Erecting a Wall inside Georgia

by Giorgi Kvelashvili

On August 14 the head of the legitimate government of Abkhazia, Gia Baramia, addressed the Abkhaz people from a bridge on the Enguri River, which now separates Russian-occupied Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. He made his appeal to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the beginning of hostilities in 1992 between the authorities in Tbilisi and Moscow-backed anti-government forces in Abkhazia.

Born and reared in Sokhumi, Mr. Baramia invoked a long tradition of “brotherhood between the Georgians and the Abkhaz who throughout the centuries lived on the same land in peace and harmony - united by identical traditions and customs and by bonds of friendship and intermarriage.” Recently appointed to this post, Baramia, the head of the Abkhaz government in exile, who is not even allowed to travel to Sokhumi and whose house in Abkhazia is currently occupied by strangers, tried to avoid mentioning political issues and concentrated mainly on humanitarian aspects of the unsettled conflict. Nonetheless, he did say bitter words about the “ignominious third force that had intruded into our lives… and had separate relatives, friends, neighbors, and classmates.” At the end of his speech the leader of more than 300,000 Georgian citizens, victims of ethnic cleansing who are not permitted to return to their homes in Abkhazia, called on “the Abkhaz compatriots to engage in bilateral dialogue that will restore confidence and renew old ties.”

On the same day the very same bridge on the administrative border was crossed by a man who said he lives in Gudauta, a town near Sokhumi, and “asked for Georgian citizenship.” In his interview to the Georgian TV channel Rustavi 2, Tengiz Lakerbaia, an ethnic Abkhaz, explained the motivation to make such a move: “It is very hard to live in Abkhazia…people have no jobs…and our president [Sergei Bagapsh] sells everything to the Russians. Many people want to leave Abkhazia but they are afraid…We will have unrest in December.”

There are signs that the situation in Abkhazia is indeed deteriorating. Opposition factions constantly accuse the de facto regime of increasingly heavy reliance on Russia and abandoning the cause of independence. Following the interview to the Moscow radio station Ekho Moskvy on July 15 in which Sergei Bagapsh did not exclude the possibility that Abkhazia, in the future, might become part of Russia through a “referendum of the people” the de facto leader’s critics came out with a statement condemning “the incompetent authorities whose actions pose a real threat to the statehood and the people of Abkhazia.”

On August 12 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin traveled to Abkhazia to give new impetus to already heavy Russian presence there. During his visit two bombs were detonated in Sokhumi and Gagra, killing two people and injuring seven. Shortly afterwards, the Russian occupational forces intensified their efforts to strengthen the “border” between Abkhazia and Georgia proper. According to Rustavi 2, “the bridges on the Enguri river are being mined” and the Russians “are putting in place fortifications and barbwire fences along the 85-kilometer border.” Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister David Jalagania said on August 17 that “this is a continuation of the Russian policy of aggression and occupation.” President Saakashvili of Georgia repeatedly called the Moscow-drawn lines separating Abkhazia and Tskhinvali from other parts of Georgia “a new Berlin Wall in Europe.”

While Georgian officials are trying to reach out to the populations on the other side of the “wall,” Moscow is doubling its efforts to militarize the two occupied regions and fortify the “borders” in order to minimize contact between ordinary Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossetians.

Medvedev Visits South Ossetia

[Photo Credit: President Dmitry Medvedev is greeted by traditionally dressed Ossetians in Tskhinvali, the capital of Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia, July 13, 2009. Photo courtesy of Ezhednevniy Zhurnal, www.ej.ru]

by Alexander Melikishvili

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's stealthy visit to Tskhinvali, the capital of Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia, on Monday, July 13, was significant in many ways. Occurring a week after U.S. President Barack Obama's historic "reset" visit to Moscow, it was firstly intended to demonstrate to Washington the importance Russian leadership (read Putin) attaches to the idea of "spheres of influence" in the post-Soviet space in general and in South Caucasus in particular. Secondly, as Russian investigative journalist Yulia Latynina correctly points out, it was an exercise in public humiliation of President Medvedev, who was dispatched to that forsaken landlocked enclave by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. After all, what better way to dispel the speculations about who is in charge in the aftermath of the U.S.-Russian summit? Thirdly, undoubtedly it was a petty swipe at U.S. and the West as a whole for the three seemingly unrelated events (in no particular order of importance): the July 20-24 visit by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to Georgia and Ukraine; the arrival of the U.S.S. Stout in Batumi on July 14 in preparation for the joint U.S.-Georgian naval exercises in maritime security scheduled for July 15; and the signing of the intergovernmental agreement for the construction of the strategically important Nabucco gas pipeline, which took place in Ankara on July 13.

