tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-41561637487822346742024-03-13T15:13:37.917-04:00Jamestown Foundation BlogTimely analysis and commentary on geopolitical developments in EurasiaJamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.comBlogger502125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-41293238192532871172016-09-15T17:27:00.001-04:002016-09-15T17:27:23.224-04:00Angry Krasnodar Farmers Write Open Letter to Putin<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-gAq5Jnors9s/V9sSE7QAhJI/AAAAAAAABcc/6A78tzqs7Rwlc7_1vFXiHOystrd8zfbDQCLcB/s1600/Police%252C%2BKrasnodar%2Bfarmers%2B-%2BBlog%2BSeptember%2B15%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="179" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-gAq5Jnors9s/V9sSE7QAhJI/AAAAAAAABcc/6A78tzqs7Rwlc7_1vFXiHOystrd8zfbDQCLcB/s320/Police%252C%2BKrasnodar%2Bfarmers%2B-%2BBlog%2BSeptember%2B15%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Richard
Arnold<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The saga
continues for farmers in Krasnodar protesting corruption in their region and
the unfair distribution of land. The farmers originally planned to caravan to
Moscow but were intercepted by a delegate sent from the federal government who
promised to address their complaints (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45283&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=827&no_cache=1#.V9sBWK3YGtQ">EDM</a>,
April 6). Presumably, their complaints were not addressed satisfactorily, as
the farmers have since held numerous demonstrations in the region. They tried
to hold a protest during the visit of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in August
but were stopped by police (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc/3070155">Kommersant</a>,
August 22). Having failed to gain the attention of the federal authorities, on
August 21 the farmers organized another convoy of tractors destined for Moscow.
They only made it as far as Rostov, where they were due to meet a deputy of the
local regional administration. The protest was stopped, ostensibly because they
had failed to inform the local authorities. The convoy was encouraged to take
up the matter with Krasnodar governor Benjamin Kondratev, despite complaints
that he was unable to overrule previous court decisions. A deployment of armed
police then compelled the farmers to halt their protest and return to Krasnodar
(<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3071009">Kommersant</a>, August 23). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">One has to
admire the persistence of the Krasnodar farmers who, on September 8, published
an open letter to President Vladimir Putin in the weekly newspaper <i>Argumenti Nedeli</i>. The letter bemoans the
shrinking of the rural population—most vividly evidenced by the twofold decline
in children enrolled in rural Krasnodar schools. The writers attribute this
state of affairs to the dominance of agricultural holdings controlled by those who
“do not live in villages, hamlets or [Cossack] hamlets; their children do not
study in our schools, are not treated in our hospitals and, therefore, do not
need to develop rural settlements.” The situation is worsened, in the opinion
of the farmers, by the “raider seizures of agricultural holdings,” who are
virtually immune from prosecution on account of their lobbyists and lawyers. The
farmers also note the uneven enforcement of court decisions as well the lack of
uniformity in court decisions, which, they say “is also a crime.” The letter
ends by asking the General Procurator to ask six questions “of all holdings,
conserves, and physical persons affiliated with state structures of power in
the Kuban: 1.) What is the focus of the enterprise and how did they enter the
holding? 2.) How many hectares of land are in the holding or concern and how
many are from municipal lands? 3.) Where and to what do they pay taxes? 4. How
much do they receive in subsidies and grants? 5.) How much credit do they obtain,
at what price and rate? Are there sunk credits? 6.) Check for judgments
illegally handed down on land questions.” The article ends by claiming that if
“we revive the villages, we save Russia!” (<a href="http://argumenti.ru/society/n555/466549">Argumenty i Fakty</a>, September
8). This sort of David versus Goliath story is certainly not unique to Russia;
across the world, it is a consequences of the increasing intensity of industrial
farming practices. But there are certain characteristics in the Krasnodar case
that may render it particularly problematic for the Putin regime.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On
the one hand, the farmers’ use of patriotic invectives and the image of the
downtrodden <i>narod</i> (nation, people) is
precisely the ideological cornerstone of Putin’s regime. Given the brazenly
public nature of the open letter, Putin arguably cannot afford to do nothing
lest his carefully cultivated image as the “fatherly tsar” and a “people’s
champion” lose some of its luster. Yet, resolving this problem to the
satisfaction of the farmers risks alienating elites who draw succor from the
corruption currently tolerated. On the other hand, the timing of the letter
just before the September 18 Duma elections is undoubtedly designed to have
maximum impact on the administration. In many ways, the letter forms an
interesting juxtaposition to the formal process of elections and a recognition
that trying to influence the regime through conventional means is futile. Many
believe that change to the Putin system will come from regional politics; the
further development of this case will test that proposition.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-64687239626076296322016-07-20T17:54:00.002-04:002016-07-20T17:54:52.898-04:00Brexit and Baltic Security—320,000 Balts May Have to Go Home<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XQpH8lHA954/V4_zDRiws2I/AAAAAAAABcA/NGOlPXKBIMkbbV2RLIRVZt5wfTK2RRZmQCLcB/s1600/Balts%2Bin%2BUK%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B20%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="226" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XQpH8lHA954/V4_zDRiws2I/AAAAAAAABcA/NGOlPXKBIMkbbV2RLIRVZt5wfTK2RRZmQCLcB/s320/Balts%2Bin%2BUK%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B20%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Many have speculated that the United
Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union will have negative consequences for
the countries of Eastern Europe in general and the Baltic States in particular
because London—hitherto one of the most outspoken defenders of those countries—will
no longer be a participant in European forums. That may ultimately be the most
serious consequence of Brexit for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. But there is a
more immediate danger, one that at least some in Moscow hope will harm the
three, simultaneously isolating them from the West and making their governments
more susceptible to Russian pressure.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">At present, there are nearly a third of
a million Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian citizens working in the UK. Negotiations
on the terms of Britain’s exit from the EU have not yet started. But if the
final deal compels the 200,000 Lithuanians, 100,000 Latvians and 20,000
Estonians in the UK to go home, their arrival <i>en masse</i> could create serious economic and thus political problems
for Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius. Such a sudden wide-scale return of Balts to
their home countries would directly raise the issue of finding work for the
returnees and indirectly call into question how Estonians, Latvians and
Lithuanians will view Europe in the future. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In a discussion of this prospect,
Moscow commentator Sergey Orlov points out that Lithuanians are among the
European nations most liable to seek work abroad; and they are especially likely
to find it in the UK. Indeed, at the present time, almost 1 out of every 14
Lithuanians is working there. Not surprisingly, he says, Lithuanian officials
are worried about what will happen if all or even most of these are suddenly
required to go home. The Lithuanian ambassador in London, for example, has
called on Lithuanians working there to protest any such decision and to
complain vigorously to the authorities about any cases of anti-Lithuanian incidents
on the British Isles (<a href="http://svpressa.ru/world/article/152605/">Svpressa.ru</a>, July 15).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The situation with regard to Estonians
and Latvians now working in the UK is similar—there are reports of anti-Baltic
sentiment among Brits as well as growing anger among all Balts that some in the
UK are treating them as less than fully European. But the reactions of Tallinn
and Riga have been more muted, not only because the numbers of people involved
are smaller—and in the case of Estonia, much smaller—but also because their
size relative to their domestic labor forces or populations are smaller as
well.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Nevertheless, the Russian commentator says
that in the coming weeks, the impact of the problems of returning workers in
all three countries are likely to intensify, raising questions about the
relationship between the Baltic States and Europe and, thus, about whether
these countries should begin to go their own way and come to some kind of
better understanding with their eastern neighbor, the Russian Federation. That
is unlikely. Much more likely would be a retreat into some kind of hyperbolic
nationalism of the kind that has already affected some other Central and Eastern
European states. But that will work to Moscow’s advantage as well by isolating
these countries further from the West and reducing the willingness of the West
to defend them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">That is what Russians like Orlov hope for; and his <i>schadenfreude</i> about Baltic workers
coming back after Brexit is clearly on display in the title of his article
“Suitcase, Railroad Station, Lithuania,” which echoes the slogan some
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians advanced concerning ethnic Russians living
there 20 years ago.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-44630632820939571872016-07-15T15:57:00.000-04:002016-07-15T15:57:06.209-04:00Is It Time for an Updated ‘Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations?’<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8-sdI1jjx_Y/V4k_8447e-I/AAAAAAAABbo/n3AZF7uZs1I28g43BZIqHfjMgWH0Nx2CwCLcB/s1600/Flags%2BABN%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B15%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8-sdI1jjx_Y/V4k_8447e-I/AAAAAAAABbo/n3AZF7uZs1I28g43BZIqHfjMgWH0Nx2CwCLcB/s320/Flags%2BABN%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B15%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="235" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The strength and longevity of the
West’s anti-Communist effort during the Cold War rested on two alliances that
no longer exist. The first was the alliance between those committed to
democracy and freedom and those committed to free market capitalism; the second
linked together those who opposed Communism as a system and those who fought
Moscow’s imperialist approach to the non-Russian peoples. It seems little
chance exists that the first alliance is about to re-form anytime soon—the
interests of the two sides have diverged beyond any reconciliation. But
Vladimir Putin’s increasingly authoritarian and imperialist policies mean that
the second might well be reconstituted, although in exactly what form is
unclear.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">What a new alliance of pro-democracy
and anti-imperial national movements might look like is far from clear. Yet, some
ideas about both the nature and strength of such a combination can be gleaned
from a consideration of the history of the most prominent of its Cold War
antecedents, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations—or, as it was almost invariably
known by both supporters and opponents, the ABN. Earlier this month, historian
Vladislav Bykov posted an article about that on the <i>Rufabula</i> portal (<a href="https://rufabula.com/articles/2016/07/05/freedom-volunteers">Rufabula</a>,
July 5).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Bykov points out that 2016 is “a
jubilee year” in the history of global anti-Communism: the 70<sup>th</sup>
anniversary of the creation of the ABN, and the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of
its dissolution at a time when its organizers believed they had achieved their
goals and that these achievements were irreversible. The ABN was created in
Munich, on April 16, 1946, by people who had fled the advance of Soviet Communism
and were committed to the overthrow of the Communist regime and to the
formation of nation-states across the region.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Its founding document declared: “In the
name of the great goals of human progress, the freedom of nations and the
freedom of peoples, the struggle with Bolshevism has decisive importance. We
are the national-liberation anti-Bolshevik center consisting of organizations
from countries enslaved and despoiled by Bolshevism. We are struggling for
independence. In this struggle, we are uniting our forces for the achievement
of the common goal of liberation and are establishing the Anti-Bolshevik Block
of Peoples.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Ukrainians played a central role in the
organization of the ABN, but there were also Turkestanis, Belarusians,
Hungarians, Slovaks, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and ultimately more than
20 different nations, not only from behind the Iron Curtain in Europe and
within the borders of the Soviet Union, but of peoples in Africa, Asia and
Latin America who were also struggling with Communism and imperialism.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Drawing on the ideas of the pre-1939
Promethean League, the ABN made its core principle “anti-imperialism” because
its founders considered Bolshevism to be “the latest reincarnation of the
Moscow Empire.” Many Russians shared their views, but the ABN did not include
them, because its leaders “did not trust Russians,” Bykov points out. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">For 40 years until his death, Yaroslav
Stetsko was the president of the ABN, a man whose career went from the
Ukrainian underground to a Polish jail to a Nazi prison camp and, ultimately,
to a dinner in his honor given by United States President Ronald Reagan. On his
death in 1986, his widow, Yaroslava Stetsko, succeeded him. Earlier, she had
been in charge of the organization’s publications, including the still valuable
<i>ABN Correspondence</i>, which was
published in Munich in English, German and French.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Today, 70 years after the ABN was
founded, reasons have been multiplying for creating something like it for the
future. Vladimir Putin has attacked both democracy and the rights of
nationalities; and those opposed to his policies—and they include many ethnic Russians,
it should be said—may want an organization that seeks to defend against the
Kremlin leader’s attacks, especially because it is important that democracy
inform the rights of nations and the rights of nations inform democracy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But it remains to be seen whether this
is possible. On the one hand, there are far fewer people in the West than there
were in 1946 who have experienced on their own skins Moscow’s brutality and far
less interest in the West in assuming any additional responsibilities with regard
to promoting these values. The remaining groups are divided between these two
sets of values as well as among the various nations involved. And many in the
West now cast doubt on the entire enterprise of democracy promotion, let alone
the defense of the rights of nations to self-determination however defined.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On the other, however, as Putin’s actions continue,
ever more people both in the former Soviet space and more broadly are seeking
to oppose him by as many different tactics as possible. A new ABN, one
committed to uniting the values of the defense of democracy and the defense of
national rights, could provide a focus for many and thus promote the
combination of values that the United Nations in general and the West in
particular have long declared that they support. Consequently, at the very
least, this anniversary and the appearance of Bykov’s article provides the
occasion for discussing this possibility.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-18885464248330969432016-07-14T16:46:00.004-04:002016-07-14T16:46:55.629-04:00Moscow’s Donbas ‘Curators’ Seek to Quell Panic Among Soldiers in Separatist Donetsk<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-6S08RJslGzI/V4f6H4naNzI/AAAAAAAABbQ/DL4K5Y-bTwYfQF5_AgRNm_ScRwzmvP2WACLcB/s1600/DPR%2Bsoldiers%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B14%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="182" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-6S08RJslGzI/V4f6H4naNzI/AAAAAAAABbQ/DL4K5Y-bTwYfQF5_AgRNm_ScRwzmvP2WACLcB/s320/DPR%2Bsoldiers%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B14%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">One of the darkest parts of the murky
history of Moscow’s “hybrid” war in Ukraine is the role of Russian “curators”—the
Russian advisors who direct the activities of the military and civilian
structures in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (DPR, LPR)
on the basis of orders they receive directly from the Kremlin. Most of the
time, these people operate in the background and even use false names in order
