By Dr. Guli Yuldasheva and Mavlon Shukurzoda.
Since the
collapse of the bipolar world system, discussions on the new world order and
problems of regional instability have not yet ceased. They have recently
achieved perhaps their apogee – fierce mass media disputes have erupted around
the Russian-proposed Eurasian way of development from the one side, and the US “New Silk
Road” strategy from the other. Each suggested model of development has its own
advantages and vulnerabilities. It is quite obvious that each vision’s success
is closely linked with the settlement of the Afghan issue in one or another
format; that is natural in conditions of globalization, integrity and
indivisibility of international security.
In fact, any
strategy pertaining to the Eurasian area should have to deal with the Afghan dilemma,
directly or indirectly affecting the speed and the level of its realization.
Besides the issues of illicit traffic in drugs, illegal migration and
criminality from the territory
of Afghanistan, the
following external tendencies should be kept in mind that can also negatively
influence the processes ongoing on the Eurasian continent:
- spread of radical movements in
Central Asia (currently found in Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan);
- atomism and absence of geopolitical
unity in the CA region;
- gradual ascent of Islamic regimes to
power in the Middle East and continuation of
instability there;
- gridlock in the Caspian dispute and uncertainty
in the sphere of energy policy in the Middle East.
In this
connection, the concept of the so-called “New Silk Road” is of special
interest. It was suggested by Prof. S. Frederick Starr, Chairman of the
Institute of Central Asia and Caucasus at Johns
Hopkins University,
and later formulated as a new US
strategy jointly with the Washington
Center for Strategic and
International Studies. At present, the Obama Administration seems to have
actively started implementing its provisions, as evidenced by the agenda of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s last visit
to the republics of Central Asia and Pakistan,
which immediately border Afghanistan.
The ideas, set
forth in the concept are not new. Similar ideas have been already voiced in
October 1997 by Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), who closely cooperated with Prof.
Starr in his legislative initiative “Silk Road Act,” and later were extensively
developed by Prof. Starr in his “Big Central Asia” concept. Today he suggests
the renewed version of the concept named a “New Silk Road” in his report titled
“Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance.”
It is worth noting
that the regional dimension of the US Central Asian strategy was analyzed by
Prof. Starr in such his earlier works such as “A Strategic Assessment of Central
Asia and the Caucasus, 1999-2000” and “The New
Silk Roads” (2008).
In “Afghanistan
Beyond the Fog,” Prof. S. Frederick Starr continues to focus on the regional
dimension of the new US
strategy, but takes into account opinions of his opponents and present-day
realities. The process of realizing transport-trade operations in Afghanistan rests upon the support of such
states as Russia, China and Iran, the role of which he analyzed
in detail as early as in 2008. Indirect cooperation with Iran is in fact
already proceeding, though quietly.
In the
interests of geopolitical and economic stability, Prof. Starr’s report
justifies a leadership and broker’s role for the US
in this project, which is de-facto the biggest investor in Central
Asia and whose interests therefore cannot be ignored in any
analytical layout. At the same time, long-term economic and political goals,
set forth in the new Afghan strategy, logically exclude US global
leadership so as to avoid the clash of numerous involved resources and
interests, without which the project itself will not be practically fulfilled.
By the same
logic, in this strategy Afghanistan
plays the role of an important hub and a crossroads for the trade-transport routes
under construction. Yet, as an unstable state, it is only a center for
concentrating efforts on social-economic stabilization of Central
Asia, but not by all means as a geopolitical center or a model of
development for its neighbors.
The following
factors will benefit the “New Silk Road” project’s realization:
- diversification of regional transit
routes is in the interest of all CA republics;
- the transport-logistical system of
the Northern Distribution Network, so important for the US strategy in Afghanistan,
covers the territory of nine former republics of the USSR – Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Ukraine and Latvia;
- US experts often
speak in favor of a partnership with Russia
and China
as important regional players, whose potential and interests should be taken
into account in the Afghan strategy;
- rapprochement of the EU and US
positions on Afghanistan (in
particular, Germany and the US);
- removal of military sanctions and
activation of American business in Uzbekistan;
- diplomatic and other efforts of the US on regulating interstate relations in Central Asia;
- the continued aspiration for
regional integration among some CA states, which is underscored by Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s adherence to the idea of the Central Asian
Union’s revival, and the efforts of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to normalize
relations (opening borders between them on October 26 this year);
- a restoration of the dialogue
between Pakistan and India,
culminated with the signing of a transit agreement between them.
