Thwarted Military Coup in Georgia was Aimed to Derail NATO Exercises

[Photo Credit: Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili speaking to surrendered mutineer soldiers at the Mukhrovani military base. Mukhrovani, Georgia, May 5, 2009. Photo courtesy of Times Online.]

On May 5, on the eve of the crisis response exercises, which commenced today and which are held under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in Georgia, a 500-strong tank battalion under the command of Colonel Mamuka Gorgiashvili rebelled against the authorities at the Mukhrovani military base, 30 km (20 miles) east of Tbilisi. Prior to that, in the comments carried by the Interfax news agency Gorgiashvili blamed Saakashvili's government for the ongoing political confrontation with the opposition. The Georgian government reacted promptly by dispatching the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) to encircle the Mukhrovani base and contain the mutineers. In an ensuing standoff, which included direct phone conversations between President Saakashvili and one of the rebel leaders, the mutineers were asked to lay down their weapons and surrender without conditions under the threat of force. By the second half of the day the rebellion was over, as President Saakashvili flanked by his bodyguards and accompanied by the Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili and his retinue arrived at the Mukhrovani base to personally tour the facility and meet with the mutineers.

Throughout the day the MIA issued contradictory statements regarding the attempted mutiny at the Mukhrovani base. Initially the ministry media liaison Shota Utiashvili spoke of a large-scale military coup with the maximum objective of fomenting the nationwide insurrection and the minimum objective of foiling the planned NATO exercises, which was uncovered as a result of the two-month-long investigation. During the press briefing Utiashvili showed the undercover video footage of Gia Gvaladze, who was described as one of the suspected coup organizers, in which Gvaladze discusses the details of the planned mutiny. In particular, Gvaladze reveals the hit list of the senior government officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria, MIA Minister Vano Merabishvili, Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava and Senior MP Givi Targamadze, who were to be physically eliminated. In the secretly obtained footage Gvaladze claims that a 5,000-strong Russian military unit was to assist the rebels once they reached Tbilisi. Gvaladze also identifies former senior military and security officials - former Defense Ministers Davit Tevzadze and Gia Karkarashvili, former State Security Minister Jemal Gakhokidze, and former Commander of National Guard Koba Kobaladze - as people, who would support the coup. More importantly, Utiashvili claimed that there was a strong link between the Russian special services and the coup organizers. Utiashvili stated, "We have information that the rebels were in direct contact with the Russians, that they were receiving orders from them, that they were receiving money from them."

According to the MIA press release, Gvaladze was arrested on the evening of May 4, hours before the mutiny at the Mukhrovani base. As Utiashvili explained, Gvaladze is thought to have received orders from Koba Otanadze, who once participated in the military uprising at the Mukhrovani base in 2001. The Georgian law enforcement authorities are currently trying to identify Otanadze's whereabouts. It appears that Otanadze and a couple of his civilian accomplices fled during the one-hour ultimatum that the government gave to the Mukhrovani mutineers. Another person, who is being investigated in connection with the military coup, is Zaza Mushkudiani, the commander of the ranger battalion located in Ortachala, on the outskirts of Tbilisi. All in all, the Georgian broadcasting company Rustavi 2 reported today that police arrested 13 civilians and 10 military servicemen in connection with the coup investigation while 50 others are being investigated on related charges. The MIA published the list of 11 detainees and announced a 50,000 GEL ($30,000) bounty for information leading to capture of Koba Otanadze, Levan Ameridze and Giorgi Krialashvili.

In his nationwide televised address later that afternoon President Saakashvili described the Mukhrovani incident as a "serious threat" and warned Russia "to refrain from any types of provocations because such provocations will not work in Georgia." However, in the subsequent MIA press releases and government statements (both on and off the record) there has been a noticeable effort to de-emphasize or intentionally omit any mention of Russian involvement. For instance, when the Voice of America pressed Utiashvili to produce specific evidence suggesting the Russian connection, he said that he was not 100 percent certain and thus could not provide official confirmation of Moscow's involvement. Instead now the Mukhrovani mutiny has been described as primarily aimed at derailing the NATO exercises. Similarly, an official from President's Office, told the Associated Press that the mutiny was planned by a few disgruntled officers, who organized a similar revolt at the same base in 2001. At the same time the official scaled down the objective of the mutiny by dropping any reference to a coup or Russian involvement.

