Prison Universities in Belarus

by Yuri Zarakhovich

On October 29, a group of young people filed a formal protest with a Minsk district prosecutor against the brutal breaking up by the riot police of a peaceful protest in the Belarus capital a week earlier.

Opposition activists are well aware of the fact that their protests against police violence will be turned down, but such formal protests also require the police to send a formal reply. On previous occasions the prosecutors’ responses were similar. Still, the opposition reasonably seeks to keep all these illegalities on the record.

Brutal police beatings and arrests of any protesters have long become a fixture of political life in Belarus. Only within the last five weeks, the riot police violently broke up three peaceful opposition rallies.

Powerful, well-trained policemen knock down protesters, shove their faces into the tarmac, beat them with clubs and heavy boots—and then throw them into huge armored trucks - the highest technological achievement of Alexander Lukashenko’s 15 year-old dictatorial rule.

I saw those trucks while covering Belarus’ “presidential election”---they are specious enough for the cops to push several dozen people in, and wield clubs to keep beating them on the way to jail. By the time they arrive, the blooded prisoners usually cannot stand on their feet.

This is followed by detentions—and more beatings.

Young protesters whom I met in Belarus in recent years, account for more days spent in jail between them, than for the number of years they have lived. Each has a broken head, or a damaged kidney, or broken ribs as mementos of senseless and vicious police brutality, as seeking democracy is a criminal offense in Lukashenko’s Belarus.

Once a Belarusian student acquires a police record, he or she is expelled from school. As protests against the dictatorship attract the best and the brightest, the most promising generations in Belarus now risk losing their education, while the state risks finding itself out on the limb. What future does any country have, if it denies education to its young?

However, the kids don’t feel they miss much. “They mostly teach Lukashenko’s state ideology at official schools these days,” they laughed in response to my questions. “In jails, we are getting the best of the real thing.” Indeed, they share jail cells with Belarus’ top intellectuals, professors, scholars and artists, who read them lectures they never had at school. “I lectured them on Freud and the arts,” the prominent Belarus documentary cinema director Yuri Khashchevatsky once explained to me, after he had served his ten days in jail with young people for taking part in a street protest action.

This is reminiscent of what we all read during our childhoods about 19th century oppression in East European monarchies where the best and the brightest obtained an education in jail rather than at school. Reproducing this pattern in the 21st century doesn’t bode well for Belarus.

Lukashenka on Abkhazia, Russia and the EU

by Roman Kupchinsky

Belarus President Alexander Lukashenka put on a grand performance in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius on September 16 during the Lithuanian-Belorussian business forum. It was his second visit to an EU member country since the EU-imposed ban on his travel was lifted.

For starters, Lukashenka told participants that the Belarus parliament will review the question of recognizing the Russian occupied Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in October.

The crafty former collective farm chairman, once seen as the last dictator in Europe, did not provide any hints as to what the outcome of these deliberations would be by his rubber stamp parliament. But the mere fact that he chose to highlight this issue a few days after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez promised to recognize the occupied territories in return for a highly lucrative arms deals worth $2.2 billion with the Kremlin, could be a sign that Lukashenka is also willing to recognize the break-away Georgian regions for a price.

At stake is a $500 million loan which the nearly bankrupt Belarus is seeking to obtain from Russia.

However, according to Kommersant daily, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sources in the Kremlin stated that Russia is not interested in providing any further credits to Belarus, even if the former Soviet Republic does recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

A source in the Russian president’s administration told Kommersant: “Lukashenka’s statement is his personal initiative. He promised this [to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia] a long time ago” To link the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with credits from Russia is senseless.”

The Belarusian president used the forum in Vilnius to present his views on relations between Belarus and the EU.

"We want to be a bridge between the East and West ... Why should we get rid of our relationship with Russia? Who would benefit from that?" "We want to be a good and strategic partner of the European Union," "I want the Europeans to understand we cannot be pushed about or made to do anything we don't want to." His country stood "on the threshold of accession to the European Union", Lukashenka stated.

While Moscow is hedging on loaning any more money to its neighbor and erstwhile ally, the West appears anxious to pull Belarus further from the Russian sphere.

Martin Raiser, the World Bank country director for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova said that the World Bank is considering extending a $200 million development credit issued to Belarus by offering the country two more development loans worth $200 million each.

This year, the World Bank’s total assistance to Belarus might total $325 million.

