Viktor Yanukovych – Forever!

By Taras Kuzio

The arrest and imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko in 2010-2012 baffled Europeans and Americans because it seemed irrational for Yanukovych to undermine the Association Agreement with the EU that opened up the world’s largest market to Ukrainian business. This could be countered by the fact that Ukraine’s elites, like elites throughout Eurasia, prioritise their own self enrichment over state interests. The EU may have blocked the Association Agreement but why should this matter when Ukrainian elites can still own property, have offices and send their children to universities in Britain, France, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and of course Cyprus. The EU has blocked Ukraine from integrating into the EU while still permitting its elites the ability to live, work and shop as other Europeans.

The step also made it more difficult for Yanukovych to balance relations and negotiate with Russia at a time when Ukraine is isolated in the West (Serhiy Kudelia, “Why Yanukovych Did It: Explaining the Rationality of His Choice,” http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/KudeliaOct18.pdf and EDM, November 4, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38631).  This factor assumes wrongly that Yanukovych was always a promoter of a multi-vector foreign policy similar to that pursued by President Leonid Kuchma.
    

Former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer writes that Kuchma’s multi-vector foreign policy centred on Europe, the US and Russia but of “the three, he increasingly placed emphasis on Europe” (http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2012/03_ukraine_pifer.aspx). Russia – not Europe - has always been the main emphasis in Yanukovych’s multi-vector foreign policy, but Western policymakers did not want to see this and believed his rhetoric about European integration.

A third factor why the arrests of opposition leaders were deemed to be irrational was because it gave Yanukovych no exit from power; if he left office, Tymoshenko could be released and she would take her revenge. A freed Tymoshenko would not only be a threat to Yanukovych but to many others in “The Family” (see EDM, December 2, 2011) and security forces (Security Service, prosecutors, judges, etc.) who have been involved in political repression.

This factor always rested on the assumption Yanukovych was considering leaving office. But, what if his strategic plan was to copy other Eurasian authoritarian leaders and think: Yanukovych – forever!

Unwritten rules under President Kuchma meant he would not imprison opposition leaders because he “understood that in this country one could not take power forever.” But, as Ukrainian Catholic University historian Yaroslav Hrytsak has pointed out, “The current authorities act as if they have come to power for 100 years” (http://expres.ua/main/2012/02/18/60595).

There are growing signals that the presidential administration is already contemplating ensuring a second term for Yanukovych in 2015 and, more dangerously, an indefinite prolongation of his presidency beyond his two term limit in 2020.

President Viktor Yanukovych no longer has to travel to downtown Kyiv and can work from his palatial Mezhyhirya home. His 30 car motorcades were a nightmare for Kyivites and reduced his always low popularity even further in Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital city. In March a rental agreement was signed between Mezhyhirya and the State Administrative Directorate (Derzhupravlinnia spravamy [DUS]) for Yanukovych’s new office in his palatial home. DUS is a relic of the Soviet era that manages all property owned by the presidential administration and National Security and Defence Council (NRBO) and provides services such as housing, clinics and transport for senior elites.

The contract runs until 2020, which means Yanukovych assumes he will be re-elected in 2015 for a second term. The contract provides for an extension beyond 2020, which also suggests Yanukovych may be considering staying in power beyond the constitutionally proscribed two-term limit (see analysis and photos at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/02/27/6959508/).

Yanukovych has always denied owning the Mezhyhirya palace but this is no longer possible to do. DUS signed the contract with its virtual owner Tantalit that, as Leshchenko has investigated, is Yanukovych’s “own company.” He found that Mezhyhirya is owned by three parties: Yanukovych admits to owning a land plot of 2 hectares and Tantalit owns 27 hectares. The Vidrodzhennia Ukrainy (Renaissance of Ukraine) Charity leases another 8 hectares. The rent paid for Yanukovych’s new office is paid by the state budget to Yanukovych’s own company, Tantalit (see http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/11/21/6773868/). Yanukovych also is renting his jet and a helicopter from a company owned by his family members (http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/07/20/6405659/).