It goes without
saying that these tendencies are still unstable and much more should be done.
However, alongside with statistical data provided in Prof. Starr’s book, they
inspire hope for a positive outcome in Central Asia.
What follows is
an in-depth interview with Prof. Starr, where he extrapolates the main ideas of
his new concept on Afghanistan.
It should be stressed that the ideas and thoughts set forth in the introduction
and conclusion of this article reflect opinions of the authors and by no means
refer to the position of Prof. Starr.
***
Question: The US government has
recently presented a “New Silk
Road” strategy, which is aimed at deepening
economic and trade relations between Central and South
Asia. What are the distinctive differences between the new
strategy and the previous American approach to economic reconstruction in Afghanistan?
Prof. S. Frederick
Starr: The
new US strategy is
concentrated on the development of an integrated strategy of economic and
social development in Afghanistan,
which means construction of the new system of transport and trade routes along
the ancient Silk road.
The US’s approach to economic renewal of Afghanistan will
rest on job creation, the provision of basic services, the construction of
infrastructure and the development of fiscal sustainability. However, all these
goals will be focused around a more purposeful yet comprehensive strategy, one
that embraces the expansion of transport and trade as the main engine of
economic advancement.
At the same time the usage of military measures will only
be a means and not the final strategic goal. The revival of the ancient transit
routes through Afghanistan in
new conditions can solve the present US
strategic dilemma and can become a genuine key to the success of their regional
strategy, whereby the US
can efficiently use its leadership potential and possibilities in this issue.
A new economic strategy
acknowledges the reality that the Afghan struggle is regional in scope,
affecting the rest of Central Asia, Pakistan,
India, China, Iran, etc., and must be resolved on
a regional basis. Such a strategy benefits all and is directed against no one. Priority
projects include the completion of the Afghan Ring Road and Kabul-Herat highway,
and linking them to continental trunk routes, especially to the Pakistani port
at Gwadar; completing trans-Afghan rail lines linking Europe and Asia;
constructing the TAPI pipeline; and completing electrical transmission lines
linking Central Asia, Afghanistan,
northern Pakistan and India.
The US nowadays
treats the implementation of a “New Silk Road” strategy as a matter of the
highest priority. In keeping with this, the Obama administration has already
appointed a special Presidential-appointed Envoy to lead a major inter-agency task force that will work closely with
military and civilian leaders in the US,
Afghanistan,
among coalition partners and in regional states. At the same time it is planned
to use all tools at the disposal of the US government to engage the private
sector.
Question: What criteria must a revised economic strategy for Afghanistan
meet to achieve success?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: First, it must directly and manifestly improve the lives of Afghans,
Pakistanis and people in those Central Asian states that are key to this
region-wide project. As this happens, internal and external stakeholders will
buy into the effort. Only through these means can one expect a decline in the
resort to violent solutions. Only in this way will the need for a large and
costly US
military presence begin to lessen in the immediate future.
Second, it must
be possible to pursue the economic strategy simultaneously with the military
strategy, and in such a way that the
two are mutually reinforcing. Third, it must leave the Afghan government
with an income stream. Today the US is paying the salaries of all
Afghan soldiers and civil servants. This cannot go on forever.
Fourth, an
economic strategy must work fast, showing substantial results within the next 1-2
years. An early focus on removing administrative and procedural blockages to
trade will produce quick results. Overall, economic progress will create the conditions
that will enable the US
to shift its main emphasis from military power to economic and social
betterment.
The only
approach that meets these criteria is one that focuses on reestablishing Afghanistan’s traditional role as a hub of transport and trade,
linking Europe and the Middle East with the Indian sub-continent and all South
and Southeast Asia.
