By Richard Arnold
On July 27, Moscow police clashed
with Dagestani traders in the market near Moscow’s Matveyevskoye district. After
a scuffle that ended with one police officer dead, the Moscow police launched a
crackdown on migrant traders across the city, with 1,000 migrants rounded up
for deportation. Competing accounts exist of the reasons for police
involvement, inevitably casting the police as the heroes or the villains of the
drama (see EDM, August 5),
but the implications for the political situation in the country are perhaps the
most concerning.
Most immediately, the principal
candidates for the position of mayor of the Russian metropolis appear to be
competing for the nationalist vote. Alexei Navalny’s association with the far-right
“Russkie” faction of the protestors against President Vladimir Putin—including
skinhead Dmitry Demushkin and the extremist Movement Against Illegal
Immigration (DPNI) leader Alexander Belov—is well known, and Navalny has made specific
pledges to crack down on illegal migration in his political manifesto (http://navalny.ru/). The establishment candidate, incumbent
Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, has also been keen to play on the emotions of the
situation, visiting the hospital of an officer wounded in the initial raid and
reminding the public of the 30 markets he had already closed (http://regions.ru/news/2470150/). While
politically organized nationalist formations may have already decided to
support Navalny, Sobyanin is still courting the votes of ordinary Russians who
support xenophobic ideas—the 56 percent who agree with the slogan “Russian for
[ethnic] Russians” (http://www.levada.ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2012).
Aside from the decline in political rhetoric that will result from such a
courting of the nationalist base, there is the danger of what political
scientist Donald Horowitz described as a “race to the bottom” in his 1985 book
“Ethnic Groups in Conflict.” Horowitz theorized that when politicians from
rival ethnic groups compete in elections, they stir up ethnic conflict by
competing with each other to demonize the other group as an electoral strategy.
One could argue that the Moscow mayoral race is even more likely to end in
bloodshed as two politicians are competing with each other to gain the support
of the majority by attacking the same unpopular minority.
Even if such a scenario were to come
to pass, however, on its own it would be unlikely to have much lasting effect
on political stability. Far more damaging will be the increased polarization of
ethnic identity within what the 1993 constitution defines as a “civic” nation. Signs
already point to such a polarization happening. First, the newly-appointed head
of Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov spoke out in defense of the Moscow market
traders in a similar manner to how Ramzan Kadyrov has appointed himself
spokesman of all Chechens in the Russian Federation (http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2013/07/pugachyov-and-kondopoga-technology.html).
Second, the owners of a local bar in Moscow belonging to ethnic groups
indigenous to Dagestan offered to pay for legal assistance to an arrested
trader (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/228052/).
As the Russian state is fighting an insurgency in the North Caucasus—a point
emphasized by two explosions on August 4 and 5 (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/228169/)
in the capital of Dagestan, Makhachkala—it does not need to alienate the
population any further, but should instead be trying to win the battle of “hearts
and minds.”
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.