According to Reuters: “This… would be only a fifth of the $1.5 billion that Belarus has received from the International Monetary Fund since January as a part of a $3.5 billion stabilization loan.”

Russia Threatens to Cut Gas to Belarus

by Roman Kupchinsky

Russia’s Gazprom threatened to cut off gas deliveries to Belarus unless a debt of $244 million is repaid in July. The warning was issued by Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller who stated that “we have sent a letter demanding that the debt be paid, if not we shall act according to the terms of the contract. We can turn to the courts or we can reduce the volume of gas supplied.”

Gazprom officials told Kommersant Daily that Belarus owed $243 million for gas consumed from January-April and $10 million for late payment fines. Furthermore, Gazprom claims that Belarus received a total of $875 million for its sale of 12.5 percent of Beltransgaz, the owner of the Belarus gas pipeline, and for gas transit fees.

Belarus vice-premier Vladimir Semashko responded by saying that his country will only begin repaying the debt in July and will be able to pay the full amount by November. Semashko also noted that Belarus disputes the penalty charges of $10 million and will not pay them.

A large part of the misunderstanding stems from what was said and promised during a meeting between Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on April 10, 2009. Officials in Minsk claim that during the meeting, Medvedev promised that Belarus would be charged $150 per 1,000 cubic meters – that figure being the average yearly price for gas in 2009. This verbal agreement was then sent to Gazprom in the form of an addendum to the existing gas contract, however Gazprom never responded to the letter.

When asked about the conversation between the two presidents, Miller replied that there was in fact such a conversation but the agreed upon terms were not included in the addendum to the contract.

Gazprom has stated that it plans to charge Belarus “European prices” for gas beginning in 2011. What that might be is difficult to say and will depend upon the price of oil.

BPS-2 -A New Russian Oil Pipeline Which Might Not be Needed

by Roman Kupchinsky
On June 10, 2009 the construction of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS-2) got underway. The 1,170 km long pipeline will run from Unecha in the Bryansk Region to the Ust-Luga oil terminal south of St. Petersburg. The first stage with an annual capacity of 30 million tons is scheduled to be completed in September 2012. The second stage will increase capacity to 50 million tons and is due to be ready by the end of 2013.

In February 2007, Semyon Vainshtok, the-then head of Transneft, the operator of the BPS-2 pipeline, issued a statement saying that it was necessary to “protect the country” from the risks involved in transporting oil through the territories of neighboring countries. Earlier that year, a dispute occurred between Russia and Belarus over tariffs for oil transported via the Druzhba pipeline. “We discussed with colleagues that if we had had no risks with neighboring countries, we did not have to spend so much money,” Vainshtok said.

By ending Moscow’s dependence on Belarus as a transit country for Russian oil as well as relying on Ukraine’s oil terminal in Pivdenny on the Black Sea, Russia will deprive the badly starved Belarus treasury of some $1 billion annually in transit fees. At the same time, the Ukrainian Pivdenny oil terminal will most likely stand empty and the Odessa-Brody pipeline, originally built to ship oil from the Caspian to the Plock refinery in Poland will rust in the picturesque Ukrainian countryside if it cannot find a supply of oil.

Other factors also contributed heavily to the hurried pace of preparations of BPS-2, not least of which is the self-interest of some members of the Russian political and commercial elite who lobbied extensively for the project. Gunvor, a company which has often been linked in the media to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin who is reputed to have a close relationship with Gennadiy Timchenko, a co-owner of Gunvor, obtained a majority interest in the oil terminal being built in Ust-Luga in March 2009.

Ust-Luga will become the biggest outlet for refined products in the region, with a spur line connecting the port and crude pipeline to the Kirishi refinery, owned by Surgutneftegaz. Kirishi is more than 100 kilometers to the east of Ust-Luga.

A report released by Moscow investment bank Troika Dialog in December 2008 criticized the Gunvor scheme for Ust-Luga as “politically-driven…It is unclear where Transneft intends to find oil for the new pipeline, given declining oil production and exports and already ample spare capacity in the pipeline system. Moreover, some 450,000 bpd of West Siberian crude will be re-routed to fill the first phase of the Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. Transneft therefore faces the prospect of paying up to $5 billion for a project that would bring no additional revenues.”

In April 2008 Russia's Ministry of Industry and Energy submitted to the government its negative conclusions regarding the pipeline; however their reservations took second place to the geopolitical motives and the personal interests of the Russian elite.

