Kidnapping and Extortion: Russia’s Modus Operandi in Georgia

by Giorgi Kvelashvili


Georgians were recently shocked when they learned of more kidnappings of ethnic Georgians, this time from the village of Tirdznisi near the Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region.

Kidnapping has been a usual Russian practice ever since Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008 and seized nearly 20 percent of its territory. But the latest abductions are truly unprecedented since they involve four Georgian schoolboys. Giorgi Romelashvili and Aleko Sabadze are 14 years of age while Victor Buchukuri and Levan khmiadashvili are 16 and 17, respectively. All of the boys attend high school in Tirdznisi, which is under Georgian control and well beyond the zone of Russian occupation.

Outrage, caused by the kidnapping, quickly spread throughout Georgia, involving the government, NGOs and the general public. As Georgia’s Minister of Education Nika Rurua told Rustavi-2 TV late on November 5, the government of Georgia has already alerted the international community through diplomatic channels and requested the intervention of the European Union’s Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia and other “influential international organizations” since “we have limited tools of our own to free the kidnapped boys.”

The schoolboys are currently in the town of Tskhinvali and the government-controlled Russian media is silent about the fact, apparently waiting for “appropriate instructions” from the authorities on how to convey the story to the Russian public. A miniscule amount of information put on its website by the Russian news agency Regnum, itself close to the Kremlin, stated that the four Georgians were arrested on charges of “violating the state border and illegally possessing and carrying weapons and explosives,” adding that the Georgians detained late on November 4 had four hand grenades and explosives.”

Earlier, in late October, Georgia had witnessed two separate incidents of kidnapping from Georgian villages adjacent to the Russian zone of occupation in Tskhivali. The first one took place on October 26 and involved sixteen Georgians, and the second one, the October 28 incident, involved five residents of Georgia’s Kareli district.

Five Georgians were freed within hours of their abduction while the freeing of the 16 Georgian citizens became a saga of international proportions, involving tedious negotiations by representatives of foreign governments and international organizations, the most instrumental of which was the EUMM in Georgia.

In both cases, armed Russian soldiers, or their “South Ossetian” proxies entered Georgian-controlled territory and arrested residents engaged in their traditional activities of felling trees or herding. In yet another incident on November 1st, this time in Georgia’s north-western Abkhazia region, the Russian forces kidnapped two Georgian citizens who tried to enter the neighboring town of Zugdidi to sell hazelnut. The fates of the two men, whose produce had been extorted, still remains a mystery.

Even more outrageous was the case with Ruzgen Khasaia, a Georgian citizen living in Abkhazia, whose house was burnt down on November 4th by Russian troops after the man refused to give up his harvest of hazelnut. Trespassing of the “Georgian-Abkhaz border” was the official accusation against Khasaia and the harvest was requested “as a fine for illegal activity.” Georgia’s Rustavi- 2 TV channel reported that Khasaia’s neighbors were forcibly taken to watch the burning of his house, supposedly, “to prevent disobedience in the future.”

Analysts believe that Russia pursues several objectives through these and other cases of kidnapping and extortion, as savage and unacceptable they may seem to the international community. It is quite possible that Moscow is trying to discredit President Saakashvili’s government by showing its inability to provide security to Georgian citizens living in territories adjacent to the zones of Russian occupation in Tskhinvali and Abkhazia.

Russia might also want to force the Georgian citizens living there to abandon their villages, which could make room for an expansion of the zone of Russian occupation. When it comes to Georgian nationals living in Abkhazia, Moscow allegedly would like to see their contact with the rest of Georgia remain as limited as possible on the one hand and their disobedience to Russian directives as strictly punishable on the other.

Besides, the Kremlin is apparently trying to test the international reaction to its current actions vis-à-vis Georgia and the Georgian government should double its efforts to alert the world community about the latest incidents.

Without the decisive intervention of the United States and other major actors, it is hardly imaginable that Russia would observe its commitments under the 2008 ceasefire agreement and allow the European Union’s Monitoring Mission free and unimpeded access to occupied Georgian territories.