to hide who they are and what they are doing. But a recent incident of panic in
pro-Moscow militia units forced some of them to blow their cover as it were, inviting
closer attention to the types of roles played by Moscow operatives that the
Western media rarely discuss.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A week ago (July 7), Ukrainian monitors
noted the spread of “mass panic” among soldiers of the first army corps
(Donetsk) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (<a href="http://apostrophe.com.ua/news/politics/2016-07-07/razvedka-pokazala-kogo-putin-prislal-na-donbass-podavlyat-paniku-boevikov/64691">Apostrophe.com.ua</a>,
July 7). In order that this panic not lead to disorder in frontline units and
possibly even the collapse of the pro-Moscow structures there, “Russian curators”
were dispatched to sort things out, sending some of those who were spreading
panic to military jails and reassigning others to units in the rear (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/908198525975470">Facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk</a>,
July 7; <a href="https://www.charter97.org/ru/news/2016/7/8/212496/">Charter97</a>,
July 8).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In reporting on this incident, Dmitry
Tymchuk, the coordinator of the <i>Information
Resistance Group</i>, commented that “the Russian curator of ‘the Republican
Guard’ of the DPR, a colonel of the armed forces of the Russian Federation who
operates under the code name ‘Berkut,’ promised to personally get involved in
the case and supervise the course of ‘the investigation.’ ” But even
Tymchuk, who is one of the closest observers of what Russia is doing in Donbas
rarely references these “curators” (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/908198525975470">Facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk</a>,
July 7). Consequently, it is worth asking who and what they are.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The “curator” system has its roots in
the early Soviet period, when Moscow routinely dispatched special
plenipotentiary representatives to various places to sort out problems, promote
Moscow’s policies, and impose control over local and regional officials. Vladimir
Putin’s establishment of the presidential plenipotentiaries over the federal
districts a decade ago is one heir of that tradition. The curators in Donbas
are another, where they are apparently being used the same way they have been
in other frozen conflicts across the former Soviet space.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The curators for the DPR and LPR are
organized in a pyramid. At the top is Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s prime
troubleshooter, who oversees two curator offices in Moscow—one for the DPR and
a second for the LPR—consisting of public relations specialists, military
experts, economists and others. The next level, which appears to include far
more people, are the “republic” curators who operate with staffs in the
capitals of the two breakaway republics, communicating to officials there what
the Kremlin wants and imposing Moscow’s will as much as possible. And the final
level, by far the largest, includes individuals from the Russian Federation who
are attached to military units, political organizations, newspapers and radio
stations, as well as other distinct institutions. These people carry out the
orders they have received from above (<a href="http://www.ukrpolitic.com/?p=7551&lang=ru">Ukrpolitic.com</a>,
November 15, 2015).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="line-height: 107%;">Those Ukrainian officials who have looked into
Russia’s curator system say that it is critically important that Kyiv identify
by name and position all these people not only so as to understand the exact
“algorithm” by which Moscow is orchestrating things in the DPR and LPR but also
to be in a position to track what the Kremlin is likely to do next given the
insatiability of Russian aspirations in Ukraine (</span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><a href="http://www.ukrpolitic.com/?p=7551&lang=ru">Ukrpolitic.com</a>,
November 15, 2015).</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-44104449472897708292016-07-01T15:49:00.000-04:002016-07-01T15:49:08.003-04:00Moscow Seeks to Isolate Finno-Ugric Peoples in Russia From Those in the West<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-eG9BCxptDDI/V3bJF_DJUDI/AAAAAAAABa4/Zy54oSkmdTEXPx-nLxp-jmykVXLgSj8gQCLcB/s1600/Finno-Ugric%2Bcongress%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B1%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-eG9BCxptDDI/V3bJF_DJUDI/AAAAAAAABa4/Zy54oSkmdTEXPx-nLxp-jmykVXLgSj8gQCLcB/s320/Finno-Ugric%2Bcongress%2B-%2BBlog%2BJuly%2B1%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By
Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Twenty
of the 24 Finno-Ugric peoples live on the territory of the Russian Federation,
and more than 3 million of the 25 million people in the Finno-Ugric world are
citizens of that country. Since 1991, the three Finno-Ugric countries in the
West—Estonia, Finland and Hungary—have sought to develop relations with their
co-ethnics in Russia. The latter have welcomed such initiatives and
participated in a variety of cooperative ventures, including a series of world
congresses of the Finno-Ugric peoples. In general, the members of this group continue
to be enthusiastic about these contacts. But the latest such meeting, held on June 15–17
in the Finnish city of Lyakhti, highlighted a disturbing new trend: efforts by
Moscow to cut the Finno-Ugric peoples of Russia off from their Western counterparts.
Such Russian actions not only recall the worst excesses of the Soviet period but
also cast a dark shadow on the future of the Finno-Ugric peoples under Moscow’s
control.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Andrey
Tuomi, a Karelian journalist for <i>Vesti
Karelii</i>, says that as a result of Moscow’s policies and in spite of the
desires of the Finno-Ugric nations in Russia, a yawning “gulf” is opening up
“between the Russian and Western parts of the Finno-Ugric world that was
earlier a single whole.” He argues that this
means that such sessions as the recent congress, as happy as they make all
delegates and observers given the personal contacts they can make, have become
“a dialogue of the deaf with the blind” between “two worlds and two realities.”
Tuomi’s words are a devastating conclusion for someone who has invested so much
of his career to promoting contacts among all Finno-Ugric peoples (<a href="http://finugor.ru/news/my-izgoi-finno-ugorskogo-mira">Finugor.ru</a>, June 24).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The
three European Finno-Ugric countries were represented at the congress by their
presidents and delegations as large or larger than any they had sent in the
past. Whereas Russia was represented by a deputy minister of culture, Aleksandr
Zhuravsky, and delegations that Moscow reduced the size of in order to ensure they
included more officials and fewer activists.
But it was what Zhuravsky said that provides the clearest indication of
where Moscow is heading in this area.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">If the Finno-Ugric
presidents talked about problems and possibilities, Tuomi says, the Russian
representative had a message that can be summed up in a single phrase: “Russia
has done everything possible for the preservation of national cultures and
languages, but European partners cannot understand this.” Zhuravsky’s speech
was “quite aggressive and accusatory and did not fail to mention sanctions.” Finally,
perhaps most outrageously for the Finno-Ugric peoples, the Russian official collectively
dismissed them as “aborigines living on the territory of the Russian state” who
need to “be shown their place in the imperial system of values.”</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-37936933080556391382016-06-27T16:21:00.002-04:002016-06-27T16:21:33.512-04:00Putin’s ‘Hybrid War’ Against Russia’s Smallest Nationalities<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-EdHQ0dzy62o/V3GKsPTTKrI/AAAAAAAABag/P-9gwSDjiboGQoXL90mvYKGREZILqnbPQCLcB/s1600/Udege%2Bpeople%2B-%2BBlog%2BJune%2B27%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="166" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-EdHQ0dzy62o/V3GKsPTTKrI/AAAAAAAABag/P-9gwSDjiboGQoXL90mvYKGREZILqnbPQCLcB/s320/Udege%2Bpeople%2B-%2BBlog%2BJune%2B27%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Moscow’s approach to the country’s smallest
non-Russian nationalities has historically been measured by the opening and
closing of schools, the level of support for non-Russian language institutions,
the share of officials from indigenous nationalities in key positions, and so
on. Over the past decade, the Russian government’s approach has not been good
even on these measurements. But lately, Vladimir Putin has adopted a “hybrid”
strategy that is even more negative: specifically, the Russian government has
been relying on market forces as well as on the use of nominally
ethnically-neutral regulations to undermine or coerce some of Russia’s smallest
nationalities. Both hit these minute groups far harder than the surrounding
ethnic-Russian communities. Thus, this “hybrid” strategy must be factored into
any assessment of Putin’s nationality policy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Like its Soviet predecessors, the Putin
regime has ignored the rights of indigenous peoples whenever the recognition of
these rights limit top–down economic development goals. That has been
particularly true in the development of the oil and natural gas industry in Russia’s
northern regions, where Moscow has tilted the playing field against the
indigenous populations and in favor of the oil and gas developers (<a href="http://www.slideshare.net/ZirconResearchGroup/ss-41688859">Slideshare.net</a>,
November 18, 2014; <a href="http://7x7-journal.ru/item/80841">7x7-journal.ru</a>,
May 4, 2016; <a href="http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/05/moscows-drive-for-oil-pushing-peoples.html">Windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com</a>,
May 11, 2016). In recent weeks, the central government has done the same thing
with regard to the coal industry, allowing its leading firms to ride roughshod
over the claims of the indigenous ethnic groups (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/ipRightsWatch.Russia/">Facebook.com/ipRightsWatch.Russia</a>,
accessed June 27).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Perhaps even more important to the fate
of the smaller nationalities of Russia—that is, those with fewer than 100,000
members each—Moscow has ended many of its subsidies to them and left them to
face market forces alone. Inevitably, this has the effect of limiting the
ability of these communities to have media and schools in their own languages,
and it forces members of these groups to shift to Russian as their primary
language (for examples of this trend in the Middle Volga, see <a href="http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/since-putin-came-to-office-more-than.html">Windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com</a>,
November 10, 2015).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Two Russian policies announced in
recent weeks show that calling Putin’s approach to the smaller nationalities a
“hybrid” war is fully justified—specifically, his government is achieving
certain goals by taking indirect actions while denying that this is what Moscow
is doing. The two cases have not attracted much attention because they involve
two groups who live in the Russian Far East: the Orochi, who number under a
thousand, and the Udege, who number approximately 1,500.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In the former case, Russian authorities
issued a ban on the use of nets to catch fish, something that they have pointed
out affects members of all groups. But the reality is that it hits the Orochi
and other traditional peoples hardest because that is their primary means of
securing enough food (<a href="http://www.vostokmedia.com/12-06-2016/n289214.html">Vostokmedia.com</a>,
June 12). And in the latter case, Russian officials have ignored a court order
requiring them to hand over land that the Udege have traditionally used for raising
food, apparently convinced that there is no reason that the members of that
nationality should be so privileged (<a href="https://regnum.ru/news/society/2147785.html">Regnum</a>, June 22).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">More such cases undoubtedly exist. Indeed, by using
such “hybrid” means, Putin achieves what earlier Russian rulers could not: the
destruction of ancient and unique cultures of peoples who have, often
inadvertently, stood in the way of Moscow’s economic goals.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-75777055882222856852016-06-22T15:23:00.000-04:002016-06-22T15:23:00.475-04:00Ethnic Balance Shifting Against Moscow East of the Urals<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9juEI_g8vnc/V2rlXqMwlOI/AAAAAAAABaI/Sezk09DulpUsyMVkbQoKZTi-cgAkxiIxwCLcB/s1600/Yakutsk%2B-%2BBlog%2BJune%2B22%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="199" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9juEI_g8vnc/V2rlXqMwlOI/AAAAAAAABaI/Sezk09DulpUsyMVkbQoKZTi-cgAkxiIxwCLcB/s320/Yakutsk%2B-%2BBlog%2BJune%2B22%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In Soviet times, the predominantly
Russian Slavic share of the population east of the Urals rose to 80 percent,
overwhelming the non-Russians there and ensuring Moscow’s control. This eastward
migration of Slavs came about both as a result of state coercion under Joseph Stalin
and thanks to large subsidies for workers prepared to live far from European
Russia. But with the collapse of subsidies starting in Mikhail Gorbachev’s time,
the Slavic share of the population in that enormous region has fallen to 60
percent, with the non-Slavic share rising to 40 percent. If current trends
continue, the two groups will be roughly equal in size within a decade, and the
non-Russians will be a majority within two—a shift that parallels but is far
greater and more rapid than that of Russia as a whole.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">That is the conclusion of Yury
Aksyutin, a specialist on demography and ethnic regions, in an article in the
current issue of <i>Novyye Issledovaniya
Tuvy</i> (<a href="http://www.tuva.asia/journal/issue_30/8680-aksyutin.html">Tuva.asia</a><span class="MsoHyperlink">, June 2). Aksyutin focuses on the
change in the ethnic composition of populations of specific regions and
republics. His research shows non-Russians increasing relative to Russians in
many of these territories even more rapidly than they are in Siberia and the
Russian Far East as a whole. If anything, this trend is intensifying as aging
Russian populations die off or depart and younger non-Russian groups have more
children—even though their fertility rates are falling toward all-Russia
averages, as Russian scholars invariably point out.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span class="MsoHyperlink">This trend has important
domestic and foreign policy implications. Domestically, it almost certainly
means that non-Russians in the titular republics will demand more positions be
given to them rather than to Russian minders. This could set the stage for
conflicts both within the political elite and in broader society, between the
newly self-confident rising non-Russian populations and the declining and
departing ethnic-Russian ones. If Moscow concedes the point to the
non-Russians, it will have less leverage over these areas; if it does not, it
will face a new round of rising nationalism and various kinds of ethnic
assertiveness, possibly including a restart of the parade of sovereignties,
which in the early 1990s threatened to break apart the Russian Federation (</span><a href="http://asiarussia.ru/news/12629/">Asiarussia.ru</a><span class="MsoHyperlink">, June 17).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">And internationally, it has an
impact on Russian national security. Compared to ethnic Russians, the
non-Russians in Siberia and the Russian Far East are far more welcoming of the
Chinese and Mongolians, viewing them as fellow Asiatics who have also been
oppressed by “European” colonial powers. That has already led to a resurgence
of pan-Mongol thinking about the Tuvins and to greater cultural and economic
ties between Beijing and leaders of the non-Russian regions of Russia east of
the Urals. As the population shift continues and the Russian economy declines, such
relationships will only multiply and deepen, adding to Moscow’s security
concerns about the expansion of Chinese influence there. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<br /></div>
<span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">One immediate consequence is
already apparent: Many of the non-Russians in this region are choosing to study
Chinese as their preferred second or third language and are attending
universities in China.</span></span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-39958707103785093912016-06-20T13:33:00.002-04:002016-06-20T13:33:15.565-04:00Volga Tatars in Iran Being Turkmenified<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9fy8V-dkksU/V2govmAwrZI/AAAAAAAABZw/AsjRujPUuRgkgxKr3g609EQVD6kVLaSpACLcB/s1600/Tatars%2Bin%2BIran%2B-%2BBlog%2BJune%2B20%252C%2B2016.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9fy8V-dkksU/V2govmAwrZI/AAAAAAAABZw/AsjRujPUuRgkgxKr3g609EQVD6kVLaSpACLcB/s320/Tatars%2Bin%2BIran%2B-%2BBlog%2BJune%2B20%252C%2B2016.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Many observers are aware that ethnic
Azerbaijanis constitute more than a quarter of the population of Iran, but
fewer have taken note of the fact that other Turkic groups from the Russian
Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are present in that country
and are undergoing some remarkable ethnic and political transformations.