Question: There is no doubt that Afghanistan’s advantage is its
geostrategic location. At the same time this country is still viewed as the “end
of the road” rather than a central hub. How do you assess this situation?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: Over two millennia, Afghanistan
was the place where trade routes to India,
China, the Middle East and Europe all converged. This is why Marco Polo crossed the
country en route to China,
and why Arab travelers like Ibn Battuta crossed it on their way to India. Such
trade along the misnamed “Silk Road” (in fact,
every conceivable product was transported over it) produced immense wealth. Balkh, near
Mazar-e-Sharif, was once among the largest and richest cities on earth.
Medieval Arabs, who knew something about urban life, called it “the Mother of
Cities.” Bagram once maintained lucrative ties simultaneously with ancient Greece and India, enabling it to flourish in
opulent splendor.
The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom radically changed the situation in
modern Afghanistan by reopening its northern border to long-distance trade for
the first time since 1936, and by creating similar potential on Afghanistan‘s
eastern border with Pakistan. This action, entirely unintended and largely
unnoticed in America
or elsewhere, is one of the most transformative developments on the Eurasian
landmass in the past century.
Question: What other factors contribute to the future
development of transcontinental trade in Eurasia via Afghanistan?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: The
most powerful drivers of the expansion of transcontinental Eurasian trade in
the coming years will be the rapid growth of the Indian and Chinese economies.
To date, most of Chinese and Indian exports are shipped by sea, but the
anticipated continued growth of such exports will increase demand for
transcontinental road and rail shipping routes. Much shipping from Western China, for example, naturally lends itself to
transcontinental trade, given the long distance from production site to port
and the slowness of maritime transport. Realistic estimates for Indian trade by
land through Central Asia to European and
Middle Eastern markets foresee a growth to US $100–120 billion annually by
2015. Afghanistan
and its neighboring Central Asian countries stand to benefit immensely from
this trade through the collection of tariffs and through the growing role of
their own transit-related industries.
Question: But some politicians and analytics argue that a
transport-based “New Silk Road”
cannot be realized until stability is established in Afghanistan. Do you agree with such
an assessment?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: It cannot be denied that sustained violence in Afghanistan – as well as areas like Baluchistan,
Kashmir and other parts of Eurasia – inhibits economic
activity and dampens the private and public investment that could help foster
continental trade and growth. Yet, the continuing flow of Pakistani trucks
ferrying NATO supplies from Karachi to Afghanistan along roads fully accessible
to Pushtun and other insurgents is proof that commercial activity can flourish
amid instability. Any gains that militants would make from disrupting these
vital supply lines on a strategic level are outweighed by the fact that local
tribes derive significant income from the traffic. As long as such incentive
structures hold, local populations have shown themselves ready to prioritize
commerce over political violence. The US and NATO would do well to recall that
one reason the Taliban succeeded in gaining control of Afghanistan is
that they promised to abolish local toll-collection points.
Improvements in
the 3,000 km
Ring Road, which connects the cities of Mazar-e Sharif, Kabul,
Kandahar and Heart,
have already facilitated Afghan internal transportation growth. IMF and Afghan
authorities estimate that there are now more than 600,000 vehicles in Afghanistan
today, as compared to 175,000
in 2002, and they travel on more than 13,000 km of newly
built or rehabilitated roads. These improvements are part of a strategic
priority placed on transportation by the Afghan Government, and they serve to
stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.
Question: As the world and regional trade benefit from the
reestablishment of the New Silk
Road, what do you estimate the role has been of
individual countries in the development of a transportation sector in and
around Afghanistan
so far?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: The project in fact is already supported by all neighboring states.
With or without America,
they would like to get benefits for what, they consider, they have all historical rights. Uzbekistan,
with financing from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has extended its rail
system to Mazar-e-Sharif and is sending electricity to light Kabul. Neighboring Tajikistan,
with help from China and Iran, has opened a road across the lofty Pamirs
from China to the new
American-built bridge to Afghanistan
and also intends to lay a rail line from its capital of Dushanbe to the Afghan border. Turkmenistan is also constructing roads and railroads to link with
the Afghan Ring Road.
Pakistan and China are rebuilding the main north-south road
across Pakistan that
provides Afghanistan with a
key link, through the Khyber Pass, both to China
and the Arabian Sea. At its southern terminus
at Gwadar, they have already built a new port that will provide the most
efficient sea link between Central Asia, Afghanistan
and the burgeoning economies of Southeast Asia.
