Playing the Roma Card in Ukraine

By Paul Goble

Kyiv naturally has focused its attention on Moscow’s exploitation of ethnic Russians in Crimea and Donbas (eastern Ukrainian region encompassing Luhansk and Donetsk provinces) and has given some consideration to political activity among ethnic Hungarians, Rusins, and Bukovar Romanians in western Ukraine. But according to Odnako.org columnist Oleg Mikhailov, Ukrainian authorities have almost completely ignored the way in which the Roma—the “tsygane,” more popularly known as “gypsies”—in the southwestern regions of the country are involved in the current conflict as well. Moscow, in pursuit of its own interests, and Bucharest, in pursuit of very different ones, are both playing the Roma card. And their parallel efforts may soon force Kyiv to pay more attention to a community and its conflicts than it has in the past (Odnako.org, March 26).

The situation is complicated, as all such ethnic cases are, but it is seldom told because of the fears of observers that they will violate the current rules of political correctness. Many Roma, but of course not all, are involved in criminal gangs, and especially since the end of the Soviet Union, their ethnic ties across international boundaries has given them a leg up over the Russian gangs with which they compete. That has led to violence and even sparked pogroms, with one or the other side charging that it has been attacked because of its ethnicity rather than because of its criminal activity.

At least equally important in this story, Mikhailov says, has been the role of the European Union and Romania. The EU, which long has focused on Roma issues, promotes Roma culture and empowerment, building schools and other institutions and arranging for Roma from different countries to develop relations with one another. And Romania has come to view the Roma in neighboring countries, including Ukraine, as its allies in the promotion of the idea of the restoration of “Greater Romania.” The Roma have been pleased to take money from the EU and even more pleased to take Romanian passports from Bucharest, passports that allow them to move far more freely in Europe than their Russian competitors.

According to Mikhailov, three factors have come together to make Romania’s assistance ever more significant. First, the current economic crisis has weakened Ukraine and made Romania a more attractive partner for the Roma. Second, Bucharest has been able to exploit the fact that Kyiv has done little for the Roma over the last two decades and has played down the number of Roma in Ukraine—Kyiv has suggested from 40,000 to 200,000 Roma live within its borders, while the Roma believe the real number is 400,000. And third, the Romanian authorities have been in a position to help Roma barons living in Bucharest to extend their reach into Ukraine.

With the help of the EU and especially of Romania, the Roma of Ukraine, in many cases working hand in glove with criminal groups, are creating the basis for demanding recognition of their own territorial autonomy, one that would be “more oriented in its activities toward Europe than toward Ukraine” and whose putative founding fathers are already using their links to criminal groups to put pressure on Ukrainian officialdom.

Moscow, meanwhile has several options of its own: It can support the Roma to further weaken the Ukrainian state; it can spark pogroms against them to isolate Kyiv from Europe; and it can use the possibility of Roma autonomy to force Kyiv to divide its forces or bend to Moscow’s will. Which one it will choose depends on the course of events, but Moscow—even more than Bucharest—appears likely to be playing the Roma card in Ukraine next.

Perhaps 1,500 North Caucasians Now Fighting for Islamic State, Sparking Fears in Moscow

By Paul Goble

Approximately 1,500 people from the non-Russian nationalities of the North Caucasus are now fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State for Iran and Syria, according to Sergei Melikov, presidential plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus Federal District. Some of them have already returned to their homelands, and when more do, he said, they will likely take up residence in difficult-to-reach villages in highland Dagestan and propagandize the ideas of the Islamic State among young people there and in universities across the region (TASS, March 26; Kavkazsky Uzel, March 21).

That some North Caucasians have fought for the Islamic State and that some who have done so have already returned is beyond question—although there is no way to determine exactly how many people are involved or what they are doing. Some Moscow officials, like Melikov, have offered larger figures, while officials in the region itself have generally suggested that the numbers are smaller, perhaps to protect themselves from charges that they are failing to block the spread of extremism.

What makes Melikov’s latest statement especially interesting is less the figure that he offers but rather his suggestion that North Caucasians who have fought for the Islamic State are returning specifically to universities and are now promoting its cause with students there. That has sparked a sharp rebuttal from students of the North Caucasus Federal University in Stavropol and Dagestan State University in Makhachkala who, in the words of the news portal Kavkazsky Uzel, “categorically deny that there are former [Islamic State] fighters among their fellow students (Kavkazsky Uzel, March 26).

Many students at the two universities say that officials want to use the suggestion that Islamic State returnees are among their number as an excuse either to impose government control over all student groups or to require the students to take courses in patriotism. Either of these moves, the students said, would backfire, leading students as a whole to be more skeptical about the government and thus more willing to listen to those who speak out against the Russian authorities—including some who may be sympathetic to the Islamic State.