Perhaps the largest of these, and certainly the one with the most resonance in
Russia today, are the Volga Tatars, who arrived in several waves over the last
century but who are treated by the Iranians as Turkmens and, consequently, are
being “Turkmenified.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A rare window on that community was
recently provided by Kazan’s <i>Real Time</i>
news agency, which has both interviewed specialists on Turkic groups in Iran
and conducted its own research into a national diaspora few have ever heard of (Real
Time, <a href="http://realnoevremya.ru/today/33020">June 2</a><span class="st">,
</span><a href="http://realnoevremya.com/today/457">3</a><span class="MsoHyperlink">).
The reason for this new focus lies in Kazan not Iran: Recently, under pressure
from Moscow, Kazan Federal University closed its Tatar studies faculty; and the
<i>Real Time</i> news agency has been
publishing materials on Tatar communities abroad in order to make the argument
that Kazan needs to restore that scholarly center in order to keep track of
developments across the Volga Tatar world.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span class="MsoHyperlink">Volga Tatars
have resided in what is now Iran for more than a millennium, but the largest
recent group to arrive was composed of those who fled Soviet power in the 1920s
and 1930s, for religious or ethnic reasons. No one knows exactly how many Volga
Tatars live in Iran. (Some estimates put their number in Iran as high as
30,000.) The Iranian census avoids asking about ethnic identities. And according
to experts like Gorgun University’s Arazmuhamad Sarly, himself an ethnic
Turkmen, many of the Volga Tatars have assimilated to the Turkmen community and
are viewed both by most Turkmens and almost all Persians as part of that
community given that they have learned Turkmen, intermarry routinely, and share
culture activities. One of the few remaining distinctions is that, in many
places, the Volga Tatars still prefer to be buried in their own national
cemeteries </span>(<a href="http://realnoevremya.ru/today/33020">Real Time</a>, June 2<span class="MsoHyperlink">). <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span class="MsoHyperlink">Turkmen-language
publications currently exist in Iran, and many of them contain stories about
the Volga Tatars in Iran and in their homeland. But so far, according to Sarly,
the Volga Tatars of Iran do not have their own publications or public
associations, preferring instead to participate in those of the Turkmens, who
are estimated to number as many as 100,000 in Iran. The Turkmen scholar told
the Kazan news agency that he would welcome cooperation with Tatarstani
scholars to study this group </span>(<a href="http://realnoevremya.ru/today/33020">Real Time</a>, June 2<span class="MsoHyperlink">). <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">It will be interesting to see
whether Moscow promotes or allows such contacts to take place. On the one hand,
the Russian government would certainly like to have more information about a
potential ally, however small, within Iran that it could use to pressure
Tehran. But on the other, Moscow may be quite reluctant to allow Tatarstan to
be the point of contact because of the possibility that religious influence
could flow from Iran into the Middle Volga region.</span></span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-54956719765179379062016-05-31T11:23:00.002-04:002016-05-31T11:23:24.459-04:00Hitherto Secret Communist Party Documents Corroborate Evidence That Holodomor Was ‘Genocide’<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-lVnzBXow5S4/V02sTrn0_zI/AAAAAAAABZY/6FWGozaKEdga6YVSPevwtbVvmfBiy2nGQCLcB/s1600/Holodomor%2Bdocuments%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B31%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="180" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-lVnzBXow5S4/V02sTrn0_zI/AAAAAAAABZY/6FWGozaKEdga6YVSPevwtbVvmfBiy2nGQCLcB/s320/Holodomor%2Bdocuments%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B31%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">It is a hallmark of the post–World War
II era: those peoples who have been subject to mass murder, expulsion from
their homelands, or other crimes intended to destroy them as an ethnic
community have wanted the world to identify what happened to them as a “genocide.”
Meanwhile, those who have inflicted such violence have generally done
everything they could to deny the charge. This type of denial is often relatively
easy because, with a few horrific exceptions, no leader declares in advance that
he is planning to commit “genocide.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Consequently, there is usually a fight
between the one side and the other. But definitive evidence is routinely scarce
that the actions of one state against an ethnic group or nation rise to the
level of “genocide” as first defined by Raphael Lemkin to describe the
Holocaust and as codified in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
December 1948.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Even Robert Conquest, in his
magisterial study of the Soviet-orchestrated famine in Ukraine, <i>The Harvest of Sorrow</i> (1986), could
provide only circumstantial and indirect evidence that what Joseph Stalin did
to the Ukrainians was “genocide.” And even though nearly three out of four
Ukrainians and most people of good will have been convinced on the basis of his
research and that of others that the killing of 4.5 million Ukrainians by
organized hunger in 1932–1933 was, indeed, an act of “genocide,” many scholars
and governments dispute that. They no longer question, as some did earlier,
that there was mass murder, but they argue that it was conducted against a
class, the peasantry, and thus does not fall under the definition of “genocide.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">That makes the appearance of documents
proving that what the Soviet government did was in fact directed at an ethnic
community and therefore genocide especially important. A collection of the
originals of such documents is now on public view at the Kyiv Memorial to the
Victims of the Holodomor. And both singly and collectively, they show that
Moscow systematically carried out a policy of replacing Ukrainians who had died
with ethnic Russians and Belarusians, thus transforming the ethnic composition
of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and, consequently, its successor,
the Republic of Ukraine. Such actions, intended to destroy or at least
undermine the existence of the Ukrainian nation fall within the UN definition (<a href="http://censor.net.ua/photo_news/336358/v_muzee_golodomora_pokazali_sekretnye_dokumenty_o_planovom_zaselenii_russkimi_obezlyudevshego_posle">Censor.net.ua</a>,
May 15, 2015).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The curators of the Kyiv museum are
convinced that the documents they have put on view about Moscow’s policies of
replacing Ukrainians with Russians and Belarusians not only mean that the
Soviet state stands guilty of “genocide,” but also shows that what the
Bolsheviks did in that regard almost 90 years ago, “in part explains the
separatism in the East of contemporary Ukraine.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The <a href="http://censor.net.ua/photo_news/336358/v_muzee_golodomora_pokazali_sekretnye_dokumenty_o_planovom_zaselenii_russkimi_obezlyudevshego_posle">Censor.net.ua</a>
portal posts pictures of some of these documents. And after reading them, it is
exceedingly difficult for anyone of good will to avoid these devastating
conclusions.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-82695613215449224292016-05-20T14:27:00.003-04:002016-05-20T14:27:47.480-04:00Migration Flows—and Not Just Russian Flight—a Problem for Kazakhstan<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-5RW9yFc3AVs/Vz9W_N2NWJI/AAAAAAAABZA/PqgADdejczoLFfUUYAaf7LEwWdyctdiRgCLcB/s1600/Kazakhstan%2Bmigration%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B20%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="178" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-5RW9yFc3AVs/Vz9W_N2NWJI/AAAAAAAABZA/PqgADdejczoLFfUUYAaf7LEwWdyctdiRgCLcB/s320/Kazakhstan%2Bmigration%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B20%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Almost all discussions about migration to
and from Kazakhstan focus on the departure of ethnic Russians and other Russian
speakers since 1991. This emigration wave has increased the dominance of the
titular nationality there. But while the Russian exodus has cost Kazakhstan
some of its more highly educated specialists, it has generally not created the
difficulties, including outright violence, sometimes associated with other
kinds of migration. Indeed, the return of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad, illegal
immigration by various groups the state has been unable to control, and
increasingly large migration flows within the country have left some regions
without the necessary workforce and imposed untenable burdens on others.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In a new article for the <i>CentrAsia.ru</i> portal, Fazilya Yunsaliyeva
says it is important not only to look at these various kinds of migration but
also to recognize that what matters in most cases is “not so much their size as
their structure and their territorial distribution.” Even small shifts in
numbers caused by in- or outmigration can have serious consequences for a place’s
ethnic, age and gender distribution (<a href="http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1462482900">Centrasia.ru</a>, May 6).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Since 1993, the Kazakhstani government
has sought to regulate patterns of ethnic migration by means of quotas
governing not only how many people may enter the country but also affecting, if
not determining, the number leaving or moving from one region to another. And
since 2007, Astana has expanded this program to regulate not only ethnic
patterns but also the age, gender and skill sets of people on the move. Generally,
it has been successful, but not always. And as a result, migration has left
some regions without the people they need, and others with new burdens. That
reality has sparked tensions and even conflicts that in, several cases, have
involved deaths.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Among the most serious migration
problems have arisen as a result of the government’s campaign to attract
Kazakhs living abroad—a group known in the Kazakh language as “oralmans.” More
than 800,000 of them have returned from other countries in Central Asia, China,
Mongolia and the Russian Federation, but they have insisted on settling almost
exclusively in Kazakhstan’s urban centers, where their skill sets are less in
demand. Oralman immigrants have generally refused to move to more rural areas,
where they could be put to better use.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">This imbalance, Yunsaliyeva says, has
sparked conflicts between the oralmans and employers as well as between these
newcomers and native-born Kazakhs. On occasion, such situations have “ended in
bloodletting,” a euphemism for deaths and serious casualties. But these conflicts
have had yet another consequence, prompting many of the oralmans who had come
back to Kazakhstan to try to leave, this time often for Russia, Germany and
Ukraine. They have also prompted many more ethnic Russians to think about
leaving Kazakhstan, further worsening the country’s overall stock of human
capital.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Indeed, the journalist says, looking
forward one can see that while outmigration to Russia has declined since the
highs of the early 1990s, more departures by members of this community are
likely, making Kazakhstan more Kazakh but leaving it, for a time at least,
without the skilled personnel it needs for modernization.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-81460776313036182552016-05-19T18:06:00.002-04:002016-05-19T18:06:49.697-04:00Centenary of 1916 Central Asian Revolt Likely to Worsen Region’s Relations With Russia<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BKt4PFxGD_k/Vz44u5jnWfI/AAAAAAAABYo/b-gUcDHNqd8foiBnMdHUTQuA70DA31XqgCLcB/s1600/1916%2Banti-conscription%2Brevolt%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B19%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BKt4PFxGD_k/Vz44u5jnWfI/AAAAAAAABYo/b-gUcDHNqd8foiBnMdHUTQuA70DA31XqgCLcB/s1600/1916%2Banti-conscription%2Brevolt%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B19%252C%2B2016.jpg" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">One hundred years ago next month, the
tsarist administration—which had heretofore excluded Central Asians from the
military draft because of its contempt for their abilities as soldiers—was
forced by the exigencies of war to announce a draft in the most recently
occupied portion of the empire for positions in the Russian military’s rear. That
policy reversal sparked a four-month-long popular uprising in which tens of
thousands of Central Asians died. But as a result, their sense of national and
regional identity grew at the expense of any remaining loyalty to the Russian
state. As such, the June 1916 revolt set the stage not only for the Basmachi
resistance movement in the 1920s and 1930s but also for the independence of the
countries in the region.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Not surprisingly given the centrality
of that long-ago event for contemporary Central Asians and the Muslims of the
former Soviet space more generally, scholars, commentators and political
activists are beginning to put out stories about it. Such stories will inevitably
have the effect of reminding Central Asians of the attitudes of Russians toward
them and hence exacerbate feelings between the two civilizations. One of the
most important of these to have appeared thus far is a study by Tajik historian
Kamol Abdullayev, which focuses less on the conflict than on its meaning for
today (<a href="http://www.fergananews.com/articles/8964">Fergananews.com</a>,
May 12).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">While Russia succeeded in crushing the
1916 revolt, he says, it did so only at the cost of enormous political losses.