Media reports on November 12-14 that Georgia will host ambassadors from all 27 EU member states appear promising. The ambassadors will be met by President Saakashvili and members of his government. The foreign diplomats also plan to visit villages where displaced persons were housed in the aftermath of the Russia invasion.

Officials in Russian Capital Refuse to Renew Leases of Two Prominent Rights Groups

by Paul Goble

A very interesting article by Paul Goble which appeared on the website www.windowoneurasia.blogspot.com

Moscow city officials are refusing to renew the leases of two leading Russian human rights activist groups, an action that the groups are appealing but that some observers are explaining as official retribution for the participation of these groups in recent anti-government protests and as a reflection of negative trends in Russian life.

Lyudmila Alekseyeva, the dean of Russian human rights activists and the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, said that Moscow city officials were refusing to extend the lease the Group has for offices in the Russian capital. Lev Ponomaryev, head of the For Human Rights Movement, said officials had taken the same action against his group.

Both of them have appealed to Vladimir Lukin, the Russian government rights activist, and Aleksandr Muzaykantsky, Lukin’s Moscow city counterpart, as well as to Ella Pamfilova, the head of President Dmitry Medvedev’s Council for the Support of the Development of the Institutions of Civil Society and Human Rights (lenta.ru/news/2009/11/06/oust/).

Alekseyeva told the Russian media that all three of these individuals had promised to help the two groups reverse these decisions. But Ponomaryev said that the fact that officials had taken nearly simultaneous actions against the two groups suggests that broader Russian government policies were behind the move.

In a comment posted on the Grani.ru portal, the For Human Rights Movement leader suggested that Moscow officials appear to have “listened to Medvedev’s ‘Russia, Forward!’ appeal and decided that the time had come to push the human rights activists into the street” (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/activism/m.161740.html).

Eduard Limonov, the leader of the National Bolsheviks, expressed the view on his blog that the Moscow city authorities had acted either at the behest of or with the implicit approval of the federal government, many of whose members are angry at Alekseyeva and Ponomaryev for taking part in the October 31 protests (limonov-eduard.livejournal.com/27382.html).

And the radical leader called on his followers to be ready to come to the defense of the two groups in a non-violent way if and when officials from the government of the Russian capital try to expel the Moscow Helsinki Group and the For Human Rights Movement from their offices.

In many ways, one might think that the timing of this action could not be worse: This week marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dawning of what many hoped would be a new era of freedom; and last week, the German government decorated Alekseyeva for her “many years of struggle for democratic values and human rights.”

But unfortunately, it is just possible that the Russian powers that be which have been taking ever more steps against the rights groups like these seek to defend may have correctly calculated that they will escape criticism from many in the West who continue to hope that under Dmitry Medvedev, Moscow is moving in a more positive direction.

Not Everyone's Dancing Where Wall Was

by Daniel McGroarty

Investor's Business Daily ran a wonderful article by former White House speechwriter Dan McGroarty about the fall of the Berlin Wall. The full text can be read on Investors.com.

Twenty years ago, late on a Thursday evening in Berlin, the cement and concertina-wire symbol of the Cold War was breached, inadvertently opened by a botched answer of a flustered East German Communist Party apparatchik.
Announcing a loosening in border-crossing policy, he was peppered with questions on when the change would take effect.

"Immediately," he said, shuffling his notes. "Without delay." "Also in Berlin?" presses a reporter. "Yes, yes," comes the response.

Reporters rush to file; word is broadcast over Western media stations on the channels no East German is allowed to watch, but everyone does. The streets fill as people head for the Wall.

The rest, as they say, is history: Bewildered East Germans step past the feared Grenztruppen border guards, their rifles shouldered and dogs at bay, across the death strips and into West Berlin.

Growing more confident, some straddle the Wall, improvising implements to chip away chunks of cement, while still others wander deeper into the Western zone, looking for vegetable vendors where bananas might be bought — every day, and not just on Christmas. If all proved a dream, let some at least bring back from their walk in the West a piece of forbidden fruit.

The fact of the Wall's fall is captured in the news clips rebroadcast today. Its cause and consequences took much longer to unpack — in some ways, we are doing so still.