The Russian reaction to the events in Georgia was predictably dismissive. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin blamed the Georgian leadership for "trying to accuse Russia of totally insane things." Russia's envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin's remarks, on the other hand, suggested that the Mukhrovani revolt provided Moscow with more ammunition to mock the NATO exercises in Georgia. As Al Jazeera English reports, Rogozin noted that NATO would be better off holding its exercises "in a madhouse" since "Georgia's military cannot properly receive their colleagues because they are rioting against their own president." More importantly, citing the NATO exercises in Georgia and the recent expulsion of Russian diplomats from Brussels, Rogozin announced that the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will not be attending the ministerial-level meeting of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) planned for May 19. Against the backdrop of bilateral attempts to revive dialogue between Russia and NATO, Moscow's decision to pull out from the NRC meeting is potentially damaging considering that it was supposed to be the first meeting on such high level since the Russia-Georgia war of last year.

Meanwhile, as expected, Armenia used the Mukhrovani incident to pull out from the NATO exercises in Georgia at the very last moment. The statement issued by the Armenian Ministry of Defense obliquely refers to the "current situation" as the justification for Yerevan's decision.

NATO reacted to the Mukhrovani revolt with understandable consternation. Bristling at President Saakashvili's shorthand reference to the NATO exercises, Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's spokeswoman, Carmen Romero offered the following correction: "It is not a NATO exercise, but an exercise of NATO with its partners which Georgia is hosting." Romero added that the exercises should not be "misinterpreted or misused by anybody for internal political purposes." This probably had a desired impact on the Georgian government as the statement issued today by the Office of the President emphasized that the Mukhrovani mutiny was an isolated incident that "must not be used for political or other purposes."

As the investigation unfolds more details will become public soon, but it is worthwhile to make some preliminary observations in conclusion. First, notwithstanding the gravity or lack thereof of the allegations leveled by the Georgian government with regard to possible Russian involvement, the participation of so many former and active senior defense and security officials is indicative of the necessity to carry out a comprehensive vetting of the officer corps at the Ministry of Defense. Second, in the absence of diplomatic relations with Russia, which, in turn, implies absence of diplomats on the ground, any reference to the Russian involvement means that the pool of former and active defense and security professionals in Georgia has been thoroughly penetrated by the Russian intelligence to the degree that the connections forged in the 1990s can be reactivated. Third, more broadly speaking, the tense "no-war-no-peace" situation has put Georgia into the "pressure cooker" that makes it easier for the external forces to find and manipulate the renegade elements within. In this regard today's arrest of Vakhtang Maisaia, who served as the counselor at the Georgian mission in NATO in 2004-2008, on charges of spying for Russia, represents a very vivid example. In a particularly egregious treachery, Maisaia frequently passed sensitive information to Russia at the height of the Russia-Georgia war in August of last year.

NATO Expels Two Russian Diplomats

On Wednesday, April 29, on the same day that NATO and Russia formally resumed contacts since they were broken off eight months ago in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war, the accreditation of two diplomats from Russia's 50-member strong Permanent Mission to NATO was revoked and they were ordered to leave Brussels. The expulsion of Russian diplomats - senior adviser and political desk chief Viktor N. Kochukov and attaché and executive secretary Vasily V. Chizhov - was in retaliation for the spy scandal involving a high-ranking Estonian defense and intelligence official Herman Simm. Mr. Simm, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison in February, was arrested last year for passing 2,000 pages of classified information to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

It appears that Russia's envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin was personally informed about the expulsion of two Russian diplomats by the NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the ambassador-level meeting of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on Wednesday. According to Rogozin, Scheffer told him that NATO was outraged over Russia's spying activities against the alliance and its member states. According to NATO sources, even though the two Russian diplomats were not directly involved in the Simm affair, NATO had to respond in kind. The expulsion of Russian diplomats carries special significance considering that one of them is the son of Russia's Ambassador to EU, Vladimir A. Chizhov.

Russian Foreign Ministry reacted angrily to the expulsion of Russian diplomats calling it a "crude provocation" and Rogozin vowed as yet unspecified but "harsh and decisive" response. The timing of the incident is rather peculiar as both NATO and Russia are trying to revive ties badly strained after last year's conflict in Georgia. Thus far there have been no indications by the Russian side that the NRC meeting at the ministerial level scheduled for May 19 would be called off due to the spat over the expulsion of the Russian diplomats from Brussels.

In an exclusive commentary for the Jamestown Foundation Blog an Estonian official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, characterized the expulsion of Russian diplomats as a significant precedent. First, by making the expulsion public at the time of the NRC ambassadorial meeting, which was supposed to restart the official relations, NATO sent an unusually strong message to Moscow. According to Estonian official, the assertion of some analysts, who think that the announcement was not intentional and that the NATO security team simply did not consider the diplomatic implications of the timing of the expulsion, seems highly improbable. It is more logical that NATO indeed decided to tell the Russians that it takes its own security seriously.