Flown to South Ossetia on a helicopter from the military airport in Mozdok, North Ossetia, Medvedev spent some time touring the newly built 4th Russian military base in Tskhinvali. At the base, which is a part of Russia's 58th Army, the commander of the North Caucasus Military District Colonel-General Sergei Makarov, who commanded the Russian troops during last year's war with Georgia, showed Medvedev the tank hangar, barracks and dining area and boasted that, "At present our base is capable of fulfilling all tasks that are assigned to it." Indeed, the military component was prominent throughout Medvedev's visit as he was accompanied by the Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov. Mimicking the secrecy that usually shrouds the trips of Western leaders to conflict areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, President Medvedev's visit to Tskhinvali was also kept secret until the very last moment. According to Kommersant, the separatist leader Eduard Kokoity was informed about the high guest less than an hour before his arrival.

Although no agreements were signed in the course of this very brief visit, its symbolic importance was manifold. The Russian government defiantly demonstrated to the West and the U.S. that it intends to honor its commitments to Georgia's secessionist areas. President Medvedev emphasized in Tskhinvali that Russia will continue to fund the reconstruction of the enclave even though he could clearly see that Russian taxpayers' money has been disappearing into thin air as much of the town still lies in ruins. The level of socio-economic deprivation and impoverishment in South Ossetia was even reflected in Medvedev's comments, when he could not help but notice that, "They [South Ossetians] live in very poor and difficult conditions, but to be honest, they are very grateful to Russia for the difficult decisions that were made in August 2008." Thus, utterly dependent on Russia in everything and with the economy at a virtual standstill, South Ossetia has been effectively turned into a military bridgehead whose sole purpose is to intimidate Tbilisi by its sheer proximity.

Russia's Economic Pressure on Belarus Escalates to Trade War

by Alexander Melikishvili

On Friday, June 5, in a three-hour interview given to the chief editors of the mainstream Russian news publications - the newspapers Izvestia and Zavtra and journals Rossiiskaya Federatsiya Segodnya (Russian Federation Today) and Soyuznoe Gosudarstvo (Union State) - the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko presented the list of grievances and focused on the sources of tensions in the bilateral relations with Russia. In a bold move, President Lukashenko spoke openly about the fact that Russia linked the postponement of the $500 million loan to Belarus with Minsk's continued refusal to recognize the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In particular, when asked when Belarus plans to recognize the independence of Georgia's separatist territories and whether this was a painful topic in the relationship between Belarus and Russia, President Lukashenko responded:

"You say that this is a painful topic and question. But to me all Russian leaders tell me: 'This does not really matter. Well, if you recognize - that's good, but if you don't - that's fine too.' First of all, of course, for Russia this is not even an issue. Whether we recognize them or not, say, now, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Compared to what is happening around Belarus - that's not that important. But, yes, we do understand that this recognition would not be redundant for Russia. However, I often say that we have our own history of relationships with those republics, and in particular with Abkhazia. With Ossetia, of course, we almost had no such relations, even though we met with people and so on. This is my position...By the way, when we met within the framework of the C.I.S. [Commonwealth of Independent States] everyone told Medvedev: 'No, we have our own problems.' And I was the last one to speak and I said: 'If you do not want to recognize, do not look for motivation under the table. You simply do not want to do it, you are afraid and so forth. And why should not we express support? This is our only ally, we want a lot from it and so forth.' Ask Medvedev, ask him this question about my position. And I told the Russian leadership how we intend to resolve this problem. They had no more questions. But nonetheless...We reached the point that they arrive and say: if [you deliver on] Ossetia and Abkhazia - this means that there will be $500 million. You know, we do not want to 'sell' any issues and positions. We never had that in our history and we never will. We will resolve this issue by ourselves. More so because we met with the leader of Abkhazia Bagapsh, and after that we met with Kokoity. They do not have any questions for us. They understand our position."

At times equally cryptic and combative, President Lukashenko spoke with palpable frustration and provided a number of responses that will surely fuel speculations about the continuing rift in relations between Minsk and Moscow. On the possibility of Belarus becoming another subject of the Russian Federation Lukashenko's remarks actually contained a warning and a veiled threat:

"We, as leaders, must calculate the consequences of such a move. Even I, let's imagine that I make such a decision, and what about tomorrow? Do we have shortage of conflicts in the Caucasus? Today Russia is being 'bombed' for the fact that it 'imperially,' with armed force squashed and subdued...And what about here? From this point of view the President of Russia says: 'Yes, you are absolutely right...This will be absolutely harmful for Russia.' On the other hand - we have our own 'morons,' there are a few of them, even if they constitute two, or, say, three percent, but they are the most active, the most ambitious, the most 'moronic' in any society. They are ready to unleash 'national-liberation war.' They need a pretext. At present everyone makes fun of this. And you think that they will not have anything to fight with? Tomorrow they can receive from Ukraine, the Baltics, mainly from there, from Poland, where they maintain channels. The weapons will surface instantly, explosions, the situation will be destabilized and many in the society will think: listen, they fight for independence, for what is sacred. Here, in Belarus, our people are not dumb, they think exactly the same as the Russians: 'our land, we will never give up, they will tear their shirts and go.' They are similar to Russians in that. Do you want to create one more Chechnya here? I don't."

