by Tammy Lynch
Ukraine announced yesterday that Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko will meet her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin next month in Warsaw, Poland. The announcement came on the same day that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev brusquely denounced Ukraine’s “leadership” during a press event with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Sochi. Medvedev also claimed that “normal relations” would not be possible until “new leadership” takes over in Ukraine.
Days earlier, Medvedev had released a harsh video blog criticizing everything from Ukraine’s treatment of Russian speakers to its “resistance” toward Russian business to its gas deals with the EU. (An English text of Medvedev’s video blog is here.)
Medvedev’s remarks have created numerous questions. The Putin-Tymoshenko meeting could begin to provide some answers.
The video blog appears to be an attempt to undermine Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko in advance of the upcoming presidential election, while increasing support for “pro-Russian” candidate Viktor Yanukovych (and possibly others considered “pro-Kremlin”). However, Medvedev included harsh words for “Ukraine’s political leaders” who “do deals with the European Union on supplying gas.” The Russian president’s use of the plural in his video blog, as well as an ambiguous reference to Ukraine’s “leadership” during his recent press event, should not be overlooked.
In fact, it was Prime Minister Tymoshenko – not Yushchenko – who negotiated and signed the Joint EU-Ukraine Declaration on the Modernization of Ukraine’s Gas Transit System. The Declaration provided for a framework to modernize Ukraine’s transit pipelines in order to increase transit capacity for Russian gas to Europe. This has the potential to undermine competing transit pipelines planned by Russia that would bypass Ukraine and led to a loud, threatening – and effective – response from Moscow.
So, is Medvedev’s wording a sign that Moscow does not understand the diarchy of power in Ukraine? Or simply doesn’t care? The Russian President clearly is proceeding as if there is one unified power center in Ukraine – and suggesting that Russia will oppose anyone associated with that center.
Or, is Medvedev perhaps signaling that concessions will be necessary from Tymoshenko if Russia is to either back the Prime Minister in the election (assuming she wants this backing) or stay out of the election?
This last question in particular will undoubtedly come up at the Putin – Tymoshenko meeting on September 1st – a meeting which was initiated by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
Tymoshenko and Putin have maintained a cordial, if sometimes strained, working relationship. In fact, Tymoshenko first began working with Putin while he was president; at that time, he clearly showed an understanding of the significant power held by the prime minister’s position in Ukraine.
The implication by Tusk that a meeting between Putin and Tymoshenko may ease tensions is a significant repudiation of Medvedev’s claim that “normal relations” with Ukraine are not possible. And the fact that both prime ministers have agreed to take part is more interesting.
Given Tymoshenko’s strained relationship with Yushchenko, she is happy to appear statesmanlike and effective at his expense. But are Medvedev and Putin working together? Will Tymoshenko meet the good cop in Warsaw? Or, is Medvedev attempting to use Ukraine as a demonstration of his own power? If so, will he be allowed to succeed?
Stay tuned......
Showing posts with label Angela Merkel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Angela Merkel. Show all posts
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Thursday, June 11, 2009
New Obstacles for the Nord Stream Pipeline
by Roman Kupchinsky
The German Ministry of Defense has once again voiced its opposition to the proposed route of Gazprom’s major gas pipeline project- the Nord Stream pipeline. The Bundeswehr reservations were recently presented to the German parliament’s committee on national defense, in which the Defense Ministry stated that the route was too close to the island of Rugen where large scale German naval maneuvers are held.
The news of this renewed opposition to Nord Stream came on the same day that German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeyer arrived in Moscow for talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
In the past Steinmeyer had been a firm supporter of Nord Stream. According to Jamestown senior fellow Vlad Socor, “The Russo-German pipeline is not a European project in any sense. Interested parties ranging from the Kremlin and Gazprom to German business groups and elements in the German government portray this project as a European one. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeyer used this argument when visiting Estonia.”
However this month, Steinmeyer is challenging German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the upcoming election and is reluctant to whitewash Nord Stream which has become a controversial issue for many German voters. As the candidate from the SPD, once headed by former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, a key executive in the Nord Stream consortium, Steinmeyer is now caught in a vicious political battle. The Bundeswehr report tempered his support of Nord Stream to the great displeasure of the Russian leadership. Steinmeyer’s position is also weakened by the fact that the head of the Nord Stream Consortium office in Switzerland is Mathias Warnig, a former intelligence officer for the East German security service, the hated Stasi.
Responding to the German military report, the deputy CEO of Gazprom, Alexander Medvedev stated: “Europe must decide how to resolve this situation. If Europe does not want our gas, we will find the means to sell it elsewhere.”
Medvedev, in what might be seen as a threat to the EU, once again raised the specter of Gazprom diverting gas from European markets and selling it as LNG to the U.S. and Canadian markets. Bloomberg quoted the Gazprom official on June 10, 2009: “Gazprom is seeking as much as 10 percent of the U.S. gas market by 2020, after two Arctic liquefied natural gas projects start producing, deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev told reporters Tuesday.”