Aleksandr Skakov, an expert on the North Caucasus at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, has no doubt that there are people from the North Caucasus who are fighting with the Islamic State’s forces, that some of them have returned, and that they constitute a threat both directly (because of their experience with the use of arms) and indirectly (because of the aura of heroism that their combat experience gives them in the eyes of some) (Kavkazsky Uzel, March 26).

But he suggests that any effort by them to recruit in universities in the North Caucasus will not bring them the people they hope for. The Moscow scholar said that they would have far more success if they sought to spread their message via mosques there and perhaps even more success if they used the Internet. But he adds that most North Caucasians will not be attracted: few of them are going to agree “to leave their native region and ‘die for ideals they do not understand’ ” in the Middle East. They might, however, be quite willing to die for their own specific causes at home; and that is what most frightens Moscow.

Is Ukraine Promoting Traitors?

By Oleksandr Gavrylyuk

“Traitors are promoted!” Ukrainian journalist Anna Babinets wrote on her Facebook page on March 12. She was commenting on the defense minister’s order No. 70 (given on February 5, 2015), which appointed Major-General Vyacheslav Nazarkin the first deputy commander of the West Operational Command (Facebook.com/anna.babinets.1, March 12). The appointment was reportedly arranged by Nazarkin’s old-time colleague, current chief of Ukraine’s General Staff, Viktor Muzhenko.

Last year, Babinets’ investigative reports (YouTube, Part One, Part Two, November 28, 2014) for the Slidstvo.info project of Hromadske.tv blamed Nazarkin for collaborating with the enemy while he served as the chief of the Special Operations Department of Ukraine’s General Staff.

According to the journalist, units under Nazarkin’s command were repeatedly ambushed by pro-Kremlin insurgents and Russian soldiers arousing suspicions that he was conspiring with the Russian military to organize attacks on his own troops. On July 29, 2014, a group of 19 Kirovohrad-based commandos fell into a trap near Snizhne, Donetsk region. Twelve scouts were killed, three were captured and only four managed to escape. The commandos had reportedly been sent to search for a Ukrainian Su-25 pilot allegedly shot down by the pro-Russia forces. However, secret and open sources confirm that this pilot was successfully rescued five days earlier, on July 24. And in fact, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced the pilot’s rescue, on July 28.

The ambushed commandos have claimed that enemy forces were told of the Ukrainian scouts’ route. Major-General Nazarkin, who had earlier served in Russia himself, allegedly phoned his brother, the deputy commandant of the Omsk garrison in Russia, every time he deployed Ukrainian troops to Donbas (eastern Ukrainian region encompassing Donetsk and Luhansk provinces). So nearly every special operation involving Nazarkin has ended in death and disaster.

However, when phoned by Babinets, Nazarkin denied having a sibling and abruptly ended the call. Later, the two Nazarkin brothers deleted their common photos from their online social network profiles. Instead, Russian online media outlets Russian Spring and Asia Center depicted the Ukrainian general as the victim of a whispering campaign (Rusvesna.su, August 30, 2014).

Following the Slidstvo.info’s investigation, Nazarkin was dismissed from office, and his former position in the military was given to Colonel Serhiy Kryvonos, the former head of the Airborne Forces Staff and a widely respected officer in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Babinets was invited to testify as a witness before the Military Prosecutor’s Office, while Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko sent Nazarkin away from journalists to the western Ukrainian city of Khmelnytsky (Hromadske.tv, September 11, 2014).

Nazarkin and Muzhenko once served together at Zhytomyr, a regional center west of Kyiv. Muzhenko even used to represent the Party of Regions in the regional council. Muzhenko’s affiliation with the ruling party helped him enter the General Staff, and Nazarkin followed him up the military ladder. Indeed, in December 2013, during the EuroMaidan protests in Kyiv and across the country, Nazarkin was named acting head of Special Operations in the Armed Forces (Hromadske.tv, August 27, 2014).

In January 2014, Nazarkin urged Yanukovych to “restore order in the country” despite his colleagues’ refusal to become involved. Nonetheless, following the EuroMaidan Revolution, in March 2014, the general was promoted to department head.

Now, Nazarkin has been offered a new appointment. “Instead of terms of imprisonment, the suspects [including Major-General Nazarkin] in collaborating with enemy are given new opportunities to lead the army,” Babinets exclaims.

On August 24, 2014, Nazarkin’s patron Muzhenko was himself promoted to the rank of colonel-general. The same day, the catastrophe in Illovaysk unfolded, where Ukrainian forces under his command were surrounded by Russian troops and suffered heavy losses. This year, the Ukrainian Army was footsteps away from repeating the tragedy near Debaltseve. And yet, for now it seems that Muzhenko’s and Nazarkin’s positions within the military are unassailable.