Meanwhile the ever inventive head of the Russian Federal Consumer Protection Service, Gennadiy Onishchenko (one of the chief architects of the economic embargo imposed on Georgia) announced a comprehensive ban on imports of Belarusian milk products to Russia, which will surely hit Minsk hard economically considering that Belarus exports 40 percent of the milk it produces and 95 percent of it (worth $1 billion) goes to Russia annually. Even though the Russian government went to a considerable extent to deny any political pretext and the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the notion of tacit economic sanctions against Belarus and insisted that the ban stemmed from the concern for the health of Russian consumers, the closer examination of imposed measures clearly indicates otherwise. According to The Moscow Times, the ban on Belarusian milk products is formally predicated on the technicality - the failure by the Belarusian manufacturers to comply with the new regulations for the dairy industry products that went into effect in December, which include requirements to provide additional information on packages. However, the dairy industries of other neighboring countries, including Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine, also, by and large, do not meet the new regulations and yet their products have not been affected by the ban thus far.

Moscow's bullying appears to have produced a rare moment of opportunity for Minsk's rapprochement with the West. At the meeting on Monday with the Deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives of the Belarusian National Assembly, Valery Ivanow, the special rapporteur on Belarus for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (P.A.C.E.), Andrea Rigoni stated that Belarus was invited to participate in the P.A.C.E. session on June 23, which will include the discussion of the question of restoring special guest status for Belarus. In addition, the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) announced today that the loan to Belarus has been increased by $1 billion to $3.5 billion, which must still be approved by the executive board of the I.M.F. It remains to be seen whether increased Western attention and efforts to engage Minsk will indeed result in the multi-vector foreign policy by President Lukashenko. It is clear though that the ultimate litmus test of whether Minsk will bow to Moscow's pressure will be the issue of the recognition of Georgia's breakaway provinces.

Fifth Round of Russian-Georgian Security Talks in Geneva Ends with Mixed Results

The fifth round of the security talks between Georgia, Russia and Georgia's breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was off to a rocky start on Monday, May 18, when the Russian delegation, citing Abkhazia's refusal to participate, pulled out from the negotiations along with its other proxy, South Ossetia. Under the pretext of a bureaucratic technicality - the delay in the distribution of the U.N. Secretary-General's most recent report on the situation in Georgia - the separatist Foreign Minister of Abkhazia Sergei Shamba told Reuters on Saturday, May 16, that Abkhazia would not take part in talks.

As this detailed analysis of the U.N. report by Civil.ge explains, Abkhazia balked at the title of the report, which contained the accepted designation of "Abkhazia, Georgia" because it implied that Abkhazia is a part of Georgia. As a result, under the joint pressure from Abkhazia and Russia, the report's title was revised to drop any reference to the contentious issue of the status of the breakaway region. In addition, the reference to the separatist authorities in Abkhazia as "de facto Abkhaz authorities," which was used customarily in all previous reports, was for the first time truncated to just "Abkhaz authorities." Introduction of these last minute semantic changes undoubtedly represented a concession to Moscow because it is consistent with the Russian campaign to obtain the international community's acceptance of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Commenting on the revised version of the U.N. report, the Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze noted that it contained "points clearly indicating that they were introduced under pressure from Russia."

After the revised U.N. report finally arrived late on Monday and the U.S. State Department spokesperson Ian Kelly called the Russian walk-out "a coordinated effort to undermine the Geneva talks," the Russian side and its separatist allies decided to reengage the next day. The 3.5 hour closed-door talks on Tuesday were hailed as constructive by the E.U. co-chair of negotiations Pierre Morel. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry press release of May 20, the discussions mainly focused on the Russian proposals for the legally binding non-use of force agreements between Georgia and the breakaway regions, including "a commitment not to remilitarize Georgia." Moscow views such agreements as absolute preconditions for "a reliable security regime" in the conflict zone.