Second, Moscow's reaction to the expulsion of Russian diplomats will be interesting to observe. In a traditional diplomatic tit-for-tat, the Russians usually respond by expelling the same number of diplomats of the "relevant" country. In this case, however, it is unclear, who the Russians should expel. There is only one NATO official in Moscow. The nominal country that expelled the Russians was Belgium and the case was investigated by the Estonians. Moscow's reaction will be a new and interesting precedent in intelligence affairs. The Kremlin is facing a conundrum. By expelling Estonians the Russians would tacitly admit the guilt in the Simm case. By expelling officials of a bigger NATO country, they would send a Cold War-type message that implies that any attempt to restore good relations with NATO is doomed to be stillborn from the outset.

The Simm affair and NATO’s subsequent retaliatory expulsion of Russian diplomats follow the latest trend of intensified Russian espionage activities in the U.S. and allied countries. Sources have informed The Jamestown Foundation that the level of Russian espionage activities in the U.S. has significantly escalated and now even surpassed the threshold established during the Cold War. One of the recent demonstrations of this was a little reported row over the appointment of Russian defense attaché in Washington, DC. In mid 2008, the Russian military attaché in Canada, First Degree Captain Viktor Nikitin was declared persona non grata for engaging in espionage activities incompatible with his status as a foreign diplomat and was ordered to leave Ottawa by the Canadian authorities. The Russian government then tried to transfer Nikitin to the U.S., but Washington refused due to the NATO-wide ban on foreign diplomats accused of espionage in allied countries. In response, in January of this year the Russian government asked the senior American defense attaché Brigadier General Henry J. Nowak to leave Moscow. Nowak has been reassigned since then and now serves as the Deputy Director for Counterterrorism Issues at the Office for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It appears that the Russia and U.S. decided to let bygones be bygones and resolved the dispute by a mutual appointment of new defense attachés.

Poland, Norway and Turkey to Share Early Warning Radar Data with Russia

At a news conference held in the town of Białystok (eastern Poland) late on Thursday, April 23, Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich unveiled the details of the trilateral initiative by Poland, Norway and Turkey to share early warning radar data with Russia. As envisioned, a command-and-control center will be set up in Warsaw to receive data on airborne threats from three early warning radars in Poland, Norway and Turkey. The Warsaw-based command center will then exchange data on airborne threats with Moscow. Klich considers the planned construction of center in Warsaw "an important element of cooperation with our partners in the East," which underscores that the dialogue between Poland and Russia is "not only political."

Subsequently commenting on Klich's statement the Polish Defense Ministry spokesman Robert Rochowicz noted that this was "a trilateral initiative by Poland, Norway and Turkey" without providing additional details.

The reaction of the United States has been pointedly muted thus far. According to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, the U.S. military abstained from making comments other than to state that "the matter should be discussed with NATO officials." This raises questions regarding the level of NATO endorsement of the trilateral initiative.

Meanwhile, Russia's envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin responded positively by hailing the trilateral initiative "as an example of practical cooperation, which will restore elements of trust between Russia and the alliance." Rogozin stated that in a reciprocal gesture Russia will establish a similar center to exchange early warning radar data with NATO.

The leading Russian defense analyst and security expert Pavel Felgenhauer told the Jamestown Foundation blog that while the exchange of radar data is technically feasible, it is politically sensitive and depends largely on the overall atmosphere of East-West relations. Felgenhauer pointed out that Russia and United States agreed to establish a joint U.S.-Russian global missile launch early warning center years ago (in accordance with the provision regarding the creation of the Joint Data Exchange Center of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative signed by Presidents Bill Clinton and Vladimir Putin on September 6, 2000), but it failed to materialize. In addition, it is not clear what info will the proposed command center in Poland share with Russia and what will Moscow send in return. Felgenhauer noted that the Russian military, following its old habits, is likely to view any radar data received from Poland as "deliberately planted malicious disinformation," and the existence of the NATO center in Warsaw as more evidence of NATO encirclement of Russia.

[Photo Credit: Defense Minister Bogdan Klich viewing Polish troops. February 11, 2009. Photo courtesy of Rzeczpospolita/Seweryn Sołtys/Źródło: Fotorzepa.]

NATO Exercises Conclude in Azerbaijan

The Regional Response 2009 military exercises, which are carried out in the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, conclude in Azerbaijan this weekend. The exercises commenced on April 18 and are due to end on April 26. Focused on multinational peacekeeping operations and intended to contribute to Azerbaijan's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO, the Regional Response 2009 consists of three-day staff and five-day field exercises. The defense attaches and representatives of defense ministries from Bulgaria, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and United States are attending the exercises as participants or observers. At the opening ceremony, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, General Carter F. Ham praised Azerbaijan's contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, where Azerbaijan maintains close to one hundred soldiers.