If Yanukovych is considering staying in power at the very least until 2020 – and possibly beyond – his imprisonment of his two strongest opponents, Tymoshenko and Lutsenko, are rational steps. Both opposition leaders are protyvnyky (mortal enemies) with who one cannot do a deal and therefore they represent a major threat. Deals can be done with oponentiv (opponents) whom one can buy off with deals and state positions, as in the case of Sergei Tigipko (whose Strong Ukraine party is to merge with the Party of Regions on March 17; see Taras Kuzio, “Tigipko to be Yanukvych’s Successor as Party of Regions Leader,” Jamestown Foundation Blog, August 5, 2010. http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2010/08/tigipko-to-be-yanukovychs-successor-as.html), Arseniy Yatseniuk and of course Viktor Yushchenko. Protyvnyky are similar to police officer Frank Serpico in the 1973 movie Serpico who refuses to follow other police officers and take bribes only to have them turn against him.

So, it would seem: Yanukovych – forever!

Amid Shifting Strategic Priorities, Poland Cancels Construction of Its Most Advanced Naval Corvette

By Matthew Czekaj

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced [link in Polish] on Friday, February 24 that his government was cancelling further construction of the “Gawron”-class naval corvette, a vessel based on the German MEKO A-100 design. In explaining the move, Tusk cited the project’s overwhelming cost overruns as well as the country’s changing security priorities. The Ministry of Defense spent 402 million PLN ($130 million) [link in Polish] on the advanced corvette, but after nearly 11 years of work on the Gawron (Polish for “rook”), the naval shipyards in Gdynia only managed to build the hull and install the engine. Finishing construction would have required another 1.1 billion PLN ($324 million), not even including the costs of arming the corvette with missiles and torpedoes – estimated [link in Polish] by the government in 2009 at 250 million PLN ($81 million). Had it entered service, the corvette’s maintenance and operational costs would have also overwhelmed the country’s military budget, Tusk added. The Polish MoD budget in 2011 [PDF in Polish] totaled 27.5 billion PLN ($8.9 billion).

The Gawron multi-role corvette would have been the most advanced vessel in Poland’s Navy, featuring [link in Polish] anti-radar stealth technology, anti-ship and anti-air missiles, anti-submarine torpedoes, electronic jamming systems, surface and air radar, as well as an advanced combined diesel and gas turbine (CODAG) [link in Polish] engine of an Italian design capable of reaching speeds of about 30 knots (close to 34.5 miles per hour). Warsaw realized in the late 1990s that its Navy required state-of-the-art vessels to patrol the Baltic, yet the path toward acquiring the Gawron was a long and bumpy one, culminating in a dead end.

Construction of the Gawron corvette began in November 2001, with an initial plan to build seven vessels. That order was soon revised down to 3-4, followed by a pair, and finally just one ship, to be christened the ORP Ślązak (Polish for Silesian), which was to enter service by 2012. The decrease in orders for Gawron corvettes drastically increased costs per unit for the Naval Shipyards. The Gdynia shipyard’s ongoing financial problems, coupled with its feud with the MoD over payments, eventually culminated in bankruptcy in April 2011. Moreover, in late 2011, Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak noted that “not without reason” Poland’s General Prosecutor was looking into the Gawron construction project for signs of misappropriation of funds, financial fraud and corruption (Kurier Lubelski, February 24). Defense Minister Siemoniak has pledged to try to sell the Gawron hull abroad.

A final decision on whether to continue building ORP Ślązak was supposed to come in March. Instead, however, Tusk revealed the Defense Ministry’s choice to scrap it at the end of February, and dressed the announcement as part of the larger list of achievements and plans decided in the government’s first 100 days in office. As Tusk noted, canceling the “nonsensical” Gawron program was part of the effort in the last few months for a “radical increase in efficiency” of the Defense Ministry’s spending. As part of a larger military modernization scheme, in addition to stopping construction of what Minister Siemoniak called “the most expensive motorboat in the world” (Gazeta Wyborcza, February 24), the government plans to raise soldiers’ salaries, purchase new multi-role helicopters and possibly more military transport planes – either the CASA or C-130 Hercules. Finally, the government plans to reduce the number of generals and streamlining the officer corps not directly attached to the army’s command hierarchy to achieve what Minister Siemoniak termed “more army in the army” (Gazeta Wyborcza, February 24; Gazeta.pl, February 24). Opposition Law and Justice politician Ludwik Dorn emphatically agreed [link in Polish] with the decision, saying in an interview with TVN-24 that today the Gawron’s anti-radar stealth technology would have been already outdated and that the vessel would have made a “floating target.”