The suppression of the revolt did not strengthen the tsarist officials. Instead,
it undermined the authority of those like the <i>jadids</i> (modernist Muslims), who had hoped to work with the Russians
and be integrated into Russia on par with European minorities. Furthermore, Petrograd’s
crackdown strengthened the influence of those who argued that the only possible
Central Asian reaction to Russian rule was militant opposition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The destruction of a role for the <i>jadids</i> was, in Abdullayev’s opinion,
among the most serious consequences of the revolt and its suppression. It meant
not only the intensification of national identities and separateness from a
broader society but also undermined the prospects for a more peaceful and
democratic development of the region’s societies. And that, along with the
violence of Russia’s reactions to the revolt, highlighted not the strength of
the Russian empire but rather its weakness and its fears.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But the very most important meaning of 1916—one that
Central Asians will be focusing on now—he suggests, is that those century-old
events represented the moment when the region began to escape its “subordinate
colonial position” and become an actor with its own desires and goals that
others had to take into account. Unfortunately, Abdullayev says, the divisions that
existed among Central Asians in 1916 limited its development in that direction,
just as the continued existence of such splits does today.</span></span><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"> </span></b>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-51129388194112092752016-05-03T15:38:00.000-04:002016-05-03T15:38:18.525-04:00Words Versus Deeds: Russian Attitudes Toward NATO’s Defensive Preparations in the Baltic<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-X3dV5ixu48g/Vyj98U636yI/AAAAAAAABYU/tKPL5S7lk70bGBFnWQv5jTIncBRhty4wACLcB/s1600/Su-27%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B2%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="191" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-X3dV5ixu48g/Vyj98U636yI/AAAAAAAABYU/tKPL5S7lk70bGBFnWQv5jTIncBRhty4wACLcB/s320/Su-27%2B-%2BBlog%2BMay%2B2%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Alden Wahlstrom<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In March 2016,
Estonia received its second shipment of FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile
systems. The initial shipment was delivered last September (<a href="http://news.err.ee/v/news/defense/ae859b72-bbda-4ad1-bab3-7b36ff70c5a2/first-javelin-anti-tank-missile-systems-arrive">ERR</a>,
September 3, 2015). Estonia received the “Block 1” version of the system, the
newest model on the market. The updated systems have improved guidance, faster
flight times, and can operate at a range up to 2,500 meters. The exact number
of systems delivered and the total cost of the purchase was not made public,
but the purchase itself was financed out of the $3.4 billion in European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funding that the United States promised in 2014 (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2944004">Kommersant</a>, March 22). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">According to Estonian
Defense Minister Hannes Hanso, building up Estonia’s defense capabilities
against tanks and other armored fighting vehicles is a cornerstone of the country’s
military strategy. Estonia’s defense budget reflects just how seriously the government
takes building up its military capabilities. In February, the Estonian Ministry
of Defense announced that it is allocating $818 million for procurement over
the next four years (<a href="http://news.err.ee/v/5732c205-2ef7-48f1-a9fb-b30f2e2783f7">ERR</a>,
February 25). This is a significant commitment for a country whose entire 2015
defense budget was just over $450 million. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine have
enflamed regional domestic anxiety about territorial integrity, pushing Estonia
and its neighbors to boost their defensive capabilities, and it has prompted
the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to refocus their
attention on securing the Alliance’s eastern flanks. Of the Baltic countries,
Estonia is taking the most serious steps toward developing the capabilities
necessary to defend itself from invasion. Ruslan Pukhov, the Director of the
Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), a Moscow think tank,
thinks that Estonia’s actions need to be taken seriously. In an interview with <i>Kommersant</i>, he said, “unlike other
countries in the region, Estonia is seriously preparing for war… and Russia, as
the country that these measures are aimed at, needs to respond adequately” (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2944004">Kommersant</a>, March 22).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Estonia’s push to
further develop its military capability poses little real threat to Russia.
Russia’s Armed Forces are orders of magnitude larger than the Estonian military
in terms of active personnel. With a force of around 750,000 men, the Russian
military is larger than one half of Estonia’s entire population. This is not to
mention how entirely overwhelming Russia’s military capabilities are in
comparison to those of Estonia. Thus, it is unlikely that Estonia itself is the
real concern for Russia. Moscow is more focused on NATO’s increased activities
in the region—which is itself reacting to Russia’s growing aggression.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In response to
Estonia’s Javelin procurement and increased NATO activities in the Baltic,
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov recently said, “We need to put
an end to spreading horror stories about Russia planning to send tanks into the
Baltic States, Sofia, or Budapest. No one is planning to do that. Plans of that
sort do not exist” (<a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2016/03/24/antonov/">Lenta.ru</a>,
March 24). According to him, Baltic countries are only stoking these fears in
order to secure financial support from NATO. However, in reality, Antonov’s
remarks reflect the perpetual disconnect between what Russian officials say and
what the Russian government does.<span style="color: red;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Moscow recently
announced a major restructuring of its tank forces, which will greatly increase
Russia’s force presence in its “Western strategic direction,” along the country’s
western border. This restructuring involves changes to the 20<sup>th</sup>
Combined Arms Army and the re-formation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Army (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45278&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=827&no_cache=1#.VxUdMZMrI_U">EDM</a>,
April 5). Disbanded in 1999, the 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Army played an important
role in Russian/Soviet military history. After participating in the Battle of
Kursk, the largest tank battle to date and a turning-point victory in the
Soviet military campaign in World War II, the 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Army
continued on to help take Berlin in 1945 (<a href="http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1324525.html">Bmpd.livejournal.com</a>, June
1, 2015; <a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2016/02/01/1stguardtankarmy/">Lenta.ru</a>,
February 1, 2016). The Soviet Union’s role in helping to defeat Adolf Hitler is
a central element of the Russian political myth heavily promoted by Vladimir
Putin’s government. Thus, the revival of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Army as part
of a broader restructuring—purportedly in response to US and NATO presence along
Russia’s border—was certainly not lost on Russian officials or many of their
constituents.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But such attempts to
portray Russia as a country facing an encroaching threat from the rapid
militarization of countries along its border fall flat when contextualized in a
timeline of events in the region over the past two years. In fact, the North Atlantic
Alliance had significantly drawn down its forces in Europe prior to 2014. But Russia’s
subsequent annexation of Crimea, its direct support for separatism in eastern
Ukraine, as well as invasion of Donbas—amid claims of defending the “Russian
World”—prompted NATO’s expedited return to the region. Under these conditions, Estonia
and its neighbors rushed to build up the capacity to defend their territorial
integrity. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Estonia’s actions
and the actions of NATO as a whole directly counter the narrative that Russia
would like to promote about itself at home and abroad. Putin and other
high-ranking Russian officials have worked hard to try to portray Russia as a
guarantor of global security. Meanwhile, countries across Europe are coming out
to name Russia as a top security threat. In early March, Estonia’s defense
minister released a report that explicitly named Russia as the singular
external force threatening Estonia’s security. Shortly thereafter, Georgia’s
President Giorgi Margvelashvili named Russia the top threat to security in the
Caucasus. Likewise, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently included Russia in
a shortlist of top threats to US security (<a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2016/03/24/antonov/">Lenta.ru</a>, March 24).
Moreover, these countries are backing their words with action, proving willing
to allocate their finite resources, monetary and otherwise, to insure
themselves against the danger posed by Russian aggression and revanchism. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Russia’s reaction
to the Estonian procurement of Javelins perfectly illustrates the Kremlin’s
irritation at having its image challenged in this way. Initially, an
undisclosed source from the Russian Ministry of Defense said that talking about
Russia invading Estonia is “nonsense” and not worth discussing (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2944004">Kommersant</a>, March 22). But two
days later, Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Anatoly Antonov gave a statement
disputing the idea that Russia has plans to invade the Baltic. He continued on
to say that Russia’s top priority is preventing the spread of terrorism in
Russia and surrounding countries (<a href="http://rg.ru/2016/03/24/minoborony-prizvalo-prekratit-sochiniat-strashnye-skazki-o-rossii.html">Rg.ru</a>,
March 24). The chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Aleksei
Pushkov, weighed in shortly thereafter, saying that the West is not prepared to
partner with Russia in a united anti-terrorism coalition, but instead the West
“makes a lot of noise about the necessity to defend the Baltics, which is under
no threat, from Moscow” (<a href="http://rg.ru/2016/03/25/pushkov-zapad-ne-gotov-k-edinoj-antiterroristicheskoj-koalicii.html">Rg.ru</a>,
March 25). Pushkov’s sentiments reflected the Kremlin line, voiced later by
officials in the presidential administration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Conspicuously, officials
in Moscow opted for a strategy of linking the discussion of developments in the
Baltic States to the subject of international terrorism. Essentially, this is a
continuation of the Kremlin’s informational strategy showcased in Syria. Among
Russia’s goals for entering Syria was the desire to promote Russia’s status as
an indispensable guarantor of global security and to discredit western claims
that Russia is a threat. Thus, by presenting the spread of global terrorism as
an alternative danger, Russia is currently trying delegitimize NATO activity in
Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, Moscow is painting NATO’s defensive
preparations on the Alliance’s eastern flank as a misallocation of resources caused
by the West’s misreading of the global threat environment and a broader
unwillingness to work with Russia in order to address the “real” risks to
international security.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The NATO-Russia Council met
on April 20, for the first time since this body was suspended by the Alliance
in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, in 2014. Few had any
illusions as to any breakthroughs emerging from this meeting; and indeed, the
two sides departed by highlighting their serious disagreements on issues of
European security (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=45354&no_cache=1#.Vyj6zEfYHHw">EDM</a>,
April 25). Meanwhile, Russian jets have repeatedly aggressively buzzed NATO
vessels and aircraft in the Baltic and prompted the NATO Baltic Air Policing
mission to scramble its planes five times in the span of a week in response to
close Russian flybys near Lithuanian airspace (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=45344&no_cache=1#.Vyj6ikfYHHw">EDM</a>,
April 21; <a href="http://www.unian.info/world/1336254-lithuania-reports-five-russian-aircraft-intercepted-by-nato-in-last-week.html">UNIAN</a>,
May 2). Clearly, Russia’s actions in the Baltic speak louder the words.</span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-31380356204416898952016-04-12T16:24:00.001-04:002016-04-12T16:24:26.112-04:00$330 Million—The Cost of Replacing a Political Rival in Russia?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-fyWa8Vka0dM/Vw1ZND8SzCI/AAAAAAAABYA/TCKZV5Af3YUtO7oF2qH0h1eyKX4ONvP_gCLcB/s1600/Sergei%2BRoldugin%2B-%2BBlog%2BApril%2B12%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-fyWa8Vka0dM/Vw1ZND8SzCI/AAAAAAAABYA/TCKZV5Af3YUtO7oF2qH0h1eyKX4ONvP_gCLcB/s320/Sergei%2BRoldugin%2B-%2BBlog%2BApril%2B12%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Alden Wahlstrom<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">How much does it
cost to replace a political rival in Russia? Can such a thing be bought? Journalist
Yulia Latynina of <i>Echo Moskvi</i> seems
to think so. On her weekly radio program “Kod Dostupa” (“Access Code”),
Latynina uncovered information supporting this idea while delving into the
financial information of Sergei Roldugin, details of which were released with
the so-called “Panama Papers.” Perhaps the
most interesting Russia-related story to come out of this massive leak involves
Roldugin, a Russian cellist and long-time friend of Putin who apparently has $2
billion stashed away in an offshore account. Excluding a select few elite
musicians—Andrew Lloyd Webber, Paul McCartney and the like—whose extreme wealth
can be directly linked to the success of their careers, a musician possessing
such sizeable assets raises legitimate questions about the origin of their
riches. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">While
investigating the transactions tied to Roldugin’s offshore account, Latynina
found one transfer of funds that is of particular interest. The transfer was
from Dagestani billionaire Suleiman Kerimov and his associated businesses to
Roldugin. Twice in 2010, Roldugin’s offshore account received money from
Kerimov—once for a sum of 4 billion rubles (about $132 million at the 2010
exchange rate), and a second time for $200 million. As Latynina asked
rhetorically on her show, why would Kerimov, a businessman, be willing to just
hand over upwards of $300 million to Roldugin at the expense of his personal
wealth and his business? One possible explanation for all of this is that it
was a business deal. However, when Latynina contextualized these transfers with
the events of Kerimov’s life at the time, this seems less likely (<a href="http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1744586-echo/">Echo Moskvi</a>, April 9).
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Apparently, in
2010, Suleiman Kerimov was engaged in infighting with Mukhu Aliyev, the then-president
of Dagestan. Aliyev, who initiated the dispute, sought to subjugate or destroy
Kerimov, putting Kerimov in an incredibly vulnerable position. However, the
tables turned rather quickly. Kerimov began saying publicly that he would
replace the president of Dagestan, and he lobbied for Magomedsalam Magomedov to
accede to the post. Shortly thereafter, Magomedov was made head of the republic.
Both these events and the transfers of money from Kerimov to Roldugin all took
place within a period of a few months (<a href="http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1744586-echo/">Echo Moskvi</a>, April 9).