Witness the small library of new books that marks today's commemoration, 20 years after. Some subscribe to the "great man" theory of history (apologies to Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher), others to what we can call the "chaos theory," capturing the mosaic of micro-actions that brought the Wall down.

On the one end stands Ronald Reagan's Jericho riff at the Brandenburg Gate; at the other, the squabble to claim credit as the unidentified reporter whose shouted question — "also in Berlin?" — toppled the Wall.

Somewhere in the middle — closer to the center of events, and perhaps closer also to the truth — stand Mikhail Gorbachev, Helmut Kohl and George H.W. Bush. Each of them would abjure the megaphone in favor of constant confidential communications to manage the Cold War's last crisis to its peaceful conclusion.

No one in those first moments knew whether the East German government and its Soviet overlords would meet the Berlin breach with an iron fist or velvet glove. The events of Nov. 9, 1989 were fraught with contingency. The events we now wrap in a celebratory glow evoked the ghosts of 1956 and 1968 — or even nearer in time, Tiananmen Square just five months earlier.

A Tragic Anniversary in Georgia

by Paul Goble

Vienna, November 6 – Tomorrow, in various ways and with various feelings in their hearts, many people across the former Soviet space will commemorate the 72nd anniversary of the Bolshevik coup d’état. But in Georgia, many will mark the 2nd anniversary of what they see as the dashing of the hopes of the Rose Revolution by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.
The full text of Paul Gobles article can be read on.

On that date, two years ago, Saakashvili first ordered his security services to use tear gas, water cannon and rubber bullets to disperse protesters who were demanding his resignation and then closed down two of the independent television networks in order to prevent the opposition from communicating with the rest of the country,

In the wake of those actions, the Georgian president called a snap election, the result of which he invoked as justification for his course of action, a course that not only has alienated many of those who first supported him in the 2002 rising which overthrew Eduard Shevardnadze but set the stage for the conflict with Moscow that led to the Russian invasion in August 2008.

Sergey Markedonov, one of Moscow’s most thoughtful commentators on the Caucasus, says that it is unlikely that the opposition will be able to mount as large a protest on this date as it has in the past, but he insists those events are nonetheless going to echo in Georgia and across the former Soviet space for a long time to come (www.politcom.ru/9069.html).

The Moscow analyst gives three reasons for thinking that the opposition is unlikely to be able to organize a serious protest on this anniversary. First, he points out, Saakashvili’s opponents remain divided, even as one or another of their leaders continues to come up with projects for new political parties and movements.
(The most recent of these – the creation of a Social Democratic Movement for the Development of Georgia – was announced only three days ago. As Markedonov notes, “from a purely theoretical point of view,” such a movement is “interesting” because it was the Social Democrats (Mensheviks) who led Georgia during the years of the Russian Civil War.)

Second, Markedonov points out, Western governments have grown tired of “illegitimate changes of power in a country pretending to the title of the ‘advance post of democracy in the Caucasus” and very much want that “the departure of the third president of Georgia be according to the constitution” rather than as a result of street protests.

And third – and this is no small thing, Markedonov suggests – the Saakashvili regime “however much people in the Kremlin talk about its unpopularity and loss of trust among the population as before retains definite resources of influence in society,” both through its control of the media and through its control of the force structures.

Flues, Plagues and Biological Weapons in Ukraine

by Tammy Lynch

Listening to Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko, we might be tempted to conclude that Ukraine is doomed. Certain to collapse under the weight of an overwhelming tripartite plague of viral pathogens.

“People are dying,” Yushchenko told television viewers. “The epidemic is killing doctors. This is absolutely unprecedented and inconceivable in the 21st century.”

Moreover, “Unlike similar epidemics in other countries, three pathogens of viral infections came to Ukraine at the same time: two of them are seasonal flu and the third is the A/H1N1. According to virologists, such a combination of infections due to mutation may produce a new, even more aggressive virus.”

The epidemic he spoke of is the H1N1 virus, which is blamed, sadly, for the deaths of approximately 90 people in Ukraine over the last several weeks. These deaths should not be minimized or dismissed. But, Yushchenko’s statement is high on panic-inducing hyperbole and low on facts.