Predictably for such a high-profile military-industrial program reversal, however, the scrapping of the Gawron corvette created a political firestorm in Poland. The Polish Navy naturally responded quite negatively [link in Polish]. Retired Polish Admiral Zbigniew Badeński said in an interview with the Polish press that having a corvette like the Gawron was a national interest for Poland, a maritime country with a 273-mile coastline. He added that the Gawron-class corvette would be “able to operate in every region, with everyone and against anyone – a multi-role vessel: meant to defend against surface, air and underwater targets, as well as asymmetric threats, both in the Baltic and beyond” (Polska Times, February 24). At the same time, Leszek Miller, former prime minister and current leader of the center-left Democratic Left Alliance, angrily rebuked [link in Polish] the government in an interview with RMF FM radio, asserting that coastal Poland needed the vessel and that the government’s decision will set in motion the phasing out the country’s entire Navy. In following interviews with the press, Miller suggested sarcastically [link in Polish] that to save money, perhaps the government should eliminate the Army next. He also encouraged [link in Polish] Polish President Bronisław Komorowski – of PM Tusk’s Civic Platform party – to save the Gawron since the decision to begin constructing the corvette in 2001 occurred while Komorowski served as Minister of Defense.

Tusk’s government was not swayed by such arguments, however. Indeed, the termination of ORP Ślązak’s construction fits into a larger and longer-term decision by Warsaw to downscale and alter the shape of the Polish Navy. Opinions abounded within the Ministry of Defense that a singular vessel like the Gawron corvette would be useless in the Baltic and be unable to protect ships carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG) or oil to Polish ports. Rather, a series of cheaper, smaller patrol vessels would be more efficient for patrolling Polish sea-lanes (Rzeczpospolita, February 20). Furthermore, in announcing the Gawron’s elimination, PM Tusk also added that the government was not expecting to repair Poland’s ailing older frigates. TVP journalist Marek Świerczyński wrote back in 2008 for Central European Digest about Warsaw’s moves to drastically downscale the Navy, focusing state resources instead on “missile and aerial defense, heavy airlift and armored vehicles.” To offset its growing lack of surface vessels, Poland plans to beef up its shore-based missile artillery system composed of Swedish RBS-15s. Decidedly less seriously, Stanisław Koziej, the head of the National Security Bureau, suggested on RMF FM radio that the Navy invest in some unmanned autonomous underwater vehicles [link in Polish]. With a shrinking sea-worthy fleet, Poland will thus need to rely more and more heavily on the navies of its NATO allies, Denmark and Germany, to protect its interests in the Baltic Sea (CED, October 15, 2008).

It is clear that Warsaw is consciously prioritizing its Air Force and Army well ahead of its Navy – to the point of enhancing the two former branches at the expense of gradually eliminating the latter. In an ongoing age of fiscal austerity, all NATO allies are under increasing pressure to do more with less and pool or share resources, at times eliminating entire military branches or capabilities in order to devote more resources to more efficient, specialized, or niche capabilities. Yet, if this is the Polish Defense Ministry’s strategy, Warsaw will need to be careful. All of its allies are currently also slashing their defense budgets to the bone. Moreover, Russia has long-term plans to bolster its own Baltic Fleet including eventually adding an advanced, French-made Mistral helicopter carrier. The Russian navy in the Baltic may not be a direct security concern to Poland at present – and arguably will not be an existential threat even with a Russian Mistral patrolling the Baltic Sea. Yet, the Alliance and each of its Baltic-littoral members will need to be mindful of Russia’s growing regional strength and act to discourage Moscow from possibly becoming more aggressive in the Baltic Sea.

The NATO summit in Chicago is fast approaching, and one important topic of discussion will be better coordination in defense procurement and training to enhance NATO’s overall security and ability to defend all of its members. Poland – whose navy is shrinking so drastically – will have to do its best in Chicago to ensure Alliance cooperation and cohesion remains strong and European defense-centric if it wants to rely on its allies for Baltic Sea defense.

Another Ukrainian Opposition Leader Jailed on Trumped Up Charges

By Taras Kuzio

Yuriy Lutsenko, former Interior Minister in two governments led by Yulia Tymoshenko in 2005 and 2007-2010, was sentenced on February 27 to four years imprisonment and a three year ban from public office (http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/123206/). The EU, European governments, US, Canada and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) immediately condemned the sentence. In Washington, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the Lutsenko and Tymoshenko cases raise, “serious concerns about the government of Ukraine’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law” (http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/123246/).

