Arson attacks on North Caucasian cars in Moscow may raise the conflict between Russians and North Caucasians to a higher level

Valery Dzutsev

On July 21, Moscow police informed the popular Russian news website Gazeta.ru about three arson attacks on cars with tags of North Caucasian regions. Two cars with Dagestani license plates and one car with a Kabardino-Balkarian tag were set on fire in the eastern part of Moscow. The police officials cautioned the cars may have flared up by themselves, but given that all three cars were in close proximity to each other and had North Caucasian regions’ codes, the coincidence is very unlikely.

Moreover, it became apparent that attacks on the cars with North Caucasian plates started at the beginning of June, 2011. Over ten cars with Kabardino-Balkarian and Dagestani license plates were set on fire in the Moscow suburb Balashikha, also situated to the east from Moscow. Independently of police sources, some car services told Gazeta.ru about other cases of car arson attacks, though they were unable to confirm whether the affected vehicles had North Caucasian tags. The number of attacks may thus be even higher.

Leader of the nationalist organization “Russians,” Dmitry Dyomushkin, denied that organized Russian nationalists could be involved in the attacks. “The degree of nationalism in the [Russian] society is extremely high. There are some autonomous groups that do not carry out any political activities, but have switched to a regime of ‘punch, explode, kill,’” Dyomushkin warned.

It appears some Russian nationalists have started to mimic the North Caucasian insurgents, creating small autonomous groups, which then target North Caucasians. If this trend persists, however, and the Russian authorities do not put an end to it, the next step will be attacks on ethnic Russian civilians in the North Caucasus and full-scale civil war.

Source: Russian military forces refuse to accept conscripts from the North Caucasian republics

By Valery Dzutsev

On June 29, Russian news agency Regnum published a news story about another hazing scandal. This time it was about six ethnic Russian conscripts running away from a Russian Ministry for Extreme Situations (MChS) training camp in Chelyabinks, in southern Ural. The North Caucasian conscripts allegedly extracted money and physically attacked ethnic Russians. Reportedly there were only 30 ethnic Russian conscripts against 140 North Caucasians, which made it especially hard for the Russians to withstand the pressure. The officers not only did not defend the group of ethnic Russian conscripts against their assailants, but were also themselves subjected to beatings by the North Caucasians. Ludmila Zinchenko, the chairwoman of the Soldiers’ Mothers Organization in Chelyabinks, stated that the Russian military had refused to draft new conscripts from the North Caucasus, so only MChS continues to accept them, which is why their concentration became so high (http://www.regnum.ru/news/1420229.html).

In April 2011, the Russian Ministry of Defense officially rebutted claims about a decrease in its drafting of North Caucasians (http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1396456.html). Yet, the draft from North Ossetia in spring 2011 decreased by threefold from previous conscription campaigns, allegedly because there are more professional soldiers in the Russian army. All quoted conscripts from North Ossetia appear to be ethnic Russians, so the number of ethnic Ossetians drafted to serve in the Russian military is probably even lower (http://region15.ru/news/2011/05/17/10-17). The Russian military is experiencing a severe shortage of conscripts, which already forced it to abolish its plans to reduce the number of conscripts from Dagestan from 4,000 to 400 in spring 2011. Instead, the draft from Dagestan was allegedly increased up to 6,000. Dagestan could dispatch up to 10,000 draftees every year, according to the local experts (http://www.rosbalt.ru/kavkaz/2011/04/22/842284.html). The Dagestani and other conscripts from the North Caucasus appear to be recruited to the Russian army only because of the shortage of manpower in Russia. It thus seems that a separation of Russia and the North Caucasus is already underway, even though officially it is still a semi-taboo topic in the country.

Chechen dead still not buried 10 years after the start of the second Russian-Chechen war

By Valery Dzutsev

On June 13, the Caucasian Knot website unveiled information about a newly discovered mass grave in Chechnya. An estimated 20 people were killed in what appears to have been an extralegal execution during the first years of the second Russian-Chechen war that started in 1999. The mass grave site is located in Chervlyonnaya, a village in the Shelkovskoi district in northern Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, June 13).

It is noteworthy that the locals reported the mass grave to the authorities only recently. According to Caucasian Knot, the locals themselves buried the gnawed remnants of the people they found around their village. The remnants could be identified only through DNA tests, but Chechnya does not have its own DNA identification facilities and it is not clear if the authorities will do the identification at all.

“No one can say how many such mass graves there are in Chechnya today,” an anonymous human rights activist told Caucasian Knot in an interview. According to the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammerberg, over 3,000 people disappeared in Chechnya between 2000 – 2009. According to Hammerberg, the Chechen authorities discovered 60 mass graves with the overall number of buried people above 3,000 (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, June 13).