Every year in Ukraine people die from the seasonal flu. Yesterday, the government claimed that the number of deaths from flu this year is actually 10 percent below last year. Since we don’t have access to documents, it’s impossible to know if this claim is accurate. But, it’s possible.

The World Health Organization recognizes a “big event” in Ukraine, but also suggests a “moderate impact.” According to Bloomberg, at the moment, infection rates seem to be in line with the United Kingdom, which has seen a .03 percent death rate after infection from H1N1 with 137 deaths in two months.

It is possible that infection and death rates will continue to rise exponentially, particularly given Ukraine’s horribly equipped and poorly maintained health facilities.

But statements like those from Yushchenko and other officials have not been helpful. The President seems determined to create panic. Because of these statements, many Ukrainians suggest that the country is actually facing an outbreak of a more virulent illness, such as pneumonic plague. Several bloggers even suggested that a pharmaceutical company had accidentally released a biological weapon. (See this google search link for the myriad of stories on this.)

Prime Minister Tymoshenko certainly didn’t help matters by announcing a “quarantine” of nine regions, limiting travel, banning all public gatherings and attempting to take control of pharmaceutical pricing. Such a strong reaction suggests a very strong virus. But while Yushchenko is sewing uncertainty, Tymoshenko is trying to show iron.

Unfortunately, this iron came after the illness had already hit. The government appears to have done little preparation to battle the flu.

Regardless, Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and all candidates in the election have seized on the H1N1 virus. Opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych criticized the government for its lack of preparedness, Yushchenko suggested that public officials should be held criminally responsible for not stopping the flu’s spread, and Tymoshenko has used the epidemic to cancel all election gatherings for three weeks.

All three candidates also have set the foundation for future use of the flu if necessary. Could Yushchenko hope to create enough panic to find support for a state of emergency, thus cancelling the election? Could Tymoshenko use the epidemic both to limit her opponents’ campaigning and to consolidate control over power entities? Could Yanukovych lead a revolt against both leaders?

It’s going to be a very long election season.

Eurasian Energy Briefs

by Roman Kupchinsky

The Russian gas monopoly Gazprom, which is being pressured by its European customers to change the current pricing policy for gas which is linked to oil prices, received an unexpected measure of support from the Chinese government.

The government in Beijing declared that the linkage between oil and gas prices remain in place. However, many experts believe that this is mostly a symbolic declaration because in the ongoing negotiations between China and Gazprom, the most that Gazprom can expect is a 10-15 percent price increase above the current price of gas sold to China of $269/1,000 cubic meters.

Sinopec, the Chinese oil and gas company, announced on October 31 that the price of gas should remain linked to oil and diesel prices and announced that the price of gas will rise on the Chinese domestic market.

Pressure from Gazprom’s European customers however, has forced Gazprom management to react to their demands and promise unspecified changes in the existing pricing scheme.

Some analysts believe that the Chinese side rushed into supporting the Russian pricing scheme in order to hasten deliveries of gas from the Russian West and East Siberian gas fields. However, it is unrealistic to believe that gas from both regions will be available in the near future. The West Siberian fields can come on line earlier since they already have the needed infrastructure to support deliveries of 30 billion cubic meters/year.

Russian gas and Ukrainian politics are being mixed once again in the traditional cat and mouse game between Moscow and Kyiv.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the leadership of the United Russia party on October 30 that “It appears that we will have problems with payment for our energy once again” Putin told the party leadership. The Russian Prime Minister refered to his phone conversation with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko during which she allegedly complained that Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is blocking payments for Russian gas.

Putin added that Ukraine has the needed funds to pay and could use its gold reserves, valued at $27-28 billion. He quoted an unnamed IMF expert who stated that it was possible and correct for Ukraine to pay Russia from these gold reserves.

Russia Casts a Wary Eye on Deepening U.S.-Georgia Cooperation

Dmitri Rogozin

by Giorgi Kvelashvili
For the full text of this article see the Jamestown Eurasian Daily Monitor.