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But why Roldugin? Roldugin
has been a long-time friend of Putin. And Kerimov only transferred money to
Roldugin during the period when he was politically in need. Not before. Not
after. So how does a transfer of money to Roldugin buy Kerimov a favor in a
time of need? Latynina notes that the relationship between power and money in
Russia is at once inseparable and indirect. Therefore, she speculates, no one
should believe that the $2 billion that Roldugin is in control of is entirely
at his disposal. Of course, being close to Putin has financial benefits. But
this money, naturally, is a supply of funds that would be available to Putin
should he wish to access it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Many Kremlin watchers have
been waiting for information to come from these “Panama Papers” that directly
ties Putin to cash stashed offshore. This sort of revelation is unlikely to
come from the information released last week. But the information released
therein has shed light on how corruption works in Russia. As Dr. Karen Dawisha,
author of <i>Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns
Russia?</i>, said in a recent interview on <i>RFE/RL</i>,
the Panama Papers have helped show exactly how the Putin regime moves state
funds and other money into offshore accounts for private use (<a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/podcast-putins-beautiful-launderette/27662814.html">Rferl.org</a>,
April 8). The story pertaining to Kerimov’s political rivalry in Dagestan takes
this one step further, possibly providing further insight into the confused,
intertwined relationship of power and money in today’s Russia. </span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-60251325973906427302016-03-14T13:03:00.000-04:002016-03-14T13:03:07.879-04:00Ethnic Tensions Break out in North Caucasian Federal District Capital of Pyatigorsk<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-X1ih4PAlNNE/VubuoGzakvI/AAAAAAAABXs/wBe0zsyf6hsxwqE6w2xgE6X6qqnJUSCoQ/s1600/Pyatigorsk%2Beagle%2B-%2BBlog%2BMarch%2B14%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-X1ih4PAlNNE/VubuoGzakvI/AAAAAAAABXs/wBe0zsyf6hsxwqE6w2xgE6X6qqnJUSCoQ/s1600/Pyatigorsk%2Beagle%2B-%2BBlog%2BMarch%2B14%252C%2B2016.jpg" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By
Valery Dzutsati<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">A
massive fist fight between Ingush students and ethnic Armenians in Stavropol
region reignited the discussion about North Caucasian migrants in Russian
regions. The incident took place in the city of Pyatigorsk, on February 15, but
became widely known only in March. An estimated group of 70 Ingush and an
unknown number of Armenian young men decided to use violence to settle their
differences (<a href="http://kmv.gorodskoitelegraf.ru/zhizn/11864-22-ingushskih-studenta-otchisleny-iz-vuzov-pyatigorska-iz-za-massovoy-draki.html">Kmv.gorodskoitelegraf.ru</a>,
March 3). Interestingly, a local newspaper described the incident as a fight
between “the newcomers [the Ingush] and the representatives of the local
Armenian diaspora,” as if the Ingush students were not Russian citizens. After
the police became involved, 22 Ingush students from the colleges in Pyatigorsk
were removed from their programs and sent back home to Ingushetia (<a href="http://bloknot-stavropol.ru/news/posle-massovoy-draki-iz-vuzov-pyatigorska-otchisli-717410">Bloknot-stavropol.ru</a>,
March 3).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">While
the Ingush authorities reprimanded the parents of the Ingush students for the
lack of control over their children (<a href="http://kmv.gorodskoitelegraf.ru/zhizn/11864-22-ingushskih-studenta-otchisleny-iz-vuzov-pyatigorska-iz-za-massovoy-draki.html">Kmv.gorodskoitelegraf.ru</a>,
March 3), some Ingush academics defended them. Anzhela Matieva said that the
Ingush young men were right to protect their dignity after the Armenians
allegedly disparaged the flag of Ingushetia (<a href="http://haqqin.az/news/65383">Haqqin.az</a>, March 9). Moreover, it
appears that mass street fights between the Ingush and the Armenians in
Stavropol region have become a regular occurrence in the past several years.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The
Russian government’s strategy of trying to promote a “melting pot” solution for
the North Caucasians by sending more students to the predominantly ethnic-Russian
regions has been marked by scandals. In Stavropol region, especially in its
southern part known as Kavminvody (acronym of Kavkazskie Mineralnye Vody), it
appears that various ethnic groups clash particularly often. The latest violent
episode in the region and its aftermath indicate that the various ingredients
of the Russian “melting pot” may not be incorporating harmoniously; and the
government clearly chooses to employ collective punishment to deal with these resulting
inter-ethnic conflicts.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-14146318985686328562016-02-16T12:38:00.001-05:002016-02-16T12:38:14.839-05:00After Ukraine: Russian Nationalists Return<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-SqGAXRDmB4U/VsNeWRvECVI/AAAAAAAABXY/NDCYWTaJ74Q/s1600/Russian%2Bneo-nazis%2B-%2BBlog%2BFebruary%2B16%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="183" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-SqGAXRDmB4U/VsNeWRvECVI/AAAAAAAABXY/NDCYWTaJ74Q/s320/Russian%2Bneo-nazis%2B-%2BBlog%2BFebruary%2B16%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By
Richard Arnold<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Russia’s
Neo-Nazi racist threat has not been in the news recently, but an attack on
January 17 showed that the movement is far from toothless. According to
reports, a group of young people burst onto a Moscow metro train at the station
Biblioteka Imeni Lenina and beat a group of migrants in their 30s and 40s from
Central Asia. One man fell to the ground and was kicked and punched repeatedly.
Most of the attackers fled the train at the next station, although police did
manage to arrest one of the youth. The unfortunate victim of the attack was
taken to the hospital (<a href="http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2016/02/d33778/">Sova-center.ru</a>,
February 5). The incident is notable not so much for its occurrence—such
attacks have been common in the past—but for its occurrence <i>now</i>, especially in light of the Russian
state’s effort to fight domestic neo-Nazi ideology.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">First,
although Neo-Nazi attacks had been declining slowly since 2009 (due mostly to
better police enforcement), their fall became precipitous following the
Kremlin’s annexation of Ukraine and championing of the rights of ethnic
Russians outside the country. According to the SOVA center, there were 525
violent attacks on ethnic minorities in 2009—a number which fell to just 168 in
2015 (<a href="http://www.sova-center.ru/database/">Sova-center.ru</a>,
February 2016). Such a decline can be attributed to the exodus of ethnic
Russian neo-Nazis to fight for their brethren in the “Near Abroad” (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=42481&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=756&no_cache=1#.VsNcSebYHiQ">EDM</a>,
June 11, 2014). With the fighting in Ukraine declining from its highest levels,
it is a plausible hypothesis that many neo-Nazis are returning to Russia and
renewing the fight against domestic “enemies” once more. It is worth noting
that this exactly parallels the official putative Russian justification for
intervention in Syria—fighting Islamic State terrorists in Syria would stop
them returning to Russia to continue the fight for Islamic radicalism in the
North Caucasus. Of course, in the above-mentioned case on the train, the
attackers were teenagers and young people rather than hardened combat veterans,
although sociological studies of skinhead groups have shown that gangs of youth
tend to be organized around an “old” skinhead in his mid- to late-twenties (Sergei
Belikov, “Britogolvye: Vse o Skinheadakhi” [4<sup>th</sup> Ed.] Moscow,
Ultrakultura, 2011). Should 2016 indeed witness an increased level of skinhead
violence, there would be support for the “return” hypothesis.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Second,
the January 17 attack was particularly notable for its brazenness despite the
considerable efforts of the Russian state to combat racist attitudes. The metro
station where the attack occurred—Biblioteka Imeni Lenina—is right in the heart
of Moscow and close to the Kremlin. Such an attack is thus a symbolic
refutation of the state’s campaign against neo-Nazism. Indeed, the Russian
state has launched a number of legal and administrative cases against the
display of racist symbols on the Internet and in public. For instance, a court
opened a case under article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code (incitement of
hatred on grounds of nationality) against a 19-year-old inhabitant of Kursk for
posting racist videos to VKontakte (<a href="http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2016/02/d33827/">Sova-center.ru</a>,
February 12). And a bookstore in Moscow was fined 30,000 rubles ($387) for
displaying bags with the official stamp of the chief of the Wehrmacht on them,
in contravention of laws prohibiting the open display of Nazi symbols (<a href="http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2016/02/d33822/">Sova-center.ru</a>,
February 11). Many more such cases exist of the Russian state clamping down on
the open display of racist symbols and attitudes. While the January 17 attack
does not mark the outright failure of this policy to create a more tolerant
society, it does indicate that, by itself, the approach will not be sufficient.
This is an even more urgent task as Russia gears up to invite thousands of
non-white foreigners to the country to celebrate the 2018 World Cup.</span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-70741987797088003422016-01-13T17:04:00.001-05:002016-01-13T17:05:32.637-05:00Russia’s Arctic Militarization: Words Versus Actions<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aWm-k8NyVZk/VpbJsc7M-MI/AAAAAAAABXE/HL4XjIxM1K4/s1600/S-300%2BNovaya%2BZemlya%2B-%2BBlog%2BJanuary%2B13%252C%2B2016.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="226" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aWm-k8NyVZk/VpbJsc7M-MI/AAAAAAAABXE/HL4XjIxM1K4/s320/S-300%2BNovaya%2BZemlya%2B-%2BBlog%2BJanuary%2B13%252C%2B2016.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Alden Wahlstrom<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Russia has no
plans to militarize the Arctic. At least, that is a according to Dmitry
Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister charged with overseeing Russia’s
defense industry. Speaking in St. Petersburg, on December 7, at the opening of
the forum “Arctic: Today and the Future,” Rogozin emphasized that Russia’s
rebuilding of military infrastructure in the Arctic is focused on creating the
conditions necessary for Russians to live and work peacefully in the region (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc/2872014">Kommersant</a>, December 8, 2015).
Just two days after this, however, Russia announced the opening of a major new
military installation on the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Novaya Zemlya facility
is home to the first full regiment of Russia’s Northern Fleet located on
Russia’s Arctic islands. Previously, deployments had been limited to smaller individual
units. Its primary role is to secure Russian airspace on the country’s northern
borders. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, modernized S-300
surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have been deployed to Novaya Zemlya to
achieve this. These systems, which have been modified to be able to work in Arctic
conditions, are capable of intercepting aircraft and intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) within a 400-kilometer perimeter around the site (Mil.ru, <a href="http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12071253@egNews">December
9</a>, <a href="http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12071546@egNews">10</a>,
2015; <a href="https://tvrain.ru/news/v_arktike_na_dezhurstvo_zastupil_raketnyj_polk_s_s_300-399786/">TVRain.ru</a>,
December 9, 2015). This marks a return of anti-aircraft/anti-ballistic missile
capabilities to Novaya Zemlya, last present on the island in the early 1990s (<a href="http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=397564">Interfax</a>,
December 12, 2015). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In addition to the
S-300s, the installation on Novaya Zemlya is reportedly outfitted with weapons
systems to defend from both air and sea attack. The Pantsir-S1 (NATO name:
SA-22 “Greyhound”) is a combination weapons system that includes short- to
medium-range surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. This system
is capable of engaging aircraft and missiles flying at lower altitudes and has
a 20 km range, providing air defense for the area immediately surrounding the
installation. Likewise, the Bastion-P Costal Defense System (NATO name: SSC-5)
is capable of defending the area from surface-level ships. This system uses Oniks
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (NATO name: SS-N-26 “Strobile”; also known
as the “Yakhont” in export markets). Traveling at a speed of Mach 2.5, these
missiles have a range of 120–300 km and are capable of engaging various
surfaces ships, carrier battle groups, convoys and landing crafts. Beyond
providing for the general defense of the installation on Novaya Zemlya, the
range of the Oniks missiles allows the Russians to create a choke point,
preventing the passage of ships from the Barents Sea to the Pechora Sea and onward
along the Northern Sea Route.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Further evidence
of Russia’s push to establish its presence in the Arctic can be seen in both
the organization of the Russian military and in official doctrine. In late
December 2014, Russia’s Northern Fleet left the Western Military District to
form the foundation of the newly created Arctic Joint Strategic Command.
Although it does not have the title of a military district, the Arctic Joint
Strategic Command is functionally a fifth military district responsible for
securing Russia’s entire northern border and the Arctic. This structural
reorganization, which is representative of the priority that the Kremlin is
placing on the Arctic, was intended to centralize responsibility for the
administration of this zone within the Russian military. Prior to this, these
responsibilities were spread across the Western, Central, and Eastern military
districts and the Northern and Pacific Fleets (<a href="http://topwar.ru/58099-k-nachalu-zimy-budet-sformirovano-obedinennoe-strategicheskoe-komandovanie-sever.html">TopWar.ru</a>,
September 15, 2014). The hope is that this restructuring will allow for the
more efficient and effective administration of Russia’s growing military
resources in the Arctic. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">This structural
reorganization came in the lead-up to the Russian government’s release of its
new maritime doctrine this past August (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=44276&no_cache=1#.VpbAWFLYHiQ">EDM</a>,
August 11, 2015). The Kremlin’s Arctic ambitions are reflected in the document,
which dedicates a whole section to the region. At a glance, establishing firm
control over its northern borders and the nearby Arctic zone is important to
Russia for two reasons: 1) ensuring the passage of its Northern Fleet to the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans and 2) safeguarding Russia’s access to the abundant
oil and gas resources in the area. Russia’s new Maritime Doctrine clearly
articulates both of these points. However, the doctrine also dedicates
significant attention to the increase of Russian military activity in the
Arctic and specifies that one of Moscow’s goals is to restrict foreign military
activity in the area (<a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50060">Kremlin.ru</a>,
July 26, 2015). Russia’s opening of the military installation on Novaya Zemlya
is a major step toward establishing the regional capabilities that will make
these goals a reality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The opening of the
new Russian military installation on Novaya Zemlya is all the more notable when
contextualized with Russia’s other activities in the Arctic. In conjunction
with Rogozin’s aforementioned proclamation, the opening of a new S-400 site in
Tiksi, Sakha Republic, was also announced (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc/2872267">Kommersant</a>, December 8, 2015).