Russia's Economic Pressure on Belarus Escalates to Trade War

by Alexander Melikishvili

On Friday, June 5, in a three-hour interview given to the chief editors of the mainstream Russian news publications - the newspapers Izvestia and Zavtra and journals Rossiiskaya Federatsiya Segodnya (Russian Federation Today) and Soyuznoe Gosudarstvo (Union State) - the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko presented the list of grievances and focused on the sources of tensions in the bilateral relations with Russia. In a bold move, President Lukashenko spoke openly about the fact that Russia linked the postponement of the $500 million loan to Belarus with Minsk's continued refusal to recognize the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In particular, when asked when Belarus plans to recognize the independence of Georgia's separatist territories and whether this was a painful topic in the relationship between Belarus and Russia, President Lukashenko responded:

"You say that this is a painful topic and question. But to me all Russian leaders tell me: 'This does not really matter. Well, if you recognize - that's good, but if you don't - that's fine too.' First of all, of course, for Russia this is not even an issue. Whether we recognize them or not, say, now, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Compared to what is happening around Belarus - that's not that important. But, yes, we do understand that this recognition would not be redundant for Russia. However, I often say that we have our own history of relationships with those republics, and in particular with Abkhazia. With Ossetia, of course, we almost had no such relations, even though we met with people and so on. This is my position...By the way, when we met within the framework of the C.I.S. [Commonwealth of Independent States] everyone told Medvedev: 'No, we have our own problems.' And I was the last one to speak and I said: 'If you do not want to recognize, do not look for motivation under the table. You simply do not want to do it, you are afraid and so forth. And why should not we express support? This is our only ally, we want a lot from it and so forth.' Ask Medvedev, ask him this question about my position. And I told the Russian leadership how we intend to resolve this problem. They had no more questions. But nonetheless...We reached the point that they arrive and say: if [you deliver on] Ossetia and Abkhazia - this means that there will be $500 million. You know, we do not want to 'sell' any issues and positions. We never had that in our history and we never will. We will resolve this issue by ourselves. More so because we met with the leader of Abkhazia Bagapsh, and after that we met with Kokoity. They do not have any questions for us. They understand our position."

At times equally cryptic and combative, President Lukashenko spoke with palpable frustration and provided a number of responses that will surely fuel speculations about the continuing rift in relations between Minsk and Moscow. On the possibility of Belarus becoming another subject of the Russian Federation Lukashenko's remarks actually contained a warning and a veiled threat:

"We, as leaders, must calculate the consequences of such a move. Even I, let's imagine that I make such a decision, and what about tomorrow? Do we have shortage of conflicts in the Caucasus? Today Russia is being 'bombed' for the fact that it 'imperially,' with armed force squashed and subdued...And what about here? From this point of view the President of Russia says: 'Yes, you are absolutely right...This will be absolutely harmful for Russia.' On the other hand - we have our own 'morons,' there are a few of them, even if they constitute two, or, say, three percent, but they are the most active, the most ambitious, the most 'moronic' in any society. They are ready to unleash 'national-liberation war.' They need a pretext. At present everyone makes fun of this. And you think that they will not have anything to fight with? Tomorrow they can receive from Ukraine, the Baltics, mainly from there, from Poland, where they maintain channels. The weapons will surface instantly, explosions, the situation will be destabilized and many in the society will think: listen, they fight for independence, for what is sacred. Here, in Belarus, our people are not dumb, they think exactly the same as the Russians: 'our land, we will never give up, they will tear their shirts and go.' They are similar to Russians in that. Do you want to create one more Chechnya here? I don't."

Meanwhile the ever inventive head of the Russian Federal Consumer Protection Service, Gennadiy Onishchenko (one of the chief architects of the economic embargo imposed on Georgia) announced a comprehensive ban on imports of Belarusian milk products to Russia, which will surely hit Minsk hard economically considering that Belarus exports 40 percent of the milk it produces and 95 percent of it (worth $1 billion) goes to Russia annually. Even though the Russian government went to a considerable extent to deny any political pretext and the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the notion of tacit economic sanctions against Belarus and insisted that the ban stemmed from the concern for the health of Russian consumers, the closer examination of imposed measures clearly indicates otherwise. According to The Moscow Times, the ban on Belarusian milk products is formally predicated on the technicality - the failure by the Belarusian manufacturers to comply with the new regulations for the dairy industry products that went into effect in December, which include requirements to provide additional information on packages. However, the dairy industries of other neighboring countries, including Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine, also, by and large, do not meet the new regulations and yet their products have not been affected by the ban thus far.

