By Anna Babinets
On
September 12, the Russian destroyer Smetlivy was stopped
on its way to the Mediterranean Sea in the port of Sevastopol by Ukraine’s
border guards, who spent more than three hours checking the vessel’s documents.
Ukraine’s border guard service is allowed to check all Russian ships of the
Black Sea Fleet (BSF) leaving Ukrainian borders because of the BSF’s basing on
Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. The procedure, codified via an agreement between
the two countries, represents the only way by which Ukraine is able to
create an obstacle for Russian warships leaving Sevastopol to head to regional
hotspots. Yet, according to recent Western reports, rather than standing in the
way of Russia’s assistance to the embattled Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, Ukraine
has been actively involved in arms and supply shipments to the Syrian
government—a claim that Kyiv vociferously denies.
At
the beginning of this month, a Washington, DC-based analytical firm, the Center
for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), which investigates transnational crime,
conflict and security, conflict resolution, as well as arms trafficking,
released a report entitled, “The
Odessa Network: Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers [link is a PDF],” written by its analysts Tom
Wallace and Farley Mesko. The report asserts that over the past year and a half,
a heavy volume of shipping traffic could be observed traveling from Oktyabrsk
port (southern Ukraine) to Syria’s coast. Wallace and Mesko used data from the
ships’ onboard transponders to track these vessels. They noticed that ships that
had left the Ukrainian port sometimes suspiciously disappeared.
“By
obtaining AIS transponder records for all ports in Syria, Ukraine, and Russia
between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2013 we constructed a near-complete log of
commercial maritime traffic entering or exiting ports in these countries over
the given timeframe, complete with exact date, time, and location,” the authors
say.
At
least two large Ukrainian companies—Kaalbye Shipping and Phoenix Trans-Servis—delivered
Russian and Ukrainian weapons to Syria, the “Odessa Network” report notes.
“This pattern of Kaalbye ships docking at Oktyabrsk, entering the
Mediterranean, then disappearing from AIS coverage has been most prevalent
during periods of heavy Russian military aid to Syria.”
According
to Wallace and Mesko’s research, these companies were linked with Igor
Urbansky, the former Ukrainian deputy minister of transportation, and Vadim
Alperin, a well-known Ukrainian businessman. Oktyabrsk port is itself controlled
by the Russian-Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Novinsky. Furthermore, the C4ADS analysts
suggest in their study that Ukrainian and Russian government officials cooperated
with these companies on the arms shipments.
A
September 7 article
in the Washington Post publicized the “Odessa Network” report and caused
particular controversy in Ukraine. Rejecting the accusations, the Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared
on September 10 that there was no supply or transit of military goods from
Russia through Ukraine to Syria in 2012–2013. Ukraine had stopped military and
technical cooperation with Syria as of May 2011, according to the foreign
ministry. A parallel announcement was published by Ukraine’s state service of
export control, which regulates all Ukrainian export and international
transfers—in particular, military goods and dual-use goods. The state export
control service alleged that it had not given out any permits for the transit of
military goods from Russia through Ukraine to Syria.
Similarly,
in a live TV interview on September 13, Ukrainian Member of Parliament
Viacheslav Kyrylenko called the arms shipments report a “provocation”
aimed at derailing Kyiv’s planned signing of an Association Agreement with the
European Union.
Oktyabrsk
port manager Andriy Yegorov, whom the Wallace and Mesko report referred to as
“a tool of the Russian-Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Novinsky,” also repudiated the arms shipment study.
According to Yegorov, the Oktyabrsk port had not provided military cargoes for
Syria for the past two years.
Whether
or not one believes the denials by Ukrainian authorities about the arms
shipments through Ukraine to Syria, a careful reading of the C4ADS report nevertheless
reveals a number of serious mistakes. For example, the authors say that one of
the main individuals identified as a part of the “Odessa network,” Igor
Urbansky, is still a member of the Ukrainian parliament. This is incorrect. He
left the parliament in 2007, and he is extremely difficult to contact. It would
be an enormous scandal if a member of the Ukrainian parliament were linked to illegal
arms trading and Russian oligarchs, as outlined in the C4ADS report.
Furthermore,
in their report, Wallace and Mesko identify Vasilii Tsushko as Ukraine’s minister
of defense and allege that he assisted Urbansky with carrying out the weapons
deals. This claim is false and improbable. Vasiliy Tsushko was never defense
minister but instead was an interior minister in 2007. As chief of Ukrainian
police, he would have been able to perhaps sell Syria police uniforms, but
certainly not cruise missiles, as the authors of the report claim.
Ukrainian
experts are also skeptical about Wallace and Mesko’s report. In an interview
with the Ukrainian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Crimean analyst
and founder of the
BlackSeaNews portal Andriy Klymenko called the
claims extremely doubtful. He does not believe Ukraine would have helped Russia
with arms shipments to Syria. Rather, Klymenko guesses that the article masks the
real route Russian weapons take to Syria—from the Russian port of Novorossiysk
to the Syrian port of Tartus.
Anna,
ReplyDeleteThanks for pointing out the typos, they've been corrected. On a research project of this scope it almost always occurs that a few slip through the cracks, so your feedback is much appreciated.
However, I think it's unfair to characterize our work as unreliable because of two minor mistakes (minor in that neither of them affect any analytical conclusions - we never said Tsushko helped facilitate weapons shipments, and Igor Urbansky was already highly active in the weapons business by the time he assumed office.) You also quite misunderstand several of our basic assumptions and findings in the Syria section.
Thanks again for the corrections.
Best,
Tom Wallace
Tom,
DeleteI`m sure you have done great work! It was very interesting to read your report. Also I watched your presentation in DC online from Ukraine.
Probably for you this is minor mistakes, but for me as for Ukrainian journalist those mistakes are very big. If I would published such "facts" in Ukraine, sure, I got an invitation to the court. Can you imagine you would wrote US congressman trades weapons, but in facts he was a congressman 5 years ago and now he just is businessman? I guess, in this case you wouldn`t call it "minor mistake". Because this is your country, your congressmen and your courts.
In true, those mistakes are reason why many people who I spoke in Ukraine don`t believe this report. They think your report is very helpfull for Russia in our "local war". I don`t think so, but I`m just describing how it looks in Ukraine.
However, thank you for your report! Sure, Ukrainian journalists will use it in their work.
Anna Babinets