Mass graves are one of the important indicators of crimes against humanity. The latest finding in Chechnya raises the issue of military crimes that were committed in this territory and have remained uninvestigated. This climate of impunity is not simply unjust and abhorrent, but also, from a very practical standpoint, promotes lawlessness and invites repetitions of the same crimes.

Manezkha Redeux? Budanov Murder May Spark Nationalist Backlash

By Valery Dzutsev

On June 10, former Colonel Yuri Budanov was gunned down in Moscow. His murder is expected to galvanize Russian nationalists. Already flowers were reportedly taken to the scene of the murder, and nationalist activists are reportedly planning a flash-mob type of action similar to what happened in Moscow in late 2010 (http://echo.msk.ru/news/783342-echo.html). Moscow police detachments are patrolling the Manezhnaya square where Russian nationalist riots took place in December 2010 as fears grow there may be another round of uprisings (http://echo.msk.ru/news/783361-echo.html). A leader of Russian nationalists, Dmitry Dyomushkin, stated that the nationalists had “no doubts this murder could be tracked back to the Chechen republic” (http://www.rosbalt.ru/kavkaz/2011/06/10/857814.html).

In 2003, Budanov was sentenced to 10 years in prison for the kidnapping and murder of 18-year-old Chechen girl, Elza Kungaeva. In 2009, Budanov was released on parole. Colonel Budanov served as the head of a Russian military detachment during the second war in Chechnya. Budanov’s trial became the most notorious of few Russian military crimes in Chechnya that were investigated by the Russian state. Russian nationalists defended Budanov, regarding him as a hero, while the pro-Moscow government in Chechnya demanded harsh punishment for him. Ramzan Kadyrov’s close aide Adam Delimkhanov briefly commented on Budanov’s killing: “I think it is retribution” (http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2011/06/10_a_3659061.shtml).

The anxiety of the government to prevent Russian nationalist backlash is reflected in attempts to portray the killing as “a provocation.” Nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated the murder was designed to undermine Russia as a viable partner for the EU, as a Russia-EU summit started in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. Investigators assure the driver of the killers’ car was of “Slavic appearance”, i.e. the killers were not Chechens (http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2011/06/10/3659081.shtml). The indications are that Russian society is becoming extremely sensitive to crimes in Russia proper that involve North Caucasians, so any such event might spark serious clashes and unrest in Moscow.

Georgia Thwarts Another Russian-Sponsored Coup Attempt

By David Iberi

On May 26, 2011, the day Georgia celebrates its Independence Day, the Ministry of Internal Affairs made public a phone conversation, or a recording on some other electronic device, between Nino Burjanadze and her son, Anzor Bitsadze, that took place some time during the May 21 – 25 violent anti-Western and antigovernment protests she organized in downtown Tbilisi.

Burjanadze, former chairwoman of Parliament who turned into the single most important conduit of Russian schemes against Georgia’s pro-Western course, discusses with her son some gruesome details of her plan aimed at overthrowing the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili. The overthrow would materialize at the expense of hundreds of innocent civilian lives “in a civil war” and, even more importantly, with the help of the Russians. “It is worth the death of 100 or even 500 people,” Anzor suggests to his mother, to which Burjanadze replies, “Yes, you are right.” Then then discuss how many Georgians are pro-Western and how many are pro-Russian, and Burjanadze says that she has “direct” support of 15 percent of Georgians. The figure is of course greatly exaggerated given the data of every single poll suggesting that Burjanadze has never had more than 1 – 2 percent.

The last part of the mother-son conversation is about how to use the “Egypt scenario” after a coup d’état has already been carried out in Georgia, such as setting up a transitory government, declaring a state of emergency and installing a curfew. As for the Georgian security forces, Anzor says to his mother, “We will withstand the first strike and then let them deal with the GRU special task forces.” The GRU, of course, is the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

[ See Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh35kUiu0Ho ]

In her latest desperate bid to force President Saakashvili out of office, Burjanadze organized aggressive protest rallies in the central parts of Tbilisi that attracted no more than a few thousand people at most, mainly men in their late fifties. Georgian social networks suggest that many of those who showed up at the Burjanadze demonstrations were former Soviet police and security officers and Communist Party apparatchiks who lost their jobs, influence and prestige after the liberal Rose Revolution ended Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime. Burjanadze and her supporters blocked several important streets in Tbilisi between May 21 and 25—even though the number of protesters was so small that they could well stand on sidewalks without interfering with the traffic. Police did not interfere until the protesters declared that their goal was to sabotage the Independence Day celebrations on Tbilisi’s Rustaveli Avenue scheduled for May 26.