Amid Intensifying Russian Complaints Kazakhstan Boycotts NATO Exercises in Georgia

Today the Kazakh Minister of Defense Danial Akhmetov announced that his country will not be taking part in the NATO exercises in Georgia planned for May 6-June 1. This was later confirmed by the head of press service of the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, Serik Shalov. Astana is weary of needlessly antagonizing Moscow and the decision to withdraw from NATO exercises at the last moment will be undoubtedly appreciated by the Kremlin. Set to assume the prestigious chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, Kazakhstan is striving to strike a delicate balance between Russia and the West. In this context, participation in routine low-scale exercises under the NATO aegis against the backdrop of escalating warnings from Moscow in Astana's cost/benefit analysis was probably seen as counterproductive to Kazakhstan's national interests. Yet, Kazakhstan's change of mood is in stark contrast with its fellow CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) member, Armenia. Thus far, Russia's lone erstwhile ally in Transcaucasus has made no indication that it will pull out of the NATO exercises in Georgia. Moreover, the Armenian Ministry of Defense spokesman Seiran Shakhsuvarian stated that Armenia "will definitely take part" in the NATO exercises in Georgia.

The NATO command-and-staff two-part exercises codenamed Cooperative Longbow-2009/Cooperative Lancer-2009 were planned in spring of last year well before the Russia-Georgia war. Aimed mainly at improving the interoperability between the NATO and partner countries as part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, these exercises will involve 1,300 servicemen from 19 countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States) without light or heavy weaponry. The exercises will take place in Tbilisi and at the Vaziani military base, 20 km east of Tbilisi.

Since the official NATO announcement on April 15, 2009, the Russian government has been increasingly voicing its objections to the planned exercises in Georgia. The public statements mirrored the chain of command with the opening salvo by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko, who denounced the NATO exercises as contributing to "regional destabilization." Similar "concern" for regional stability was echoed later in the statement made by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Russia's eccentric and firebrand envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin called the NATO exercises in Georgia "insanity." On Friday, April 17, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev entered the fray when he described NATO's decision to hold military exercises in Georgia as "dangerous" and alluded to possible consequences for NATO-Russia relations. Today Rogozin specified what those consequences are when he mentioned that Russia will not take part in the meeting of the commanders of the general staffs of Russia and NATO, which was originally planned for May 7.

The Kremlin's ire is understandable because it interprets the conduct of NATO exercises as the demonstration of Western support to Mikheil Saakashvili's government, which has been besieged by the opposition protests since April 9. Thus, despite the seemingly innocuous nature of the NATO exercises, which the Secretary of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Lieutenant General Alexander Sinaisky dismissed as NATO's "political demarche," their timing appears to come into direct conflict with the Kremlin's hopes for collapse of Saakashvili's regime in Georgia amid ebbing and flowing political instability fomented by the fractious and impotent opposition.

Russia to Increase Military Presence in Kyrgyzstan

Today Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – the Russia-dominated military-political grouping of former Soviet states comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – announced that Russia decided to increase its air force assets at Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan. Speaking to journalists during his visit to Kyrgyzstan, Bordyuzha stated: “Russia’s leadership plans to increase the number of military aircraft at Kant (air base). It is in line with the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan.” Bordyuzha did not provide additional details regarding the number of planes, which Russia intends to send to Kyrgyzstan. Russia’s decision to increase its military presence in Kyrgyzstan should be viewed in the context of impending closure of U.S. air base at Manas, which serves as a vital transportation hub for providing supplies to the NATO and U.S. forces engaged in anti-terrorism and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. In an overt attempt to calm Kyrgyz anxieties over the expulsion of U.S. forces from Manas, Bordyuzha even deliberately diminished the importance of Manas when he told the RIA Novosti, “I don’t think the pullout of the base from Manas will drastically impact on the state of security in Central Asia.” He insisted that the recently signed transit agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will more than compensate for the loss of Manas by providing a more direct access route for the transportation of non-lethal cargo to Afghanistan. It should be recalled here that the Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev demanded the closure of U.S. air base in February in the course of his visit to Moscow, which yielded $2 billion economic assistance package and loan guarantees from the Russian government. Thus, seen against the backdrop of U.S. withdrawal from Kyrgyzstan, even a nominal increase in Russian air force assets here will contribute to consolidation of Moscow’s influence over this impoverished country and, broadly speaking, will increase the Kremlin’s bargaining leverage with the West vis-à-vis Afghanistan.