The sentence prevents Lutsenko from participating in the 2015 presidential elections where President Viktor Yanukovych will seek a second term. In October 2011, Yulia Tymoshenko received a seven year sentence and a three year ban from public office that removed her from the next two presidential and three parliamentary elections. Thus, with these two imprisonments the Ukrainian authorities have removed two of the main opposition threats to Yanukovych in the 2015 elections.

Lutsenko, the scourge of the nexus of Yanukovych, the Party of Regions and organised crime, was jailed by what Luke Harding, former Guardian correspondent in Moscow, describes as the Mafia State (London: Guardian books, 2011), which Lutsenko sought to dismantle as Interior Minister. Eurasia Daily Monitor (February 17) has written and US diplomatic cables have reported on the Mafia State (http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39024).

Marieluise Beck of Germany, a rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), said, “As a reformist interior minister who – among other things – dismantled the criminal hit squad within the ministry responsible for such high-profile crimes as the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze, he angered some persons who are now back in power” (http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/123221/).

Beck pointed out that, “The trial against him was unfair, as shown in detail by the observers of the Danish Helsinki Committee. Furthermore, the ‘crimes’ for which he was convicted could not possibly justify a term of imprisonment even if the prosecution had been able to prove all the allegations against him” (see Mikael Lyngbo, Legal Monitoring in Ukraine I. Preliminary Report on the trials against former Minister of Interior Yurij Lutsenko and former First Minister of Justice Yevhen Korniychuk [Copenhagen: The Danish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, 2011] http://helsinki-komiteen.dk/Helsinki-gammel/downloads/LM-Ukraine.pdf).

Lutsenko was charged with illegally granting an apartment to his lawyer, increasing the pension of his driver and financial irregularities relating to celebrations marking National Police Day. The amount paid for the celebrations ($35,000) was miniscule compared to the size of corruption in Ukraine and did not go into Lutsenko’s pocket but to the state-owned Palac Ukrayiny where the National Police Day held its celebration.

In comparison, on the same day as the sentencing of Lutsenko, Ukrayinska Pravda reported that table lamps in Yanukovych’s new office in his palatial Mezhyhirya are handmade and each cost $10,000 (http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/02/27/6959508/). Last year, news reports revealed that fittings for a bathroom in the Mezhyhirya palace cost 300,000 Euros and a chandelier was purchased for $45,000. In 2010, two companies working on the estate imported luxury goods worth $20 million (http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/99514/).

Obviously, these figures are far larger than the official salary of the President, who has been a state employee since 1997.

The Lutsenko, and earlier Tymoshenko case, are blatant cases of selective application of justice by the Yanukovych administration. Lutsenko’s sentence shows he has totally ignored Western criticism of the Tymoshenko trial and that his administration does not listen to the West. Incredibly, many Western policymakers and seasoned ex-Ambassadors believed otherwise until last summer.

It is time to acknowledge that it is impossible to reset relations with politicians such as Yanukovych who speak a different language, are a product of a completely alien political culture to European and American values, and who never fulfill promises made to European and American leaders.

Political Corruption and Preparations for Election Fraud in Ukraine

Ihor Rybakov

By Taras Kuzio

There have long been rumors and some evidence that Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych (this practice was not used by President Viktor Yushchenko) have bought opposition deputies to encourage them to defect to pro-presidential parliamentary coalitions (see EDM, February 17). Bribes are allegedly in the form of down payments of $1 million or more, as well as $20-25,000 per month ‘salaries.’ The ‘salaries’ are paid when defectors vote for pro-presidential laws and resolutions.

In the Kuchma era, the number of defectors was far smaller than under Yanukovych because presidential pressure was far less and as a consequence, parliament never became Kuchma’s rubber stamp institution. Under Yanukovych, the scale of political corruption has exponentially grown, the numbers of deputies who have been bribed to defect has tripled and parliament has become a de factor rubber stamp institution.

In December 2011, Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko [BYuT] parliamentary deputy Roman Zabzaliuk pretended to defect to the pro-presidential Reforms and Stability parliamentary coalition and taped the ensuing conversations with head of the pro-presidential Reforms for the Future parliamentary faction Ihor Rybakov. The Reforms for the Future faction mainly consists of 19 former opposition deputies.

