tammy Lynch is a Senior Research Fellow at Boston University's Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Dmitri Medvedev's Disinformation Blog
by Roman Kupchinsky
The Kremlin never fails to astonish its world-wide audience.
In what can best be described as an open letter to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko posted on the Russian President's website on August 11, Dmitri Medvedev took the proverbial gloves off and lashed out at the democratically elected Ukrainian President.
The pretext of his letter was a directive he signed that day postponing the appointment of a new Russian ambassador to Ukraine.
By publicizing his private communication on his website and his video blog Medvedev turned what should have been a civil debate on differing views between him and Yushchenko on the nature of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, into a new confrontation.
The Russian President did everything in his power to popularize his views in order to turn them into an instrument of anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda and prolong the ongoing anti-Ukrainian campaign that began in 2004.
The Kremlin's disinformation campaign that the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 was not a popular one, but was funded and organized by the government of the United States, remains alive and well in the imagination of many Russians. “Democratically elected” is a term which is still widely misunderstood on the streets of Russia.
The letter to Yushchenko appears to have been carefully crafted by the Kremlin’s spin- doctors in order to incite an anti-Ukrainian backlash among the Russian folk. Medvedev’s letter includes denunciations of Ukraine’s support of Georgia during last year’s Russian invasion of that country; Ukraine’s continued efforts to join NATO; and attempts to diversify gas supplies –denouncing Ukraine’s agreement to allow the European Union to have a say in the main Ukrainian pipeline which brings gas to Europe.
Medvedev did not fail to include historical issues such as the role of the Ukrainian Partisan Army and its struggle for Ukrainian independence against both the fascist invaders and the Red Army during World War Two, which he characterized as the “glorification of Nazi collaborators” and his rejection of the Stalinist man-made famine in Ukraine as “genocide.”
That same day, Medvedev met with veterans of the “Great Fatherland War” at a round table and went out of his way to praise Ukrainian Red Army veterans.
The Russian President’s video blog site received a number of comments by visitors to Medvedev's letter to Yushchenko on the site and they reveal a stark microcosmic view of Russian attitudes towards Ukraine.
“We can get a knife in the back from Ukraine anytime. History has not taught Russia anything.“
“Ukraine is an artificial state” (Vladimir Putin once whispered this same theory into the ear of former U.S. President George Bush) “something created by the Bolsheviks after their coming to power…”
“I am a Russian citizen unfortunate to be living in Odessa… I was against the collapse of the USSR and observed the era of Gorbachev – Yeltsin which was very strange…I am very grateful to you, Dmitri Anatolevich about what concerns Ukraine…”
Ukrainian acting Foreign Minister,Volodymyr Khandogiy's response to Medvedev’s letter was low-key: “I am not personally upset by this, but it does evoke a somewhat disappointing feeling.”
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