Ethnic Russians Flee North Caucasus Because They Do Not Feel Presence of Russian State

By Paul Goble

Ethnic Russians left the North Caucasus in massive numbers in the 1990s because of the collapse of their economic prospects, fear for their personal security, an increase in crime, and personal ties with family members elsewhere in the Russian Federation. But today, according to new research, most of those choosing to leave are doing so less because of any direct threats but rather for psychological reasons, including the sense that there is no firm presence in the region of Russian statehood or any institutions there that defend their interests. And consequently, there is little reason to expect that the outmigration of ethnic Russians from the region will not continue until this group, which has played a key role in cementing the North Caucasus to Russia, is no longer represented there.

In a survey of more than 15 recent studies on the issue of Russian flight from the Caucasus, Natalya Varivoda, a scholar at the Nalchik Institute for the Study of the Humanities, says that the number and share of Russians in the population of the North Caucasus republics grew throughout the Soviet period until the early 1960s, began to decline relatively after that, fell both absolutely and relatively during the 1990s at rates far higher than official Russian statistics show, and continue to fall now in both urban and rural areas in most republics of the region (Skfonews.info, January 15).

Between the 1989 and 2002 censuses, she writes, 279,000 more ethnic Russians left the region than arrived. But those are “official figures.” Detailed analyses of the census returns show that the number of Russians leaving was “somewhat higher and formed on the order of 330,000–335,000.” That meant that the Russian exodus left Chechnya and Ingushetia mono-ethnic republics, and it meant that the Russian share in the populations of all the capitals in the region fell by more than a third. The situation in rural areas was more varied: virtually all ethnic Russians left the rural areas of Chechnya and Ingushetia. Few remained in Dagestan. But in Adygea and North Ossetia–Alania, the Russian numbers remained unchanged; and in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia, the number of ethnic Russians, though not their share of the population, actually rose slightly.

The exact mix of factors leading ethnic Russians to leave varies from one republic to another as does their choice of where to go to. Most ethnic Russians from the North Caucasus have moved not to Moscow or other central Russian cities, as have many non-Russians from the region, but into those predominantly ethnic-Russian regions adjoining the North Caucasus—Stavropol kray, Krasnodar kray and Rostov oblast. Not surprisingly, such people bring their concerns and fears from the North Caucasus to these regions and contribute to the rise in inter-ethnic tensions there.

The sense ethnic Russians have that they are not wanted has little to do with the attitudes of the indigenous population, Varivoda says. Polls show that majorities of these nations view the Russians now less as occupiers than as people who can make a significant contribution to the economic development and stabilization of the region. Thus, they are concerned about the departure of the ethnic Russians and are especially worried when the rate of departures accelerates. But governments are another matter: Most republican governments are less interested in retaining the Russians and have adopted numerous policies, including declarations about the “state-forming” role of the titular nationalities, which seem to leave Russians out of the equation. And Moscow, in the views of the ethnic Russians remaining there, has failed to show the flag and prove convincingly that the North Caucasus will forever remain part of the Russian state.

Two-Thirds of Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan Say They Would Like to Leave—But Few Do So

By Paul Goble

Two out of every three ethnic Russians now living in Kazakhstan say they would like to leave that country, according to a major study being conducted by a team of Kazan-based ethnographers, but few actually do so. According to official statistics, the number departing has been stable at approximately 20,000 a year. The first figure may appear apocalyptically disturbing, while the second may appear completely reassuring. But the scholars say that the situation is in fact far more complicated than that (Fergananews.com, March 13).

On one hand, the statement of preferences reflects how people feel about where they live as opposed to where they would like to be and suggests that the ethnic Russians in Kazkhstan are perhaps less well integrated into the country’s community than many in Astana or Moscow think. And on the other hand, the low number of actual departures is the product, among other things, of the actual prospects for jobs in the Russian Federation. At a time of economic difficulty, most people will remain where they are out of fear that moving could land them in an even worse position. Consequently, changes in Kazakhstan and Russia could easily lead to more unhappiness and more departures.

In 2012, at the request of the Kazan Institute of History, the Scientific Center for History and Ethnology at the Southern Kazakhstan State University interviewed 130 ethnic Russians in Chimkent—about one-tenth of one percent of the ethnic Russian population there. Since that time, the Kazan scholars have organized similar surveys the Kazakhstani capital of Astana, as well as in Petropavlovsk. None of the research has been published up until now, but discussions about it have become so widespread that Igor Savin, one of the researchers at the Chimkent center has decided to go public with some of the data. What he presents provides a fascinating glimpse into one of the most important issues in Eurasia (Fergananews.com, March 13).

Savin says that of those who say they want to leave, 52 percent point to Kazakhstan’s language and ethnic policies as their reason to emigrate. An additional 24 percent say that they would like to escape what they see as a worsening of inter-ethnic relations. The community is isolated: Only two percent of its members speak Kazakh fluently; 51 percent have some familiarity with the language of the country; but 33 percent say they do not know a word of it. As a result, he continues, more than four out of five—82 percent—feel “discomfort” in interacting with others in Chimkent.