"The volume which we have right now is just 0.5 percent of natural gas consumption of the United States, but with gas out of Shtokman and maybe Yamal LNG our share in the U.S. and Canadian markets would go up between 5 and 10 percent," Medvedev said.
Many U.S. energy analysts view this as an empty threat. LNG is still a tiny source of gas supplies to the U.S. and will remain such for years to come. Besides, Russian LNG will face fierce competition from Qatar and Nigeria, not to mention Trinidad and Tabago, the main supplier of LNG to the U.S.
Is the Nord Stream pipeline doomed? Much will depend on the upcoming German elections and on the continuing opposition to Nord Stream from Poland and the Baltic states. But the end game will take place in the near future and a showdown between Gazprom and Germany is in the works.
The German Ministry of Defense has once again voiced its opposition to the proposed route of Gazprom’s major gas pipeline project- the Nord Stream pipeline. The Bundeswehr reservations were recently presented to the German parliament’s committee on national defense, in which the Defense Ministry stated that the route was too close to the island of Rugen where large scale German naval maneuvers are held.
The news of this renewed opposition to Nord Stream came on the same day that German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeyer arrived in Moscow for talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
In the past Steinmeyer had been a firm supporter of Nord Stream. According to Jamestown senior fellow Vlad Socor, “The Russo-German pipeline is not a European project in any sense. Interested parties ranging from the Kremlin and Gazprom to German business groups and elements in the German government portray this project as a European one. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeyer used this argument when visiting Estonia.”
However this month, Steinmeyer is challenging German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the upcoming election and is reluctant to whitewash Nord Stream which has become a controversial issue for many German voters. As the candidate from the SPD, once headed by former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, a key executive in the Nord Stream consortium, Steinmeyer is now caught in a vicious political battle. The Bundeswehr report tempered his support of Nord Stream to the great displeasure of the Russian leadership. Steinmeyer’s position is also weakened by the fact that the head of the Nord Stream Consortium office in Switzerland is Mathias Warnig, a former intelligence officer for the East German security service, the hated Stasi.
Responding to the German military report, the deputy CEO of Gazprom, Alexander Medvedev stated: “Europe must decide how to resolve this situation. If Europe does not want our gas, we will find the means to sell it elsewhere.”
Medvedev, in what might be seen as a threat to the EU, once again raised the specter of Gazprom diverting gas from European markets and selling it as LNG to the U.S. and Canadian markets. Bloomberg quoted the Gazprom official on June 10, 2009: “Gazprom is seeking as much as 10 percent of the U.S. gas market by 2020, after two Arctic liquefied natural gas projects start producing, deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev told reporters Tuesday.”
"The volume which we have right now is just 0.5 percent of natural gas consumption of the United States, but with gas out of Shtokman and maybe Yamal LNG our share in the U.S. and Canadian markets would go up between 5 and 10 percent," Medvedev said.
Many U.S. energy analysts view this as an empty threat. LNG is still a tiny source of gas supplies to the U.S. and will remain such for years to come. Besides, Russian LNG will face fierce competition from Qatar and Nigeria, not to mention Trinidad and Tabago, the main supplier of LNG to the U.S.
Is the Nord Stream pipeline doomed? Much will depend on the upcoming German elections and on the continuing opposition to Nord Stream from Poland and the Baltic states. But the end game will take place in the near future and a showdown between Gazprom and Germany is in the works.
Monday, May 11, 2009
EU and Six Former Soviet Republics Launch Eastern Partnership Initiative in Prague
On Thursday, May 7, the Czech Republic, the current EU president, hosted a half day summit of the Eastern Partnership Initiative, which was originally conceived by Poland and Sweden and which is aimed at deepening ties between the EU and six former Soviet Republics - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. According to the final document of the summit - the Joint Declaration - the EU plans to engage the "Eastern European Partners" in the four areas of cooperation, including the following: democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies; energy security; and contacts between people. In exchange for the non-binding pledge by the six post-Soviet states to commit to the "fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to, market economy, sustainable development and good governance," the 27-nation bloc will offer the €600 million ($804 million) package of targeted assistance programs until 2013.
As this primer explains, the Eastern Partnership is a comprehensive outreach effort through which EU intends to align the six countries with European aqui communitaire and therefore make them membership-ready. Due to the current enlargement fatigue, the major European powers, which are sometimes referred to as the "Old Europe," appear to be less enthusiastic about the Eastern Partnership than the newly admitted EU members. This was reflected in the noticeable absence of British, French, Italian and Spanish leaders at the Prague summit. In this regard German Chancellor Angela Merkel proved to be a surprising exception.
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion between the European capitals regarding the scope and purpose of the Eastern Partnership, the EU tried its best to present the initiative in a "win-win" light to the weary Russians. Chancellor Merkel explicitly stated in Prague, "This Eastern Partnership is not against anyone, not against Russia." The same sentiment was echoed in the remarks delivered by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, who declared that Russia would only benefit from the eastward expansion of European values because "when we increase prosperity, when we increase stability, we are increasing it not only for us but all the others as well." However, the Czech hosts were less circumspect in their comments as they acknowledged that the Eastern Partnership is also aimed at drawing the six former Soviet Republics out of Russia's orbit. The Czech Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra pointed out, "Foreign policy is always about the projection of interests. You can project your interests, but you must give the respective countries the freedom to make choices." A senior Czech official speaking on the condition of anonymity admitted, "We're not living in a vacuum. Russia might be hostile to the eastern partnership, but that's their problem. They see the world through zero sum game lenses."