Furthermore, Russia has built five other military bases on its Arctic islands
(New Siberian Islands, Alexandra Land, Severnaya Zemlya, Cape Schmidt, and
Wrangle Island) and began construction of over 440 military infrastructure
projects that were due to be completed by the end of 2015. Future projects
include the construction of a major airbase that is due to be completed by 2017
(<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc/2872014">Kommersant</a>, December 8,
2015).</span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">As a part of a
larger network of new and reopened Russian military installations in the
Arctic, the base on Novaya Zemlya is the Russian military’s largest unveiling
in the region thus far. The weapons systems deployed there give it firm control
over the Western end of the Northern Sea Route, as it exists along Russia’s
borders. Continued development in the region promises to increase Russia’s
capabilities and extend this level of control across Russia’s entire expansive
northern border. Russian officials, like Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin,
continuously emphasize that their goal is only to maintain stability and
security in the region so that life in Russia’s northernmost regions can
develop peacefully and its people can prosper from the resource wealth of the
area. Nevertheless, the reality remains that Russia is rapidly changing the
facts on the ground in the Arctic. While Moscow claims it is not trying to
militarize the High North, Russia’s rapidly expanding military presence in the
Arctic increases the possibility for conflict as other countries begin to
assert their interests in the region. </span><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-25455352995308507032016-01-07T13:11:00.001-05:002016-01-07T13:11:21.224-05:00Signs of Coming Civil Strife in Trans-Baikal Region?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-5jKm7BCrBl8/Vo6qGJpndKI/AAAAAAAABWw/yENORD6Vs4k/s1600/Decembrist%2BMuseum%252C%2BChita%2B-%2BBlog%2BJanuary%2B7%252C%2B2015.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="212" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-5jKm7BCrBl8/Vo6qGJpndKI/AAAAAAAABWw/yENORD6Vs4k/s320/Decembrist%2BMuseum%252C%2BChita%2B-%2BBlog%2BJanuary%2B7%252C%2B2015.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By
Richard Arnold<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Trans-Baikal
Region is not generally known for its contentious politics or social
disharmonies. But a recent open letter from the Public Chamber of the region to
the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of Chita suggests one could be in the offing.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On December 30, the
Trans-Baikal Public Chamber—an organization created in 2010 to resolve social
and political problems and defend civil rights in the region—addressed a letter
to the head of the city of Chita’s Orthodox Church, criticizing the suggested
transfer to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) of a building now housing a museum
dedicated to the 19<sup>th</sup> century “Decembrist” movement. The open letter
stated that “the mere posing of the question to transfer the building to the
ROC has become one of the most talked-about in the region, caused a wave of
indignation, and actually promised to split the society, threatening to develop
into civic strife… the pretensions of the Chita Metropolitan might become the
start of a dangerous split in a territory marked by peace, stability, and unity
in the Trans-Baikal region of which we are proud. We reckon that today it would
be a sign of positive historical memory, a sign of respect for people-patriots
of Russia, local pride in our region as a place of kindness and knowledge, for
the securing of social unity and peace, to preserve the Decembrist museum in
its present form” (<a href="http://www.sova-center.ru/religion/news/community-media/communities-conflicts/2015/12/d33574/">Sova-center.ru</a>,
December 30, 2015). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The museum
commemorating the Decembrists was opened in 1985 in Chita, the location of the first
cooperative community they had organized in the region. The Decembrists were
originally a group of liberal officers from the Russian army who were
encouraged by the reforms of Tsar Alexander I to demand further change and
modernization in their society. The group was made famous in the 1825
revolutionary uprising against Tsar Nicholas I, an event interpreted by some
observers after the fall of Communism as proof of Russia’s democratic heritage
and aptitude for democracy. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">At the Christmas
session of the local legislature in Chita, Metropolitan Vladimir petitioned for
the transfer of the building used to house the Decembrist museum to the ROC. Deputy
Roman Shcherbakov supported the transfer, as did the leader of the Zabaikalsky
Cossacks, Ataman Gennadi Chupin. Similarly, the consul of the Australian branch
of the Zabaikalsky Cossacks called on his followers to mobilize in defense of
the church of the Archangel Michael. Activists from the regional branch of the
Russian Union of Architects have opposed the conversion of the building into a
church; and regional authorities recently prohibited the construction of a
church on the site of a local sports stadium. Reportedly, the activists have
also contested the claims of Chita’s 140-year-old Cossack organization to a
building dating back some 300 years (<a href="http://news.chita.ru/81827/">Chita.ru</a>,
December 30). It remains to be seen how the issue will resolve itself, but the
contest is a microcosm of one of the larger social debates in Russia today. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The debate over
whether Russian national identity is an ethnic or civic category—the <i>Russki</i>/ <i>Rossianie</i> debate—has been in existence since the fall of the Soviet
Union (Valery Tishkov, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict After the Soviet
Union: The Mind Aflame,” 1997). The Decembrists are a symbol of a liberal,
civic, and inclusive sense of Russian national identity; the ROC’s attempt to
impose control over sites of popular memory symbolizes a conservative, ethnic,
and exclusive sense. Some analysts have claimed that this debate is behind the
spate of race riots in Russian cities over the past several years, including
the 2010 riots on Moscow’s Manezh Square (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=42046&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=756&no_cache=1#.Vo2RfFLiPiQ">EDM</a>,
March 5, 2014; Vera Tolz and Steven Hutchings, <i>Nation, Race, and Ethnicity on Russian Television</i>, 2015) as well as
calls to establish a segregationist regime with the North Caucasus. Debates
over Russian national identity—and the need to undermine the appeal of ethnic-Russian
nationalists by assuming elements of their agenda—are also behind Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as well as the Kremlin championing the interests of ethnic
Russians in Donbas (see <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=44518&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=786&no_cache=1#.Vo2TgVLiPiQ">EDM</a>,
October 23, 2015). Therefore, if not handled tactfully by the authorities, the
fate of a relatively minor museum in a remote Russian province could boil over
into the kind of social conflict warned about by the Trans-Baikal public
chamber.</span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-72406580259216996062015-12-21T22:10:00.000-05:002016-02-01T14:01:30.169-05:00Is the Islamic State a Threat to the Security of the Republic of Georgia?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3xkNxn_kvWE/Vni-1kBzudI/AAAAAAAABWc/VFgpGEjRerg/s1600/ISIS-GeorgianVideo-112415.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="173" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3xkNxn_kvWE/Vni-1kBzudI/AAAAAAAABWc/VFgpGEjRerg/s320/ISIS-GeorgianVideo-112415.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif;"><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">By George
Tsereteli</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif;"><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">On November
29, authorities in Tbilisi, Georgia, arrested four people accused of being
connected to the Islamic State (IS) organization. Weapons, explosive devices,
IS flags, and Islamist literature on CDs and DVDs were found in the suspects’
apartments (</span><a href="http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28817"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Civil Georgia</span></a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">,
December 1). The Georgian State Security Service announced an investigation into
whether other individuals are involved in IS-related activities on Georgian
soil. Interestingly, the four individuals were from the Guria region, and not
from the Pankisi gorge, which has in the past been a source of Islamic
extremism (</span><a href="http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/samartali/356532-wall-street-journal-i-da-new-york-times-i-sus-is-mier-isis-sthan-savaraudo-kavshiristhvis-4-piris-dakavebaze-statias-aqveyneben.html?ar=A"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Interpressnews</span></a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">,
December 1). The suspects denied the charges against them, although two of them
had allegedly appeared in a Georgian-language IS propaganda video released on
November 23. In this video, they call on Georgian Muslims to join the “Islamic
Caliphate” and issue threats against “Georgia’s infidels” (</span><a href="http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-georgia-next"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">The
Clarion Project</span></a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">, November 25). The video also mentions that Georgia has
been fighting against Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq, conflicts in which
Georgia contributed significant troop numbers to coalition military efforts. The
release of the propaganda video suggests that the Islamic State’s ideology has now
spread, at least in some small part, to Georgia’s capital city.</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">
</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif;"><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">In an
interview that aired on December 7, regional expert Mamuka Areshidze contended <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>that various organizations—which are either
affiliated with the Islamic State or wish to be—are working to build an
ideological base and foundation in Georgia and thereby gain influence. Those
who fall under this influence are taught Salafi-jihadist ideology and are
radicalized from a young age (</span><a href="http://maestro.ge/menu_id/254/id/4144/lang/1/"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Maestro</span></a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">, December 7).
This is the case not only in the Pankisi gorge, but other regions such as Adjaria
and Guria, where there are sizeable Muslim populations, and even in Tbilisi. Areshidze
went on to explain that according to IS ideology, Georgia is located within the
self-declared Caliphate’s territory; thus, when the group decides to move into
the region, it will want a loyal segment of the population already in place, ready
to welcome it.</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">
</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif;"><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">However, not
everyone believes that the Islamic State poses a serious threat to Georgia at
this time. A few days after the November 13 attacks on Paris, the deputy head
of Georgia’s State Security Service, Levan Izoria, stated that Georgia is not
among the countries with a high risk of terrorist attacks, since it is not
involved in the anti-IS air strikes carried out by the United States and its
coalition allies (</span><a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng_old/article.php?id=28779"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Civil
Georgia</span></a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">, November 17). Defense Minister Tina Khidasheli echoed this
sentiment when she announced that although additional safety and confidence measures
would be taken, such as heightened security at airports and along the border,
this would be done as a precaution and not in response to any immediate threat
(</span><a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28781"><span style="color: blue; font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Civil Georgia</span></a><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">,
November 18).</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">
</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif;"><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">One must
remember, however, that the Islamic State’s ideology and actions are not driven
solely by recent or contemporary developments; indeed, the argument that
Georgia falls within the so-called “Caliphate’s” territory is based on a historical
precedent dating back to the ninth century. Therefore, the fact that Georgia is
not involved in international coalition airstrikes against the IS in Syria and
Iraq does not preclude the possibility of future terrorist attacks on Georgian
soil by this extremist militant group.</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , serif; line-height: 107%;">Georgia is most likely not
high on the current list of priority targets for the Islamic State. And yet,
the above-mentioned recent arrests, the appearance of the Georgian-language
propaganda video, as well as the presence of IS recruiters in the Pankisi gorge
(see <a href="http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2015/06/alleged-is-recruiter-arrested-in.html"><span style="color: blue;">Jamestown
Blog</span></a>, June 22) indicate that a mobilization of Georgia’s defense, security
and information channels may in fact be necessary.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-10172570628788263592015-12-04T16:20:00.003-05:002015-12-05T23:44:14.830-05:00Armenia and Serbia Pledge Military Cooperation<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/--sVv3pDUPq4/VmIDd10glxI/AAAAAAAABWI/-_rYKi8AnbI/s1600/Bratislav%2BGa%25C5%25A1i%25C4%2587%2Bin%2BArmenia%2B-%2BBlog%2BDecember%2B4%252C%2B2015.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="213" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/--sVv3pDUPq4/VmIDd10glxI/AAAAAAAABWI/-_rYKi8AnbI/s320/Bratislav%2BGa%25C5%25A1i%25C4%2587%2Bin%2BArmenia%2B-%2BBlog%2BDecember%2B4%252C%2B2015.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">By Erik Davtyan<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">On November 24,
the Defense Minister of Serbia Bratislav Gašić arrived in Yerevan for a two-day
official visit. Interestingly, as the minister himself mentioned, this was the
first such trip to Armenia by a Serbian minister of defense. Minister Gašić met
with Armenian Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan, who stressed that “recent years’
reciprocated official visits and meetings have gone a long way toward
intensifying the political dialogue between the two countries, improving the
legal framework and deepening the ongoing cooperation within international
organizations.” As to possible areas of defense cooperation, both officials underlined
the importance of sharing their experiences in the fields of military medicine,
military education and interaction within the framework of international
peacekeeping forces (Gov.am, November 24).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">On November 25,
Minister Gašić met with his Armenian counterpart, Seyran Ohanyan. After the two
delegations discussed issues of bilateral, regional and international
importance, the Serbian and Armenian defense ministers signed a declaration on cooperation
in the field of defense (Mil.am, November 25). According to the declaration,
the bilateral defense cooperation treaty, when ultimately signed, will cover
areas like defense and security policy, military-economic cooperation,
peacekeeping missions, military scientific/technical cooperation, military
education and training, military medicine, and so on (Razm.info, November
25).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Though this was
only the first step toward establishing Serbian-Armenian military ties, the
signing of the declaration opens a new chapter in Armenia’s international
military cooperation. First, the treaty will embrace a wide span of areas of
defense cooperation, thus contributing to the more extensive development of
bilateral relations with this key Balkan country. In a wider context, Armenia will
be expanding the geographic scope of its global military partnerships. To date,
Armenia has regularly cooperated with Russia, Greece, the
United States<span lang="HY">, </span>the <span lang="HY">Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), </span>and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);
moreover, it actively participates in a number of international peacekeeping
missions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Armenian-Serbian
defense cooperation will be an impetus for further rapprochement between the
two states. On November 25, the Serbian defense minister was also received by
the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan. The Armenian head of state welcomed
the bilateral initiatives in the military field and said that “the Armenian
people attached great importance to the presence of Serbian President Tomislav
Nikolić at the events dedicated to the centennial of the Armenian Genocide [on
April 24, 2015],” describing Nikolić’s gesture as “a unique display of
friendship and solidarity that the Armenian nation will always remember and
appreciate” (President.am, November 25).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">During his visit to
Yerevan, Minister Gašić also had meetings with Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward
Nalbandian and His Holiness Garegin II, the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of
All Armenians, as well as the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly (NA) of Armenia
Hermine Naghdalyan. The NA deputy speaker emphasized the development of
inter-parliamentary relations, noting a necessity for greater cooperation in
this sphere. In particular, she has highlighted the active cooperation of the
Friendship Groups in the parliaments of the two countries (Parliament.am,
November 26). It will now be up to the mid-level bureaucrats in both
governments to turn these pledges and high expectations into concrete policy
actions.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-87476251663110505592015-11-23T11:37:00.002-05:002015-11-23T11:37:22.132-05:00Rising Discrimination Accelerates Ethnic Sorting out of Central Asia<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-C3SK38hls9k/VlNAosBQ4dI/AAAAAAAABV0/J6V_MksSLZs/s1600/kyrgyzstan-tajikistanAlai_Mountains.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="211" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-C3SK38hls9k/VlNAosBQ4dI/AAAAAAAABV0/J6V_MksSLZs/s320/kyrgyzstan-tajikistanAlai_Mountains.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: white; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #222222;">By Paul Goble</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: white; color: #222222;">None of the five republics in Central Asia were ever
ethnically homogeneous. Joseph Stalin, in fact, purposefully drew their borders
so that there would always be a local minority that he could use against the
ethnic majority, either as his agents in place or as a target on which to shift
the anger of the majority away from Moscow. Since 1991, however, all five
republics have become far more ethnically homogeneous. This has largely been the
result of people fleeing countries where they had, often, lived for many years
due to violence or the fear of violence and moving to neighboring states where they
are members of the titular nationality.</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="background: white; color: #222222;">That process had slowed in the early 2000s, but now there is
evidence that it is accelerating again, not because of violence or fear thereof,
but rather because of increasing ethnic hostility by ethnic majorities directed
against minority groups as well as discrimination against the latter in the
workplace and more generally. </span><span style="color: #222222;"> <span style="background: white;">And what is worrisome is
that xenophobic attitudes among the titular majority nationalities appear to be
far stronger among young people than among their parents, who grew up in Soviet
times when “internationalism” was highly valued.</span></span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="color: #222222;">The attitudes of the majorities and the experiences of the fleeing
minorities will make it far more difficult for the governments in the region to
deal with one another, and far more likely that at least some politicians will
exploit these ethnic hostilities to the point that border conflicts in this already
tense and unstable region will become ever more likely.</span><span style="color: #222222;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="color: #222222;">Recently
illustrative of this wider trend has been the flight of ethnic Kyrgyz from the
Dzhirgatal district of Tajikistan. </span>Many
Kyrgyz fled the region in the 1990s because of civil war. But the current
exodus, which has reduced this minority’s share of the region’s population by
an additional 50 percent, is reported by those Kyrgyz still living in the
region to be due to “discrimination on an ethnic and racial basis.” <span style="color: #222222;">And they add that younger ethnic Tajiks are far more
likely to display anti-Kyrgyz attitudes than the older generation, which was
born and grew up in Soviet times (<a href="http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1447428060">Centrasia.ru</a>,
November 13).</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="color: #222222;">Local officials play down the problem and say that the departure
of anyone from their region is entirely voluntary, the result of personal
social and economic problems of kinds found everywhere. But local
Kyrgyz residents dispute this, pointing to frequent discrimination against them.