Co-chaired by the U.N., the E.U., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (O.S.C.E.) and with participation of U.S. diplomats, and dubbed the "Geneva Discussions on Transcaucasia" by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the security talks in Geneva represent one of the few remaining diplomatic venues, where Russian and Georgian sides meet face to face. The most recent session, originally scheduled for two days (18-19 May), is the fifth one since the launch in September of last year and the next meeting is tentatively scheduled for July 1. Meanwhile the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (U.N.O.M.I.G.) with its 129 military observers and 16 police officers, who monitor the situation along the de facto border between Abkhazia and Georgia, is expiring on June 15 and its fate will be decided by a vote of the U.N. Security Council.

Russia Signs Border Defense Pacts with Georgia's Breakaway Regions

[Photo Credit: The separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity (left and right respectively) with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (center). The Kremlin, Moscow, April 30, 2009. Photo courtesy of the Presidential Press and Information Office/President of Russia Official Web Portal.]

On Thursday, April 30, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and separatist leaders of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia - Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity - signed bilateral agreements that, in effect, make the Russian border guard troops, which are under the jurisdiction of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), responsible for protecting the de facto borders of secessionist regions with Georgia proper. According to the Kremlin press release, Russia will assist the separatist authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with personnel training and establishment of national border guard services. In addition, the agreements on cooperation and collaboration between FSB and Abkhazia's State Security Service and South Ossetia's State Security Committee were signed thereby confirming the status of Moscow's newly acquired satrapies as intelligence-gathering bridgeheads in the Transcaucasus. President Medvedev used the ceremony marking the signing of the security pacts in the Kremlin to attack the planned NATO exercises in Georgia calling them "a blatant provocation."

Russia's signing of border defense pacts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia drew rebukes of varying degrees of severity from the EU, US and NATO. EU Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg accused Russia of violating last year's Sarkozy-Medvedev six-point ceasefire agreement and stated that Moscow's move destroyed any hope of trust. The US State Department statement expressed "serious concern" and charged Russia with violating Georgia's territorial integrity. NATO spokesperson James Appathurai echoed Schwarzenberg's comments when he characterized the signed border defense pacts as a "clear contravention" of the Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire agreements of August 12th and September 8th.

Meanwhile, unperturbed by the international outcry the Russian border guards assumed control over the de facto border between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Head of the FSB's Department of Border Guards in the Southern Federal District, Colonel General Nikolai Lisinsky confirmed that Russian border guard units began patrolling the de facto border between South Ossetia and Georgia. Lisinsky revealed the plans to build 20 military compounds along the border perimeter, which will be monitored with modern equipment, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (an obvious exaggeration considering that currently Russian UAV capabilities are still in their infancy; see the related past story here).

By deploying its border guards to protect the de facto borders of Georgia's separatist territories Russia is significantly upping the ante ahead of the NATO exercises planned for May 6-June 1. The Kremlin's belligerent rhetoric already scared Kazakhstan, Moldova and Serbia out of participating in the aforementioned exercises. Taking into account the volatile situation in the areas along the de facto border between the breakaway regions and Georgia proper, Tbilisi is now bracing for possible provocations timed to coincide with the NATO exercises. More specifically, the possibility of orchestrated harassment of the Georgian population in the Gali District of Abkhazia looms as particularly ominous contingency because it will force the Georgian government to react. Although the Georgian population of the Gali District fluctuates considerably it is estimated to be in the 30,000-40,000 range.

Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian Sides Meet to Defuse Tensions in the Conflict Zone

The first meeting of Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian sides in accordance with the terms of the incident prevention and response mechanism agreed upon during negotiations in Geneva in February was held today in the Georgian village of Ergneti close to the border between the breakaway region of South Ossetia and Georgia proper. The representatives from OSCE and EU Monitoring Mission also attended this meeting. According to Shota Utiashvili, head of the Analytical and Information Department of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, who headed the Georgian delegation, the sides failed to make "progress on concrete issues." The Russian representative, first deputy chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Sergei Antonov told the Itar-Tass news agency that the sides agreed to meet twice a month and to establish a 24-hour phone hotline to report incidents. Even though the Georgian side already selected an officer from the Shida Kartli police department to be liaison officer for that purpose, Utiashvili expressed skepticism about the feasibility of the new communications channel. The meeting could not have been timelier considering the recent increase in Russian military presence in South Ossetia, shooting incident on April 22 on the border between South Ossetia and Georgia and the temporary detention of two OSCE observers by the South Ossetian separatists on April 21.

[Photo Credit: Russian checkpoint at the entrance to the Georgian village of Akhmaji on the border between Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Georgia. April 13, 2009. Photo courtesy of Associated Press Photo/Sergei Grits.]