A police officer and a civilian were killed, and another police officer was critically injured, when two cars from Burjanadze's escort speeding away from the scene crashed with the crowd after police started breaking up the violent demonstration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said in a statement.

Burjanadze has visited Moscow several times over the past few years and repeatedly met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Every time she returned from Moscow, her ambitions seemed to have increased and her plans only became more aggressive. Burjanadze never publicly called Russia’s illegal presence on Georgian soil occupation, nor has she ever qualified the events of August 2008 as Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Moscow, for its part, has never hidden its support and sympathy for Burjanadze nor other representatives of a small group of Georgia’s pro-Russian forces.

The latest events, including, the scandalous record of Burjanadze’s conversation with her son, show both the ability of Georgia’s pro-Western government to defend the nation’s sovereignty and the incessant attempts by the Kremlin to destabilize Georgia and bring it back under its suzerainty. But it is also true that until Georgia becomes a formal ally of the West, its long-term stability and security will remain under a big question mark. Greece and Turkey of the 1940s could serve as a good reminder.

Kyrgyz MPs Exorcise Demons by Slaughtering Sheep

By Erica Marat

Tired of continuous showdowns that threaten to disintegrate the ruling coalition, Kyrgyz MPs decided to sacrifice seven sheep in front of the parliament building. According to local traditions, offering the blood of a slaughtered sheep expels devils that a human being is not able to oust just by virtue of his or her own effort.

Although blood offering is a common feature of most Kyrgyz politicians’ campaigns in rural areas, this is the first time the ritual has been performed in central Bishkek. Each of the 120 MPs contributed 700 soms (roughly $18) toward the ritual. Slaughtered meat was served to the people working in the parliament and shared with the elderly and disabled.

In an attempt to boost their own popularity, Kyrgyz MPs have resorted to symbolic politics, trying to justify their own dysfunction. In a recent brawl, ruling coalition members engaged in a fistfight, smashing each other’s faces and further threatening the coalition’s collapse.

Other attempts to boost individual popularity include the compilation of an extended list (over 1,160) of heroes of the April 7, 2010 regime change. The list is long because every parliamentary faction suggested its own heroes. The list embraces about 10 percent of the roughly 10,000 demonstrators on that day.

Furthermore, MPs also voted to impose restrictions on the use of state symbolism. For instance, anyone wearing a hat while performing a national hymn will be charged for misconduct. Also, the state emblem and flag cannot be used on personal business cards.

The parliament’s use of rituals exposes its attempt to deal with the increased transparency of parliamentary work. Most parliamentary sessions are broadcast live, while local media outlets have a good overview of the ruling coalition’s work.

The politics of symbolism might indeed increase the parliament’s short-term popularity among some segments of society. To most international media, however, the Kyrgyz MPs’ lamb slaughter was a source of comical headlines.

U.S. Image in Central Asia

By Erica Marat

Nearly half of the Central Asian population shares a favorable view of U.S. global leadership, the latest Gallup survey shows.

Ironically, approval rating in Kyrgyzstan, where the United States has a transit base servicing the war in Afghanistan, is the lowest within Central Asia. Only 30 percent of population sees the United States in a positive light. Only in Belarus and Russia are the ratings lower – 29 percent and 23 percent, respectively.

The latest Gallup survey results show that the United States’ image has remained favorable over the past years in Central Asia and has significantly improved in Ukraine in the past two years. Between 2008 and 2010, the share of Ukrainians with favorable views of the United States grew from 26 percent to 38 percent.

The biggest gains were seen in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. All three countries saw a roughly two-fold increase since 2008. Compared to three years ago, when 20 percent of Kazakhs and 22 percent of Uzbeks approved U.S. leadership, in 2010 this number increased to 42 percent and 47 percent, respectively.

According to Gallup, such a spike in U.S. ratings is the response of these Central Asian states to President Barack Obama's landmark speech in Cairo. “That may have influenced approval in the region, given that the majority of its population is Muslim,” explains Gallup.

In Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, the U.S.’s rating has been fluctuating. In 2008, only 24 percent of the Kyrgyz population viewed the United States favorably. In 2009, positive perceptions increased to 36 percent, only to decline to 30 percent in 2010.

Importantly, however, the share of Central Asians unsure about their view of the United States is high. Forty three percent of Kazakhs are not sure whether United States leadership is positive or negative. Kyrgyzstan 44 percent and 36 percent of Uzbeks refrain from identifying Washington’s global impact.

Russia is the only former Soviet state where the number of those disapproving the U.S. leadership is higher than the U.S. approval rating – 29 against 23 percent of responders.