Moscow's bullying appears to have produced a rare moment of opportunity for Minsk's rapprochement with the West. At the meeting on Monday with the Deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives of the Belarusian National Assembly, Valery Ivanow, the special rapporteur on Belarus for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (P.A.C.E.), Andrea Rigoni stated that Belarus was invited to participate in the P.A.C.E. session on June 23, which will include the discussion of the question of restoring special guest status for Belarus. In addition, the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) announced today that the loan to Belarus has been increased by $1 billion to $3.5 billion, which must still be approved by the executive board of the I.M.F. It remains to be seen whether increased Western attention and efforts to engage Minsk will indeed result in the multi-vector foreign policy by President Lukashenko. It is clear though that the ultimate litmus test of whether Minsk will bow to Moscow's pressure will be the issue of the recognition of Georgia's breakaway provinces.

Amid Growing Tensions Russia Postpones $500 Million Loan to Belarus

On Thursday, May 28, the Russian government delegation led by the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin traveled to Belarus to participate in another session of the Council of Ministers of the Belarusian-Russian Union State, a chimera of bilateral state integration that has been dragging on with mixed results for close to a decade. The visit laid bare the growing differences between Russia and Belarus on a number of important issues. At the press conference before the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Belarusian-Russian Union State, the Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin harshly criticized the Belarusian government's inept economic policies.

In particular, Kudrin stated that because Belarus refused to accept the $500 million loan in Russian rubles, Moscow decided to postpone it. It should be noted that the aforementioned loan was supposed to be the final installment of the $2 billion loan, which Moscow and Minsk agreed upon last year as part of the bilateral anti-crisis economic recovery program. Russia gave Belarus $1 billion last year and another $500 million earlier this year. Kudrin ridiculed the Belarus' planned economy and described the Belarusian government's control of its currency as a "meaningless policy." He went on to accuse Belarus of having a "parasitic" attitude toward Russia. Kudrin warned that the deepening hard currency deficit in Belarus may lead to the country's insolvency. In this regard Kudrin noted, "We may see insolvency of the Belarusian government and the Belarusian economy as a whole due to the hard currency shortage at the end of this year or next year."

Emerging after a frosty meeting with President Lukashenko, Putin tried to alleviate tensions caused by Kudrin's remarks by calling them "extreme assessments" which were "inappropriate." He provided the assurance that "whatever happens in the world economy, Russia will always give its shoulder to Belarus when necessary." On Friday, May 29, in another attempt at belated damage control, the visiting First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov interpreted the recurrent Russian-Belarusian "complications" as the byproduct of "intensive work," which in his view "must be settled calmly."

However, the damage appears to have been done. On Friday, at a meeting of the Belarusian government devoted to the discussions of socio-economic developments, President Lukashenko bluntly rebuffed Kudrin's criticism and strongly urged cabinet members to diversify sources of external economic assistance to Belarus. In an impassioned soliloquy he implored Belarusian Prime Minister Sergei Sidorsky and the Chairman of the Board of the National Bank of Belarus Piotr Prokopovich to stop relying on Russian assistance. President Lukashenko pointedly remarked:

“If things don’t work out in Russia, bowing, nagging and weeping is useless. We should seek our happiness in another part of the planet...We are an independent sovereign country and we will do everything in our interest...Therefore, you must remember: no praying or begging. If they don’t have the $500 million that they promised a long time ago and that we included in our budget, don’t go and beg...Let’s build our economy and policy as a sovereign independent state. We have many levers to influence the situation, those challenges that we face, including in Russia. Let’s use them. When will we start thinking as civil servants of an independent sovereign state?”

Referring specifically to Kudrin's remarks, Lukashenko stated:

"Yesterday we witnessed an interesting situation. The President of Belarus and Vladimir Putin were discussing things from private to state ones in an absolutely friendly manner. The discussion went well. Meanwhile Aleksei Kudrin held a press conference before the session of the Union Council of Ministers in order to sow panic in Belarus...If their economy is that good, where did the 10% GDP decline come from? Our economy is different, but our GDP growth stands at 1.5%."