On October 30th, Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, gave an interview to Ekho Moskvy Radio, in which he severely criticized America’s Georgia policy. Quoted by most of Russia’s news agencies, Rogozin said: “No one has abandoned the idea to use Georgia as a counterbalance to Russia…[Georgia is] a toothache or a headache for us in the Caucasus; as far as we are concerned, these attempts will continue.”

When answering the question regarding the future of the relations between Moscow and Washington if the United States deploys military bases in Ukraine and Georgia, the high-profile Russian envoy, a fierce critic of the current leaderships in Kyiv and Tbilisi said, “a few days ago there was a statement by a high-rank representative of the Obama Administration that Washington has no plans whatsoever to establish military bases” in those countries.

He apparently meant U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow who recently held talks in Tbilisi and made several public announcements.

On the one hand Vershbow stated that the Obama Administration does not plan to use territories of non-NATO countries for future air defense installations, but on the other he once again reiterated America’s commitment to Georgia’s sovereignty by saying that “the protection of Georgia’s territorial integrity is a matter of principle for the United States,” and that America wants to have Georgia as “a strong, independent and sovereign partner that will be able to defend itself.”

Rogozin and in fact the entire Russian political establishment look puzzled about the United States’ future steps vis-à-vis Georgia’s security. “We do not know what to believe since we have heard so many contradictory statements over the past month and half.” Rogozin also added that “the Russian side would like to receive more clarity in this regard from the Administration of President Obama.”

Russia’s major concern seems to be the upward trajectory of U.S.-Georgian security and military cooperation, one of the pillars of the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. Joint exercises of the American and Georgian military have already become a commonplace. Rapid Response 2009, the latest one, was recently held at Vaziani, one of Georgia’s best-equipped military bases near the capital Tbilisi. The United States has also committed itself to providing Georgia with military planning and training assistance.

Although the declared goal of the exercises was to train Georgians for their participation in NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan (Tbilisi intends to send troops there in December), Russia’s reaction was unusually swift and critical, making clear its deep suspicion about the role of the American military in Georgia. In Rogozin’s words, “any military activities near the Russian borders causes Moscow’s concerns, especially when they involve the American military.”

Moscow’s envoy to NATO also added that “there must be an agreement between Russia and NATO as soon as possible to create trust between us.” It seems Moscow’s worst nightmare would be America’s permanent military presence in Georgia that would entirely thwart the current Russian leadership’s geo-strategic aspirations regarding “a zone of privileged interests.”

In regard to Georgia’s NATO membership which Moscow apparently wanted to undercut by invading Georgia, Russia also failed to achieve a desired outcome. Although the prospect of Georgia’s membership might seem more distant now than would have been in the absence of the Russian military aggression, it is not at all taken by NATO’s enlargement agenda. In Vershbow’s words, as reported by Russian media, “it is extremely difficult to say” when Georgia will join NATO and in Washington’s view the process “could take years”.

Meanwhile, Washington’s and its allies’ support for Georgia’s NATO choice remains unchanged. On October 30th the Georgian media reported NATO’s Spokesperson James Appathurai as saying that “the improvement of relations between the Alliance and the Russian Federation will not hinder the process of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s integration into NATO”.

Russia’s anxiety about Washington’s deepening cooperation with Tbilisi is perfectly understandable. Despite Moscow’s incessant attempts to bring Tbilisi back to its geopolitical orbit, Georgia, is now further from Russia than ever before. Even the war that Russia waged against Georgia in August 2008 failed to produce the outcome Moscow very much hoped for, namely, a regime change that would bring to power a pro-Russian leadership in Tbilisi or create anarchy and instability throughout Georgia.

Quite the contrary happened during the course of the war. Georgia abruptly withdrew from the Moscow-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States, to which Russia purportedly extends its “zone of privileged interests,” severed diplomatic relations with Moscow and in an even more surprising development signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership with the United States a few months later, in January 2009. Economically - while trade with Russia is steadily declining as a result of Moscow-imposed economic embargo on Georgian products- trade relations with Turkey, the United States and other NATO and European countries are on the rise, further distancing Tbilisi from Moscow’s political and economic orbit.