At least a third of them say that they hope to leave once they save up enough money
to do so and find a place in Kyrgyzstan to move to.</span><span style="color: #222222;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; margin-bottom: .1pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: .1pt; mso-para-margin-bottom: .01gd; mso-para-margin-left: 0in; mso-para-margin-right: 0in; mso-para-margin-top: .01gd;">
<br /></div>
<span style="color: #222222;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">One Kyrgyz resident of Dzhirgatal told a <i>CentrAsia</i> journalist that he could not
find work “only because he is a Kyrgyz,” adding that his patience with the
situation was running out. Another Kyrgyz there, a taxi driver, said
he and other members of his nation faced discrimination of both an open and a concealed
kind; they feel they are being forced out, despite what the authorities say. And
many local Kyrgyz say that “discrimination is especially developed” among young
Tajiks. “The older generation,” they say, “is more loyal to one another” (<a href="http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1447428060">Centrasia.ru</a>,
November 13).</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-83010194784026867712015-11-18T17:54:00.003-05:002015-11-18T17:54:53.876-05:00Russia Moves to Open Six Top Secret ‘Closed Cities,’ Citing Budgetary Reasons<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Yd-9rN4GQh8/Vk0BndVInTI/AAAAAAAABVg/GZ-pgtLwn-w/s1600/Seversk%2Bclosed%2Bcity%2B-%2BBlog%2BNovember%2B18%252C%2B2015.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="213" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Yd-9rN4GQh8/Vk0BndVInTI/AAAAAAAABVg/GZ-pgtLwn-w/s320/Seversk%2Bclosed%2Bcity%2B-%2BBlog%2BNovember%2B18%252C%2B2015.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Alden Wahlstrom<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Russian
government recently announced a plan to open up 6 of its 42 publicly identified
closed cities (officially named closed administrative-territorial formations),
as of January 1, 2016 (<a href="http://m.tvrain.ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/ujut_za_koljuchej_provolokoj-397227/">Tvrain.ru</a>,
October 30). Closed cities, a carryover institution from the Soviet Union, are
home to military installations; facilities used for the development,
production, or storage and disposal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and
other facilities considered central to Russian national security (<a href="http://www.interfax.ru/russia/475261">Interfax</a>, October 23). During
the Soviet era, these cities were given code names and did not appear on
official maps. In their current manifestation, many of these cities have been
identified and have been permitted to resume using the historical names they
held prior to their closure. However, entry into these cities is still strictly
regulated, even for Russian citizens.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Making the list of
cities to be opened starting next year are: Seversk (Tomsk Oblast), Zelenogorsk
(Krasnoyarsk Krai), Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk Oblast), Zarechny (Penza Oblast), Zvyozdny
Village (Permsky Krai), and Lokomotivny village (Chelyabinky Oblast). These
cities are home to over 350,000 people and are situated across the entire
expanse of Russia (<a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2015/10/29/614760-zakritim-gorodam-propishut-vihod-otkrituyu-ekonomiku">Vedomosti</a>,
October 29). Russia’s state nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom, administers
the first four of these cities, and the Russian Ministry of Defense administers
the remaining two (<a href="http://www.interfax.ru/russia/475261">Interfax</a>,
October 23). Among the strategically sensitive things located at these heretofore
closed cities are facilities for the enrichment of uranium (including the
facility at Novouralsk, which is the largest of its kind in the world) and
military installations dealing with missile production and housing Russian
missileers (<a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2015/10/29/614760-zakritim-gorodam-propishut-vihod-otkrituyu-ekonomiku">Vedomosti</a>,
October 29; <a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2842899">Kommersant</a>,
October 30; <a href="http://tass.ru/ural-news/2385870">TASS</a>, October 28; <a href="https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/ujut_za_koljuchej_provolokoj-397227/">Tvrain.ru</a>,
October 30).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">According to the
Ministry of Economic Development, the goal of the government’s initiative to
open up these cities is linked to optimizing federal budgetary spending (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2842899">Kommesrant</a>, October 30).
Despite the prolonged decline in the value of the ruble and the sizable deficit
in the recently announced Russian budget, the reclassification of these cities
is said to be part of a development project that has been in the works since
before Russia fell into an economic downturn (<a href="http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2015/10/151027_5floor_closed_towns?ocid=socialflow_twitter">BBC—Russian
service</a>, October 27). Closed cities present unique challenges to economic
development. The strict control over what and who is allowed to enter these
cities restricts the flow of resources necessary to stimulate organic economic
development. As a result, large subsidies from the federal budget have been necessarily
allocated to supplement the budgets of closed cities. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">What motivated the
Russian government to start this process? Even if transitioning these cities
had long been discussed, announcing these initiatives with only a two-month
lead time before implementation is quite sudden. According to the plan, there
will only be a nine-month transition period for the cities, starting on the
first of the year (<a href="http://www.interfax.ru/russia/475261">Interfax</a>,
October 23). Critics in the varying regional governments and within Rosatom are
likely considering this when it says that the move to reclassify these cities
is too fast and that more discussion is required to plan their smooth
transition. To put this in perspective, Seversk, the largest of Russia’s closed
cities, will instantly lose 900 million rubles of its 3.8 billion ruble ($13.9
million out of $59 million) budget, if it loses its status as a closed city at
the start of the year (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2842899">Kommersant</a>,
October 30). This one cut, which only saves the Russian government about $13
million, will leave the city of Seversk scrambling to find the resources
necessary to continue to provide services to its 120,000 residents after losing
almost one quarter of its budget, with little advanced notice. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The announcement
of the plan has already been met with broad pushback. Many residents prefer
that their city remains closed to the rest of Russia. In their measure, the
positive externalities of living in closed cities outweigh the negative ones.
The tight control over movement in and out of these cities provides residents
with an increased sense of security. One city official from a closed city not
slated for this round of status changes described closed cities as places where
residents do not lock there doors and children can safely walk to school
unaccompanied (<a href="https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/ujut_za_koljuchej_provolokoj-397227/">Tvrain.ru</a>,
October 30). Moreover, government subsidies allows these cities to provide a
level of benefits to the residents of these cities that would otherwise not be
possible. Residents speaking out against the government’s plan are motivated by
the fear of losing these subsidies and the standard of living they provide (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2842899">Kommersant</a>, <a href="https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/ujut_za_koljuchej_provolokoj-397227/">Tvrain.ru</a>,
October 30). Given the nature of what is located within these cities, however,
domestic political challenges are unlikely to either drive or redirect this
process. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Russia was able to maintain
its closed cities through all of the economic troubles of the 1990s. And the
Russian government’s decision to maintain its current level of defense spending
in its shrunken 2016 federal budget is a testament to the Kremlin’s commitment
to spending on issues related to national security. For this reason, the
transitioning of these cities from closed to open is particularly intriguing.
In some cases, it is quite possible that the city in question may no longer be
home to activities considered core to national security, or facilities in that
city could perhaps easily be converted into lower-risk establishments. From a
logistical standpoint, the two cities administered by the Ministry of Defense
will have an easier time redistributing any top-secret resources located there.
As for the cities with nuclear research activities, there is some talk of
adapting these facilities to expand production into other areas—likely part of
the much talked about, but thus far largely unsuccessful, plan to develop dual-use
military technologies. Potential development opportunities aside, the
heavy-handed decision by Russian officials to transition these cities on such a
short timeline presents an opening for possible breaches of Russian national
security.</span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-32274486853798153072015-10-26T15:23:00.001-04:002015-10-26T15:23:23.469-04:00Armenia and Iran After the Nuclear Deal: The Quest for Broader Cooperation<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-gTMclax0ids/Vi58CJyc1oI/AAAAAAAABVM/TXYpaZGd2XM/s1600/Armenia%2Btrain%2B-%2BBlog%2BOctober%2B26%252C%2B2015.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-gTMclax0ids/Vi58CJyc1oI/AAAAAAAABVM/TXYpaZGd2XM/s320/Armenia%2Btrain%2B-%2BBlog%2BOctober%2B26%252C%2B2015.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Erik Davtyan<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, which
Tehran reached with the P5+1 powers (the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, China, Russia and Germany) on July 14, has provided new perspectives for
Iran’s wider engagement in the South Caucasus—especially with Armenia, the only
state in the region that actively promotes a close partnership with the Islamic
Republic. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In August 2015, Iran and Armenia had already
signed an agreement on the construction of the third high-voltage electricity
transmission line connecting the two countries. This new planned electricity
link will cost an estimated $120 million (Azatutyun.am, August 13). The Iranian
nuclear agreement and the promised gradual lifting of sanctions apparently
increased mutual interest in maintaining a more active political dialogue and
reinforcing economic cooperation between Iran and Armenia. These issues were
discussed during last month’s (September 17) meeting between Armenian Ambassador
to Tehran Artashes Tumanyan and Iranian Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade
Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh (Armenpress.am, September 18). The energy aspect of
bilateral relations was discussed on October 3–5, when the Armenian delegation,
headed by Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Ervand Zakharyan, visited
Iran and held talks with the co-chair of the Armenian-Iranian Intergovernmental
Commission, Hamid Chitchian, Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zangane, and the
chairman of Iran’s Export Development Bank, Ali Salehabadi (Minenergy.am, October
5).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The next and, in fact, the most important recent event
(after the nuclear deal) for bilateral Iranian-Armenian relations was the
official visit to Yerevan of the First Vice President of Iran Eshaq Jahangiri (October
14–15). After Iranian then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit in 2011, this
is the highest-level visit to Armenia by an Iranian official. At the airport, Jahangiri
was welcomed by Armenian Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan, along with the ministers
of energy and natural resources, culture, and transport and communications, as
well as the deputy minister of foreign affairs. Clearly, the Armenian
authorities attached great importance to this official visit and expect positive
developments in bilateral relations (Armenpress.am, October 14).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">On October 15, Jahangiri and Abrahamyan took part
in the Armenia-Iran Business Forum, which was attended by nearly 300 Armenian
and 80 Iranian businessmen. Commenting on the importance of boosting trade
relations, the Iranian vice president stated that “it is important for us to
sign a number of memorandums of understanding, including a preferential tariff
agreement” (Gov.am, October 15). As to Armenia’s transit role in Iran’s foreign
policy, he underlined that “Armenia is the only country to provide a gateway
for exporting Iranian goods toward the Eurasian Economic Union. Besides,
Armenia has an important role to play as a transit zone. We have the North–South
Transport Corridor; we should settle the railroad issue, which is of regional
significance”. Vice Presdent Jahangiri also held meetings with Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan and the president of the Armenian National Assembly (parliament),
Galust Sahakyan.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Certainly, the realization of joint economic plans
highly depends on completing large-scale transport projects to more fully
connect the two states. The North–South Road Corridor is already under
construction; but the Iran-Armenia railway project faces financial challenges. In
his interview to <i>Azatutyun</i>, Iranian
Minister of Transport Abbas Ahmad Akhoundi said that Iran is ready to start the
construction of the Iranian part of the railroad as soon as Armenia covers at
least one third of the estimated cost of $3 billion for this project (<a href="http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/27308127.html">Azatutyun.am</a>, October
15). Indeed, the railway may have regional and even interregional importance;
therefore, Armenia aims to attract large investments from abroad. Back in June
2015, the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) had
expressed interest in this project. During the Armenian prime minister’s recent
visit to China (in September), the issue of the possible engagement of Chinese
companies was discussed with the premier of China’s State Council, Li Keqiang,
and the chairman of the CCECC, Wu Wanliang (Panarmenian.net, September 22).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 150%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">So far, no practical agreement has been reached on
the Iran-Armenia railway project. Yet, following the breakthrough of the
Iranian nuclear program accord, the chances of realizing this project have
increased, at least in the political realm. Thus, the appeal of large-scale investments
in bilateral projects will continue to grow over the coming months for both
Armenia and Iran.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-74470720556277474772015-10-19T16:55:00.003-04:002015-10-19T16:55:40.537-04:00Estonia to Help Crimean Tatars Tell the World About the Occupation<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-k5M3HjLYZB0/ViVYrjyDkZI/AAAAAAAABU4/5tPAQ2z5Pbg/s1600/CT%252C%2BEstonia%252C%2BUkraine.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="170" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-k5M3HjLYZB0/ViVYrjyDkZI/AAAAAAAABU4/5tPAQ2z5Pbg/s320/CT%252C%2BEstonia%252C%2BUkraine.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The victims of almost 50 years of
Soviet occupation themselves, Estonians are now preparing to help the Crimean
Tatars, who have again come under Russian occupation. At a press conference in
Kyiv, Mart Nutt, a member of the Estonian parliament, and Oliver Loode, the
Estonian vice president of the United Nations forum on indigenous peoples,
outline what they hope to do in cooperation with Mustafa Cemilev, the longtime
leader of the Crimean Tatar national movement, Serhi Kostinsky, a Verkhovna
Rada deputy who oversees television and radio policy, and the project’s Crimean
Tatar producer Emine Dzheppar (<a href="http://qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/estoniya-pomojet-krimskim-tataram/149102/">Qha.com.ua</a>,
October 6).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The Estonians, Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars said that the project was being launched because the international
community is too little informed about the problems of the Crimean Tatars under
occupation and is not focused on the important reality that the Crimean Tatars
are the indigenous population of the Ukrainian peninsula, a status which under
international law gives them certain exclusive rights. They added that the
three sides had agreed over the course of the next several months to develop a
media strategy, one that will involve both several members of the Crimean Tatar
Mejlis (de facto representative body of the Crimean Tatars), representatives of
the media, and Estonian experts.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Emine
Dzheppar said that “the goal of this group is the formulation of a strategy on
the basis of which the project will be carried out over the next two years, one
that will become a so-called road map for its realization.” The project will
organize photographic exhibits in various countries around the world and at the
United Nations. In addition, it will produce video materials, including both
films and clips, about key problems that the Crimean Tatars now face.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The
Estonians have one key advantage over the Crimean Tatars, and it may prove to
be something from which the Crimean Tatars can profit from. Estonia was an
independent state at the time of the beginning of the Soviet occupation, and
the West, led by the United States, came up with its non-recognition policy
based on the Stimson Doctrine that the international community cannot recognize
any border changes achieved by force alone. As a result, the Estonians, like
their two Baltic neighbors, have insisted that their states continued de jure
throughout the occupation and that in 1991, they recovered their independence
de facto rather than creating new states.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Unfortunately,
the international community has not articulated the same policy with regard to
Russian-occupied Crimea. While Western governments have said they will not end
sanctions until Russia gives Crimea back, the reality is that at some point the
sanctions regime will be lifted and Crimea will not have any legal support.