The tape recordings provide evidence of political corruption, cynicism in the ruling authorities and preparations for falsification of the October 2012 parliamentary elections. The prosecutor’s office has, not surprisingly, refused to investigate the corruption. Following is a translation of one part of the conversations.

Roman Zabzaliuk: Can you tell me if the starting negotiating figure is around $500,000? Is this indeed the case?

Ihor Rybakov: Yes! Yes! Yes! The starting negotiating figure is $500,000, …and it is important that this is clearly understood…This is the first point. And the second point is that we should reach agreement with them as we need candidates in western Ukraine like we need (fresh) air. This is what the President of Ukraine himself…

RZ: In District Election Commissions (OVK) or as deputies?

IR: Yes, f**k, candidates for (parliamentary) deputies!... They will put pressure on BYuT and (Arseniy) Yatseniuk.

RZ: Yanukov or do you mean Yatseniuk?

IR: Yes, Yatseniuk. We need them today…the President said to me to my face at our meeting “F**k, give me as many as you can, the maximum!”

IR: We need any kind of candidates. F**k, any kind! What is most important is that they are allied to us. The (candidates) …who have popularity in western Ukraine. It does not f**king matter where they are from. The most important point is that I control some of these slaves…We will include them in majoritarian districts… All of the power of the authorities will be used toward getting them elected, which includes oblast (councils), governors, head of the (presidential) administration, SBU (Security Service), and prosecutors office. The entire set of administrative resources. This will be so brutally undertaken that they will be f**ked over.

Source:

Ukrayinsky Tyzhden, 23 Feb 2012, p.14.

The tapes made by Roman Zabzaliuk can be listened to here at http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/41780.

Russian Opposition Leader Accuses Chechen and Russian Authorities of Corrupt Practices

By Valery Dzutsev

On February 8, arguably the most illustrious leader of the Russian opposition, Alexei Navalny, attacked Ramzan Kadyrov in his blog entry in response to Kadyrov’s earlier derogatory statements (http://navalny.livejournal.com/, February 8). Kadyrov, known for his close relationship to Vladimir Putin, called Navalny a “real chatterbox” that “acts against the people of Russia.” Referring to Navalny’s crusade against corruption in the Russian government, Kadyrov alleged that in his revelations Navalny does not provide any names “because he is afraid.” Kadyrov concluded that “Navalny is a coward” (http://www.baltinfo.ru/2012/01/24/Kadyrov-nazval-mitinguyuschikh-vragami-Rossii-a-Navalnogo---boltunom-255025, January 24).

Seizing on this opportunity, Navalny published the results of his investigation of the Chechen police’s car inventory acquisitions, naming and shaming several people in Kadyrov’s entourage, such as minister interior of Chechnya, Ruslan Alkhanov, and his deputy, Roman Edilov. It transpired that the ministry interior of Chechnya planned to acquire 15 Mercedes-Benzes and one Porsche Cayenne for the total price of over $3 million. Apart from the striking luxury of the police cars for the Chechen republic, another dubious feature of the government agency’s acquisition process came to light. No organization bid to supply the cars and the previous auctions of the Chechen ministry interior also did not have any bidders. Russian antitrust government agency confirmed that the Chechen government had not requested permission to buy the needed equipment without an auction. So Navalny concluded that either the Chechen ministry did not buy anything in the past few years or did it in violation of existing legislation (http://navalny.livejournal.com/, February 8).

Ramzan Kadyrov’s attempts to curry favor with Vladimir Putin may backfire against both men as the general Russian public is increasingly against lavish spending on the North Caucasus and the North Caucasians as such. The situation poses a suitable opportunity for the Russian opposition to expose corruption in Putin’s government. Putin and Kadyrov are so closely related to each other that the opposition may expect its attack against Kadyrov will inevitably inflict considerable harm on Putin.

Democratic Regression Continues in Ukraine

By Taras Kuzio

In a speech commemorating Ukraine’s January 22 declaration of independence in 1918, President Viktor Yanukovych said “Defense of human rights is an inalienable component of the democratic nature of a European country. We are definitely strengthening monitoring and control over every instance of the infringement of human rights and freedoms. And I have under my personal control defense of freedom of speech” (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/01/22/6925178/).

Is Yanukovych president of Ukraine or another country?