At times noticeably irritated President Lukashenko continued to press his cabinet members and even implied that Kudrin's remarks were approved by Prime Minister Putin:

“What is your problem? Why do you go to Russia where you are kicked? Don’t you understand that it is not the first time when they want to get us for free? Yesterday Vladimir Putin said that he had discussed the situation with Kudrin while flying to Minsk. And after that Kudrin broke out his rant. Wasn’t it arranged? It was, totally."

The global economic downturn caused severe hard currency shortage in Belarus and forced President Lukashenko to pass the law simplifying procedures for foreign companies to deposit funds in Belarusian banks. As the independent Belarusian political analyst Leonid Zaiko suggests, Belarus' impending default may provide Moscow with an opportunity to pull Minsk back into its orbit. In this regard two matters are of particular importance to the Kremlin. First, Belarus' recent overtures to the West have been an irritant for the Kremlin in part because improved relations will increase Minsk's bargaining leverage with Moscow. Minsk's goodwill gesture of release of political prisoners, Brussels' decision to lift the travel ban on top Belarusian officials, followed by President Lukashenko's unprecedented visit to Vatican and Minsk's accession to the Eastern Partnership greatly concern the Kremlin. Moscow is fully aware of the hard currency shortage in Minsk and the sudden change of the monetary format of the last installment (from U.S. dollars to Russian rubles) of the loan may have been intended to remind Belarus of its obligations. Second, Moscow expects Minsk to recognize the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During his visit to Minsk, Kudrin was quick to deny the existence of any linkage between Minsk's continued refusal to recognize the independence of Georgia's secessionist provinces and the postponement of the loan. He told the press: "I have never raised this issue with any Belarusian official." Nonetheless, judging by the fact that President Lukashenko raised this issue in his speech at the government meeting on Friday, there is little doubt that it was indeed discussed during his meeting with Prime Minister Putin. On this matter Lukashenko stated:

“The bottom line is the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is the question between us and these countries, with which we have excellent contacts and they know our tactics...nobody will pressure us about it from the East and the West”.

Proverbially resilient President Lukashenko proved many a times in the past that he is capable of resisting Russia's pressure effectively. It will remain to be seen whether he will succeed this time under the impact of the global economic crisis. In conclusion of his Friday speech at the government meeting President Lukashenko made a veiled reference to the peculiar geopolitical setting in which Belarus is caught due to the struggle for influence between the E.U. and Russia:

"This is a big game. Keep it in mind. If we make it, the state will survive. If we don’t, we will be crushed and pocketed. Our sorrow is nothing. But we lead 10 million talented and hard-working people, who we mustn’t expose or deceive.”

Iran Signals Possible Shift of Procurement of Advanced Air Defense Systems from Russia to China and Belarus

According to a report in the Iranian news agency Press TV, Tehran is now contemplating to buy the HongQi-9 (HQ-9) long-range surface-to-air missile systems recently offered by China for export under the name of FD-2000. As the Press TV report suggests, Tehran's shift of procurement efforts from Russia to China can be explained by Iran's frustration over Moscow's continued refusal to honor the $800 million deal signed in 2007 to deliver the S-300 strategic air defense systems, which was discussed on this blog in April. Designed by the China Academy of Defense Technology and manufactured by the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), the HQ-9/FD-2000 is a reverse engineered hybrid of U.S. Patriot and Russian S-300 air defense systems. Although, judging by some of its technical characteristics, HQ-9/FD-2000 is inferior to the advanced versions of the S-300 family of air defense systems, including the S-300 PMU1 and S-300 PMU2, it can nonetheless considerably improve Iranian air defense capabilities around the nuclear facilities and critical infrastructure assets. Equipped with the phased array guidance radar capable of tracking 100 targets, the HQ-9/FD-2000 air defense system can engage up to 48 airborne assets (including aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles and even tactical ballistic missiles) simultaneously at the range of 7-125 km and firing altitude of 0.025-27 km.

In a parallel development, in January the British defense publication Jane's reported that, based on the information provided by the undisclosed "defense industrial sources in Belarus," Iran was finalizing the $140 million deal with Belarus for the delivery of two surplus S-300 PT air defense systems. It should be noted that the S-300 PT is an older version of the S-300 air defense system, which was first deployed by the Soviet Union in 1978. Nonetheless, according to the Jane's report, the S-300 PT air defense systems allegedly proposed for sale to Tehran by Minsk are equipped with the 5V55K and 5V55R missiles with the range of 47 km and 75 km respectively. Considering that in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on the joint air defense and creation of an integrated air defense network signed by Russia and Belarus in February, Moscow is obligated to supply the advanced S-400 air defense systems as part of the planned upgrade of air defense system in Belarus, it is no wonder that Minsk is now in the possession of the surplus outdated S-300 PT platforms. The First Deputy Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Vadim Volkovitsky recently confirmed to the RIA Novosti that Russia and Belarus were negotiating the details of the S-400 transfer without specifying the delivery schedule.