China also hopes to enhance Afghanistan’s access to the East with a railroad
through the Khyber Pass that will then connect to east-west lines across Pakistan.
Iran, meanwhile, is
extending its railroad and highway systems to Herat,
the key city of western Afghanistan.
Teheran is also constructing a new port at Chabahar rivaling Gwadar. India has helped build a road to connect
Chabahar to Afghanistan’s
Ring Road. Afghanistan’s
neighbor to the northwest, gas-rich Turkmenistan,
has meanwhile built a new port on the Caspian Sea at the city of Turkmenbashi that will transmit cargoes from Afghanistan and the East to Azerbaijan and then the Black Sea and Europe. Turkmenistan signed an agreement with Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and India to construct a gas
pipeline to deliver Turkmen gas across Afghanistan
to India’s energy starved
northwest, as well as to Pakistan.
And, as I mentioned earlier, the United States spent US $1.8 billion
to redevelop 635 km
of the Ring Road and 2,700 km of other roads linking primary and secondary
markets.
Question: You described in detail the situation with the highway and railroad
projects in Afghanistan.
What progress do you see concerning the aviation sector in this country?
Prof. S. Frederick
Starr: Connecting
Afghanistan with the larger world by air has proceeded slowly, and in a
competitive environment in which most of Afghanistan‘s neighbors are striving
to become the main stopover for East-West flights. Japan,
however, has reconstructed the terminal at Kabul
airport and a new private Afghan-owned airline is already flying into Frankfurt. Direct flights from Kabul to major air hubs are essential, as is
the development of a reliable and Afghan-owned airline for internal travel. Uzbekistan has already made huge strides in
establishing itself as an air hub between South and East Asia and Europe. Those who think only in terms of a “zero sum” fail
to realize the large potential of this traffic in the future. Afghanistan may
not become THE main air hub, but it can play a useful role and one that
benefits its domestic economy.
In Afghanistan and
around the region there are many opportunities to implement relatively routine
enhancements to commercial aviation operations that would result in more safe,
secure and controlled airspace and ground operations. This would allow Central
Asian countries along the New Silk Road to assert rights and collect rents
commonly associated with destination and en route flight operations in the
developed world.
Question: Recognizing that inadequate infrastructure is not the
only barrier to expanded commerce in the region, what measures are necessary to
address institutional impediments to efficient transportation in Afghanistan?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: There
is a lot of research, which concludes that the
biggest obstacles to transcontinental trade are institutional, bureaucratic and
political. The most common of these obstacles are excessive duties imposed by
governments, simple corruption on the part of border officials, and the failure
of bordering states to cooperate to facilitate trade. A survey conducted by the
ADB of nearly 1,000 continental truck drivers from various countries hauling
goods across Afghanistan
supports this assessment, with 90 percent pointing to the bureaucracy at
borders as the greatest impediment to trade. This does not mean that
infrastructure is unimportant. It is crucial, of course – especially railroads,
pipelines and power lines. But that is only part of
the story.
That is why the standardization and professionalization of customs
administration is essential to unlocking Eurasia’s
trade potential. They will reduce the opportunity for low-paid and untrained
officials to extract illegal rents from shippers, and will also spur private
investment. In addition, the modest expense of a comprehensive standardization
and professionalization effort can be shared among leading trading nations or funded
by multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank. Both the
political and financial risks involved are modest, and would decline further as
success breeds success. The resulting reductions in dollars-per-ton-per-mile
costs will allow Afghanistan,
Central Asia, Pakistan
and their neighbors on the Modern Silk Road to compete favorably with other
trans-continental transportation routes.
Question: Who will lose under this proposal?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: First, it is not a
proposal. The new silk roads are advancing on many fronts, with or without the US or any other
single country or grouping of countries. The opening of continental transport
across Afghanistan and Central Asia is inevitable. The only question is whether
it can be hastened through US
support. So we are not asking whether or not such a project should go forward.
It is already advancing quickly.