Is he in charge of the same country as that in which the editor of Segodnya, a daily newspaper owned by Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, was sacked after it published photographs of Yanukovych’s Mizhirya palace? This was clear evidence of censorship in the print media (see interview with former Segodnya editor in  http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2012/01/17/6915277).

More to the point, is Yanukovych in charge of the same country as that written about by the human rights think tank Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org)?

In January 2011, Freedom House downgraded Ukraine, only one year into Viktor Yanukovych's presidency, from ‘Free,’ a status the country received in 2005 following the Orange Revolution, to ‘Partly Free.’ Ukraine was “Partly Free” under authoritarian President Leonid Kuchma in his second term in office in 1999-2004.

In 2005-2010, Ukraine was the only country ranked ‘Free’ in the CIS.

In January 2012, Freedom House reported, “The steepest decline in the institutions of freedom has taken place in Ukraine, where a series of negative developments was punctuated by the conviction of opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko on dubious charges. In the past two years, Ukraine has moved from a status of ‘Free’ to ‘Partly Free’ and suffered deterioration on most indicators measured by Freedom House.”

Freedom House said, “Ukraine’s political rights rating declined from 3 to 4 due to the authorities’ efforts to crush the opposition, including the politicized use of the courts, a crackdown on media, and the use of force to break up demonstrations.”

A ‘Partly Free’ country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. ‘Partly Free’ states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism.

Ukraine in 2012 remains ‘Partly Free’ but for the first time Moldova is ranked better in its democracy scores.  Georgia and Moldova are better reformers than Ukraine and negotiations for their Association Agreements with the EU are making more progress than with Ukraine, which are frozen (see European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries report at www.irf.ua/index.php). The EU will not sign or ratify an Association Agreement with Ukraine until opposition political leaders are released from prison.

The decline of freedom in Ukraine since 2010, the year Yanukovych came to power, will continue because of two factors.

The first factor is because opposition leaders such as Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko are unlikely to be released from imprisonment (see “Why Yulia Tymoshenko Will Remain Imprisoned,” http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38631).

The second factor is that imprisonment of opposition leaders during Ukraine’s October 2012 parliamentary elections will mean the country will fail to meet democratic standards in the eyes of the European Union, US, Council of Europe, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). With election fraud highly possible by the Party of Regions, which plans to receive at least half of parliamentary seats, mass protests are inevitable and there could be violence from heavy-handed policing.

With the downward trajectory of Ukraine’s democracy likely to continue falling, Ukraine will become ‘Not Free’ and a full authoritarian state some time following the 2012 elections, possibly in 2013 or 2014.

Numbers of Casualties in the North Caucasus in 2011 Rise

By Valery Dzutsev

The Caucasian Knot website published 2011 conflict casualties’ statistics for each republic in the North Caucasus. 70 people were killed and 38 people were injured in violent incidents in Ingushetia in 2011. The overall figure of victims in the republic dropped from 326 killed and injured in 2010 to 108 in 2011 (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198680/). At the same time in Dagestan, the overall number of the conflict’s casualties grew from 685 in 2010 to 824 in 2011. 413 people were killed and 411 were injured in the largest North Caucasian republic in the past year. The growth was mostly caused by the rise of civilian casualties (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198813/). 95 people were killed and 106 were injured in Chechnya in 2011. Caucasian Knot warns that these figures are approximate; it is impossible to check the validity of the law enforcement’s statements. In 2010, the numbers of killed and wounded people for Chechnya were respectively 127 and 123 (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198855/). Numbers for victims in North Ossetia decreased from 195 in 2010 to 10 in 2011, due to absence of terror attacks in the republic in 2011 (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198773/). Kabardino-Balkaria experienced a great surge in numbers of casualties in 2011. In 2010 this republic had 57 casualties, including four people killed and 53 wounded. In 2011, at least 129 were killed in the republic and 44 were wounded (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198758/). Also in Karachay-Cherkessia the numbers of victims surged from four in 2010 to 34 in 2011, of these 22 were killed and 12 received injuries (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198769/).

At least in three republics of the North Caucasus, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, the situation in terms of casualty counts deteriorated in 2011. Journalists can hardly count casualties for Chechnya reliably because of difficulties in accessing this territory. The numbers appear to confirm that the security situation in the North Caucasus in 2011 has continued to worsen.