Regardless of how often the EU officials will try to reassure Moscow that the Eastern Partnership is not aimed at curbing Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space, as the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Ahto Lobjakas explains, perceptions matter. Aptly calling EU's Eastern Partnership an "accidental sphere of influence," Lobjakas reminds us of what the Russian analyst Sergei Karaganov recently told a conference in Germany. Karaganov noted that the "core of all differences between the West and Russia is the question of whose sphere of influence the Soviet successor states fall into." Mikhail Margelov, an influential Russian politician, who is the Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council (the upper chamber of Russia's bicameral legislature - the Federal Assembly) interpreted the fact that a day after the Eastern Partnership event the Czechs hosted the EU South Corridor summit dedicated to the Nabucco gas pipeline project as a geopolitical ploy intended to increase Western influence over Russia's former Soviet satellites. Margelov stated, "The juxtaposition on the agenda of the Prague summit of issues of organization of the partnership and of the Nabucco pipeline project — whose route, as you know, bypasses Russia — reveals the true intentions of the organizers of the Eastern Partnership."
As critics suggest, the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit falls short of making membership promises to the six states. Nor does it specify any concrete steps envisioned to relax the visa regime to ease the travel restrictions. And, as it turns out, only €350 million ($475 million) of the pledged assistance package represents new money. Equally important is the fact that only two out of the six recipient states - Georgia and Ukraine - even remotely satisfy some of the aqui communitaire requirements while two - Azerbaijan and Belarus - are openly autocratic and four - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova - are beset by territorial conflicts. But the most important aspect of the Eastern Partnership that will determine its short-term viability is what the EU is prepared to do to defend this important outreach initiative in the face of Russia's resistance.
As this primer explains, the Eastern Partnership is a comprehensive outreach effort through which EU intends to align the six countries with European aqui communitaire and therefore make them membership-ready. Due to the current enlargement fatigue, the major European powers, which are sometimes referred to as the "Old Europe," appear to be less enthusiastic about the Eastern Partnership than the newly admitted EU members. This was reflected in the noticeable absence of British, French, Italian and Spanish leaders at the Prague summit. In this regard German Chancellor Angela Merkel proved to be a surprising exception.
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion between the European capitals regarding the scope and purpose of the Eastern Partnership, the EU tried its best to present the initiative in a "win-win" light to the weary Russians. Chancellor Merkel explicitly stated in Prague, "This Eastern Partnership is not against anyone, not against Russia." The same sentiment was echoed in the remarks delivered by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, who declared that Russia would only benefit from the eastward expansion of European values because "when we increase prosperity, when we increase stability, we are increasing it not only for us but all the others as well." However, the Czech hosts were less circumspect in their comments as they acknowledged that the Eastern Partnership is also aimed at drawing the six former Soviet Republics out of Russia's orbit. The Czech Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra pointed out, "Foreign policy is always about the projection of interests. You can project your interests, but you must give the respective countries the freedom to make choices." A senior Czech official speaking on the condition of anonymity admitted, "We're not living in a vacuum. Russia might be hostile to the eastern partnership, but that's their problem. They see the world through zero sum game lenses."
Regardless of how often the EU officials will try to reassure Moscow that the Eastern Partnership is not aimed at curbing Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space, as the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Ahto Lobjakas explains, perceptions matter. Aptly calling EU's Eastern Partnership an "accidental sphere of influence," Lobjakas reminds us of what the Russian analyst Sergei Karaganov recently told a conference in Germany. Karaganov noted that the "core of all differences between the West and Russia is the question of whose sphere of influence the Soviet successor states fall into." Mikhail Margelov, an influential Russian politician, who is the Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council (the upper chamber of Russia's bicameral legislature - the Federal Assembly) interpreted the fact that a day after the Eastern Partnership event the Czechs hosted the EU South Corridor summit dedicated to the Nabucco gas pipeline project as a geopolitical ploy intended to increase Western influence over Russia's former Soviet satellites. Margelov stated, "The juxtaposition on the agenda of the Prague summit of issues of organization of the partnership and of the Nabucco pipeline project — whose route, as you know, bypasses Russia — reveals the true intentions of the organizers of the Eastern Partnership."
As critics suggest, the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit falls short of making membership promises to the six states. Nor does it specify any concrete steps envisioned to relax the visa regime to ease the travel restrictions. And, as it turns out, only €350 million ($475 million) of the pledged assistance package represents new money. Equally important is the fact that only two out of the six recipient states - Georgia and Ukraine - even remotely satisfy some of the aqui communitaire requirements while two - Azerbaijan and Belarus - are openly autocratic and four - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova - are beset by territorial conflicts. But the most important aspect of the Eastern Partnership that will determine its short-term viability is what the EU is prepared to do to defend this important outreach initiative in the face of Russia's resistance.
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