By Alden Wahlstrom
How much does it
cost to replace a political rival in Russia? Can such a thing be bought? Journalist
Yulia Latynina of Echo Moskvi seems
to think so. On her weekly radio program “Kod Dostupa” (“Access Code”),
Latynina uncovered information supporting this idea while delving into the
financial information of Sergei Roldugin, details of which were released with
the so-called “Panama Papers.” Perhaps the
most interesting Russia-related story to come out of this massive leak involves
Roldugin, a Russian cellist and long-time friend of Putin who apparently has $2
billion stashed away in an offshore account. Excluding a select few elite
musicians—Andrew Lloyd Webber, Paul McCartney and the like—whose extreme wealth
can be directly linked to the success of their careers, a musician possessing
such sizeable assets raises legitimate questions about the origin of their
riches.
While
investigating the transactions tied to Roldugin’s offshore account, Latynina
found one transfer of funds that is of particular interest. The transfer was
from Dagestani billionaire Suleiman Kerimov and his associated businesses to
Roldugin. Twice in 2010, Roldugin’s offshore account received money from
Kerimov—once for a sum of 4 billion rubles (about $132 million at the 2010
exchange rate), and a second time for $200 million. As Latynina asked
rhetorically on her show, why would Kerimov, a businessman, be willing to just
hand over upwards of $300 million to Roldugin at the expense of his personal
wealth and his business? One possible explanation for all of this is that it
was a business deal. However, when Latynina contextualized these transfers with
the events of Kerimov’s life at the time, this seems less likely (Echo Moskvi, April 9).
Apparently, in
2010, Suleiman Kerimov was engaged in infighting with Mukhu Aliyev, the then-president
of Dagestan. Aliyev, who initiated the dispute, sought to subjugate or destroy
Kerimov, putting Kerimov in an incredibly vulnerable position. However, the
tables turned rather quickly. Kerimov began saying publicly that he would
replace the president of Dagestan, and he lobbied for Magomedsalam Magomedov to
accede to the post. Shortly thereafter, Magomedov was made head of the republic.
Both these events and the transfers of money from Kerimov to Roldugin all took
place within a period of a few months (Echo Moskvi, April 9).
But why Roldugin? Roldugin
has been a long-time friend of Putin. And Kerimov only transferred money to
Roldugin during the period when he was politically in need. Not before. Not
after. So how does a transfer of money to Roldugin buy Kerimov a favor in a
time of need? Latynina notes that the relationship between power and money in
Russia is at once inseparable and indirect. Therefore, she speculates, no one
should believe that the $2 billion that Roldugin is in control of is entirely
at his disposal. Of course, being close to Putin has financial benefits. But
this money, naturally, is a supply of funds that would be available to Putin
should he wish to access it.