The Jane's report provides astonishing details regarding the manner in which the S-300 PT air defense systems may be delivered to Iran from Belarus. According to Jane's, the partially disassembled air defense systems and spare parts will be transferred to Iran aboard cargo civilian and military aircraft as part of the regular flights between Minsk and Tehran. Moreover, the investigative reporter Edwin Black wrote in July of last year quoting "informed sources" that some of the components of the S-300 air defense system had already arrived in Iran but remained disassembled in boxes. Black described Belarus as "a common portal for controversial Russian arms shipments" and claimed that the Israeli Ministry of Defense believed that the S-300s would be delivered to Iran via Belarus. Meanwhile, on May 8, the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko summarily dismissed foreign media reports concerning illicit transfers to Iran. President Lukashenko stated, "As far as S-300 and Iskander [missiles] are concerned, these complexes cannot be exported without my approval. There is not a single contract or project related to these systems that I have been asked to approve. This is utter nonsense."

Regardless of the speculations in media and official denials, the "background noise" created by the aforementioned news reports prompts one to surmise that the United States and its allies will not be able to prevent the illicit transfers of S-300 air defense systems to Iran if they were to occur within the hypothetical logistical Russia-Belarus-Syria-Iran (with a plausible modification of Russia-Belarus-Armenia-Iran) network. The high level of secrecy and impeccably falsified consignment documentation will most likely ensure that the shipments will be carried out undetected. Thus, in the absence of specific intelligence, the U.S. and its allies will have to continue to rely on satellite imagery in the hope of identifying preparations indicative of the possible deployment of S-300 air defense systems in Iran.

Distrust between Russia and EU builds over Eastern Partnership initiative

The meeting of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on April 28 in Luxembourg presented another vivid example of growing differences over the recently launched EU outreach initiative to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova called the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Conceived by Poland and supported by Sweden, the EaP was formally introduced to the EU in May 2008. It is primarily aimed at forging closer ties between the EU and the six ex-Soviet republics by encouraging democratic changes and free market reforms with targeted assistance programs. The EaP was officially endorsed by the EU on March 20, 2009 and it will be launched at the EU summit in Prague on May 7.

From the outset the EaP caused considerable anxiety in Moscow. At the Brussels Forum in March, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov famously lashed out at the EU for using the EaP as a vehicle for carving out a "sphere of influence" in the post-Soviet space. Lavrov's comments set the stage for his meeting with the Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg (Czech Republic currently holds the EU rotating presidency) in Luxembourg. Before the meeting Schwarzenberg dismissed Lavrov's misgivings regarding the EaP when he told the press, "He knows himself it's nonsense." The Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt stated that Lavrov's comment in March "speaks for itself that he thinks in terms of influence immediately."

At the meeting in Luxembourg the Russian side apparently sought and, at least according to Lavrov, received assurances from the EU that the EaP will not be directed against Russian interests in the post-Soviet space. At the press conference following the EU-Russia meeting, Lavrov guardedly noted, "We heard an announcement from Brussels that this is not an attempt to create a new sphere of influence and that it is not a process which is directed against Russia. We want to believe in this guarantee but I won't deny that some comments on the initiative made by the EU have concerned us." Schwarzenberg attempted to further reassure the Russians when he told the media, "I am sure Russia will see this time that it's not against them. It [EaP] is purely a development project."

Despite the fact that there is much uncertainty about the EaP to begin with, as demonstrated in this thoughtful analysis by RFE/RL's Ahto Lobjakas, the Kremlin's increasing paranoia of encirclement turns all Western initiatives in the post-Soviet space, however benign they may be, into a zero-sum competition for influence in the best traditions of XIX and XX centuries geopolitics. Furthermore, the EaP implementation in states like Belarus, as David Marples discusses in Eurasia Daily Monitor, will be highly questionable in the long term considering the essential incompatibility between the EU standards and the authoritarian nature of the political system in that country. In sum, the EaP emerges as a major irritant in EU-Russia relations and over time it may turn out to be an insurmountable obstacle.