Will
there be losers as well as winners? Not necessarily. The opening of continental
transport across Afghanistan
and central Asia is not against anyone. The
Russian government in Moscow
may have expressed skepticism, because it wants to preserve Soviet era patterns
of transport. But meanwhile, businesses in the Urals, West Siberia and Altai
are eager to be able to ship goods to India,
Pakistan and Southeast Asia, and will benefit enormously from the
proposed initiatives. The only losers will be those who refuse to compete, and
those who try to prevent others from competing.
Question: What main considerations were behind the American administration’s
adoption of the “New Silk Road”
concept for Afghanistan?
Prof. S. Frederick Starr: First, the failure by the
US to embrace a “Silk Road
Strategy” for Afghanistan
and adjacent countries would have been a blow to Washington’s
credibility in Kabul
and other regional capitals. This prospect of becoming strategically irrelevant
is no trivial matter for the US, given that Afghanistan and Central Asia are
the only region on the planet surrounded by four, or possibly five, nuclear
powers (Pakistan, India, China, Russia and, possibly, Iran). It means that in some
future crisis Afghanistan,
Central Asia, and Pakistan,
too, will respond first not to Washington but
to other voices, by no means all of which wish America well.
Second,
if Washington
took a pass on a transport and trade-based strategy, it would have failed to
seize and build upon its comparative advantage throughout the broader region.
It would proclaim to anyone listening that the greatest commercial power also
have passed up an opportunity to engage NATO partners and other powers in a
project to which even their most pacifist parliaments cannot object. In other
words, if the US
had failed to embrace and lead a transport- and trade-based strategy, NATO,
too, would also have paid the price.
Third,
a transport strategy effectively attracts the US private sector, including
American firms. Even though their role will surely not be enormous, it is an
important factor in garnering domestic support for Central Asia within the US. Business
leaders in China, India, Japan
and Iran, with strong
encouragement and help from their governments, are already actively lining up
transport-related projects that will cross Afghanistan and the region. As the
new corridors open, opportunities in fields as diverse as insurance, freight
forwarding, hotels, mining, hydroelectric production, agriculture, and
manufacturing will open up.
Finally,
if the US
had failed to open its eyes to a trade-based economic strategy, or rejects it
as nation-building, it would have
squandered its enormous investment in the form of American blood and treasure,
and at a moment when a positive outcome is still within reach. This would be
all the more regrettable in light of the fact that the United States has already been the biggest
single investor in the new transport systems that will reconnect Afghanistan
with the world.
***
Conclusions
- It is obvious that a
solution to the Afghan issue, as described above, first of all benefits US
interests by removing the potential threats to American and Central Asian interests.
The solution preserves American presence in Central Asia.
Furthermore, US efforts at raising the regional countries’ economic,
scientific-technical and commercial potential strengthens their links with global
political institutions and financial markets.
- In the meantime, the
problems of democracy-building are relegated to secondary importance due to the
incommensurability of potential consequences of regional instability for
democratic development. It will be easier,
however, for more open political systems to evolve in those countries that enjoy
peace, stability and solid economies.
- It is impossible to exclude
as well the interests of the regional states themselves, including first of all
CA states, in achievement of stability, development of transit possibilities
and regional trade, solution of the social-economic issues. Purely political
projects for “integrating” Central Asia have
not advanced, and for understandable reasons. The New Silk Road strategy calls not for integration
but for coordination, which is compatible with the concerns of all regional
states to preserve and enhance their sovereignty and independence.
- Despite shared regional
interests supporting the New Silk
Road strategy, current bi-lateral friction such as
between US-China, US-Iran and US-Pakistan, as well as lesser US disagreements with Russia, hamper its realization, Special
US efforts are needed to remove these barriers. But
it should be stressed again: the New Silk Road Strategy is not against anyone. Everyone
will benefit from it, not least China,
Russia and Iran.
-
It is obvious that success of the “New Silk Road” will
be largely defined by economic interests in the region, by existing demand and completed
projects. However, political support will also play an important role. If
political disputes and discussions on New
Silk Road implementation are prolonged, and unanticipated
difficulties in the Central Asian area arise, the new strategy will risk
turning into nothing more than just another political slogan. If the New Silk Road
strategy stumbles, Moscow’s
proposed Eurasian way of development will undoubtedly be the strongest impetus for
Central Asian coordination.