Western non-recognition policy by articulating a principle allowed for
variations in Western relations with Moscow but did not allow for any change
concerning the West’s view of the continuing legal status of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">It is
extremely likely that the Estonian involvement in this joint project will lead
the Crimean Tatars to appreciate the importance of a Western declaration of
non-recognition of the Russian occupation of Crimea and press their friends and
supporters to take a step equal in its legal standing to the 1940 declaration
by Sumner Welles. If that happens, this small joint project will have a
profound impact on international relations for years to come.</span><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-24529401828402435342015-10-07T18:03:00.001-04:002015-10-07T18:03:25.738-04:00Estonia’s Proposed Border Improvements Could Derail Estonia-Russia Border Agreement<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-DcqyecBYJOs/VhWWiTgEd0I/AAAAAAAABUg/edUzlyT809U/s1600/Estonia-Russia%2BBorder.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="179" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-DcqyecBYJOs/VhWWiTgEd0I/AAAAAAAABUg/edUzlyT809U/s320/Estonia-Russia%2BBorder.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Alden Wahlstrom <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Last week, on the sidelines of the 70<sup>th</sup> annual
session of the United Nations General Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov met with his Estonian counterpart, Marina Kaljurand, at her request.
Among other topics, the two discussed the outlook for Russia and Estonia
reaching a political settlement on a border dispute that has persisted since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has,
thus far, been unable to settle an official border agreement with Russia since
gaining its independence in 1991. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 11.6pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">During their meeting, Kaljurand told Lavrov that the
Estonian Parliament is prepared to review and ratify an agreement officially
recognizing the borders that has de facto<i>
</i>been used since Estonian independence. Lavrov, in turn, said that the
Russian State Duma is prepared to consider the agreement for ratification (<a href="http://rus.postimees.ee/3342595/jestonija-i-rossija-v-skorom-vremeni-pristupjat-k-ratifikacii-dogovorov-o-granice">Postimees.ee</a>,
September 28). The resolution of this border dispute would no doubt be welcomed
by Estonians, who, like the citizens of many of Russia’s neighboring states,
have been anxious about preserving their territorial integrity since Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in 2014 (see <a href="http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2015/02/amid-escalating-russian-tensions.html">Jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com</a>,
February 26).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">However, what are the chances that this dispute will be
resolved in the near future? While Estonia may be keen on formalizing its
borders with Russia vis-à-vis a bilateral agreement, Estonia’s other efforts to
secure its borders could actually serve as an excuse for Moscow to stymie this
process. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">In late August, Estonia announced a plan to completely seal
off its land border with Russia using fencing, high-tech surveillance systems
and aerial drones (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2800399">Kommersant</a>,
September 1). This project, estimated to cost €71 million ($80 million) and set
to begin construction in 2018 (<a href="http://vz.ru/politics/2015/8/25/446497.html">Vz.ru</a>, August 25), has
largely been interpreted as a response to the fear of Russian incursions into
Estonian territory. Estonians’ territorial insecurities were accentuated last
year by the highly publicized case of Estonian security officer Eston Kohver.
According to Estonian officials, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)
abducted Kohver on September 5, 2014, while on Estonian territory, and
imprisoned him in Russia on false charges. Kohver was convicted of espionage in
early September 2015, and Estonian officials were able to secure his return
home in a spy swap with the Russians by the end of the month. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Russian officials have been vocal in their responses to
Estonia’s announced border strengthening plan. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
released a statement labeling Estonia’s plan as “politicized” and declared that
unilateral action to enforce the border between Estonia and Russia is legally
unfounded, as Russia and Estonia have yet to ratify an agreement defining their
shared border (<a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2800399">Kommersant</a>, September 1). Meanwhile, Irina
Yarovaya, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for Security and
Anti-Corruption, has mocked the plan, stating that it looked as though Estonia
was trying to build an “Indian reservation” for its citizens (<a href="http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/08/25/7717091.shtml">Gazeta.ru</a>,
August 25). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Of most concern, however, are comments by Alexei Pushkov, the
head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs. Pushkov claimed that
poor bilateral relations with Estonia, undoubtedly shaken by Estonia’s
announced plan to fence off its border with Russia, promise to slow the Russian
ratification process of any border agreement (<a href="http://vz.ru/news/2015/9/1/764307.html">Vz.ru</a>, September 1<span lang="RU">)</span>.
In an effort to quell the Russian reaction, Estonian Foreign Minister Marina
Kaljurand gave a statement emphasizing that the Estonian government is only
discussing possible future options for securing its border (<a href="http://kommersant.ru/doc/2804685">Kommersant</a>, September 6).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">The effectiveness of Estonian efforts to assuage Russian
officials’ stated anxiety about Estonia’s proposed border security plan will be
seen when the Russian Duma formally discusses the ratification of the proposed
border agreement. Although Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that the Duma is
prepared do discuss and ratify the agreement, Pushkov’s statements raise doubts
concerning the likelihood of this happening. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Beyond poor bilateral relations, it is conceivable that
Russian officials may not view ratifying a border agreement with Estonia as in
their strategic interest. Estonia is not the only EU member state with concerns
about its border with Russia. Latvian officials have echoed their Estonian
neighbors, saying that Latvia may also need to consider erecting a fence along
its shared border with Russia (<a href="http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/transport/?doc=109961">Baltic Course</a>,
August 28); and Finland’s Defense Minister<span style="color: red;"> </span>Jussi Niinistö has publicly considered
laying new landmines along the Finnish-Russian frontier (<a href="http://news.err.ee/v/International/a846fe95-fed0-46e1-8f1f-0262764be2d8/finland-pondering-mine-defenses-on-eastern-border">EER</a>,
September 3). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Whether or not these
statements result in concrete actions, they are obviously an expression of the
tense security situation across the region. Meanwhile, judging by their vocal
criticism, Russian officials may fear that Russia will be unable to easily defeat
these increased security measures taken by all of the countries on its border.
Therefore it is entirely probable that Moscow will view not ratifying a border
agreement with Estonia as strategically advantageous: giving it the grounds to
further oppose Estonian border reinforcements and maintaining a legal gray area
in which Russia prefers to operate.</span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4156163748782234674.post-47797967703301544152015-09-30T15:38:00.001-04:002015-09-30T15:38:27.680-04:00Buryats, a Large Nation in Russia, Fear They Are on Verge of Extinction<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-UChRc3qcuQg/Vgw513xUSNI/AAAAAAAABUI/ejWRjGUSKeE/s1600/Buryats%2B-%2BBlog%2BSeptember%2B30%252C%2B2015.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="214" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-UChRc3qcuQg/Vgw513xUSNI/AAAAAAAABUI/ejWRjGUSKeE/s320/Buryats%2B-%2BBlog%2BSeptember%2B30%252C%2B2015.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">By Paul Goble<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNoSpacing" style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Not surprisingly, many of the very
smallest nations now within the borders of the Russian Federation fear that
they will not survive for more than a few decades. Numbering only a few
thousand or even less, they feel on their own skin, as it were, the predictions
of international experts that they cannot hope to survive as separate nations
given the lack of support from the Russian government and the pressures of globalization.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">But disturbingly, this sense of doom is
infecting ever larger nations there, peoples whose numbers and institutions
would seem to make them good candidates to survive well into the future. Indeed,
all but the largest nations in the Russian Federation—the seven who number more
than a million each—now appear to be at risk of losing first their language and
then their identities in this generation or the next. This has been mainly due
to Moscow’s Russification policies (see EDM, <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=40062&cHash=bd729f32b09265751e9c30fc64bcd412#.Vgw16ZfMK94">November 5,
2012</a>; <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5bswords%5d=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5bany_of_the_words%5d=surinam&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=43664&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=7&cHash=562318cba5ac50fa88ff41ba183e7f55#.Vgw16pfMK94">March 17,
2015</a>; see also jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com, <a href="http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2013/11/mongolia-tv-broadcasts-to-buryatia-and.html">November 27,
2013</a>; <a href="http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2014/01/non-russians-in-russian-federation.html">January 23,
2014</a>) as well as the impact of international media and economic change.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">According to Bato Ochirov of the ARD
portal, for cultural and historical reasons, Buryats are not capable of either
evolutionary or revolutionary change. The first is precluded by the nature of
the state in which they find themselves at present, and the second is
impossible because of the nomadic past and individualistic nature of their
500,000-strong nation. Consequently, those Buryats who are most accomplished
will seek their fortunes elsewhere and be assimilated; and those who remain
will increasingly degrade, he suggests (<a href="http://asiarussia.ru/blogs/9141/">ARD</a>,
September 16).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">“Therefore,” he argues, “if one
reflects on the prospects of the contemporary Buryat nation” and tries to study
the fates of other peoples that the Buryats are “most likely to repeat,” the
most obvious candidate is the Evenks. A numerically small people of the Russian
North, the Evenks arose as the result of the intermixture of “several
aboriginal tribes of Eastern Siberia.” Like the Buryats, the Evenks reflect
three anthropological types and are involved in three distinct economic
activities: reindeer herding, cattle herding and fishing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">Also like the Buryats, he continues,
“the Evenks live in China and in Mongolia. At the time of their inclusion into
Russia (the 17<sup>th</sup> century), the Evenks numbered approximately 36,135.”
They had increased to 64,500 by the time of the 1897 imperial census, but
declined to 35,527 in the 2002 Russian census. In short, they are on their way
to exhaustion and extinction.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">About half of the Evenks live in the Republic
of Sakha, but the rest are widely spread around the country, again like the
Buryats. Indeed, the dispersal of the population accelerates the rates of loss
of language, assimilation, and loss of historical identity, Ochirov says. “All peoples
who lose ‘their own’ are on a common path, that of slow withering away and
dying. The conditions of life of the representatives of such a dying people, as
a rule, are not enviable.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;">That a leading intellectual of the Buryats—a nation
that, after all, has important co-ethnic groups in Mongolia and in China—should
be saying this now is a mark of despair. Ochirov clearly hopes to provoke his
fellow Buryats to respond by changing the situation. But his words suggest that
he has little confidence they will be able to do so.</span></span>Jamestown Foundationhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12021168990196781078noreply@blogger.com0