As far as inter-ethnic relations are concerned, 71 percent of the ethnic Russians surveyed say they often or sometimes experience discrimination because of their nationality. That happens, they say, most often in government offices, somewhat less in day-to-day living, and relatively infrequently at work or in schools. Thirty-nine percent of ethnic Russians consider Kazakhstan their native country; but 13 percent say their native country is the Russian Federation; 11 percent name the former Soviet Union; and two percent point to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The survey also sought to determine ethnic-Russian attitudes toward marriage with members of other nationalities and toward other more personal activities. Almost a third of the Russians surveyed were married to someone of a different nationality; and 40 percent say they would be indifferent or approve of the marriage of one of their daughters to an ethnic Kazakh. Only 16 percent say they would be “categorically” against such unions. On a relative issue, 88 percent of the ethnic Russians say they are quite ready to live next door to a Kazakh: only 2 percent say they would not want to.

These patterns suggest that ethnic Russians are far from integrated in Kazakhstan and that, in the event of a crisis or of intense Moscow propaganda, the situation could deteriorate quickly in a Donbas-type scenario. But if the situation continues without either of those factors, the ethnic Russians of Kazakhstan are likely to decline in numbers still further and not present Astana with a serious problem.

Armenia Cautiously Expanding Ties With Iraqi Kurdistan

By Paul Goble

Over the last year, Armenia and Iraqi Kurdistan have exchanged a series of high-level delegations. The diplomatic visits were the result of Erbil’s interest in gaining support for its apparent drive toward greater autonomy or even independence. At the same time, Yerevan is interested in improving ties with a place where there is a significant Armenian minority; building an alliance with a people long at odds with Armenia’s bête noire, Turkey; and gaining benefits for itself while limiting the possibility that Kurdish aspirations will in any way threaten Armenia’s position either in the region or within the borders of Armenia itself.

Last month (February 2015), Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan received Iraqi Kurdistan’s President Masood Barzani. And judging from media reports, the two discussed many of these issues, some longstanding and some new. The two agreed to increase their cooperation not only to ensure added protection for the Yezidis, a significant minority in Iraqi Kurdistan and the second largest ethnic group in Armenia, but also to develop the five Armenian villages in Kurdistan whose populations total some 5,000 people (Kavkazoved.info, February 27).

Many Armenian officials and academic specialists are convinced that the region’s roughly 35 million Kurds will finally achieve their goal of an independent state sometime soon. And Yerevan wants to be sure that it develops a friendly relationship with a potential new state that is certain to find itself at odds with Turkey. Moreover, an independent Kurdistan would have the potential to create problems for Christian and Armenian minorities on its own territory and for mobilizing some in Armenia itself.

Indeed, Yerevan apparently believes the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq is already an entirely legitimate state formation, and that its strengthening could lead to the formation of a second Kurdish autonomy or even state within Turkey. Such a development would force Ankara to moderate its opposition to Armenia. Consequently Yerevan wants to be an active participant in any such developing trend. Building the relationship now is thus important to Armenia if it is to play that role in the future.

But Armenia has three additional reasons to want to be involved with a Kurdish state. First, many Kurds talk about a Greater Kurdistan, which would approach or even impinge on Armenian territory. Therefore, any such discussions could set the stage for conflict in the region at some point in the future. Second, because of Iraqi Kurdistan’s proximity to Armenia, Yerevan wants to make sure that Armenia has access to oil and gas from there and also to open the door for Armenian specialists to work in Kurdistan.

And third and most intriguingly, there is an idea—which has periodically surfaced over the last 25 years—that the restoration of Kurdish autonomous districts in Armenia and Azerbaijan could be a possible precondition for the settlement of the Karabakh dispute between those two countries. Such districts existed early in Soviet times. However, this idea seems remote since the numbers of Kurds in the South Caucasus today is quite small—only a few thousand declare themselves officially as Kurds, although many more were forcibly re-identified as Armenians and Yezidis in Armenia or as Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, given Armenian sensitivities about anything that touches on Karabakh, it seems likely that this issue, too, is part of the mix.

Kyrgyzstan: Another Central Asian State Whose Army Is Not Combat Ready

By Paul Goble

The countries of Central Asia face challenges from both within and without, but few of them have militaries capable of maintaining domestic order or blocking the invasion of Taliban or Islamic State forces from Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s military is in particularly dire straits. The country’s Armed Forces suffer from inadequate food, uniforms and supplies, widespread mistreatment of draftees by older soldiers and officers, corruption, suicides, and mass desertion, according to a new 66-page Russian-language report prepared under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It concludes brutally: “the Armed Forces of the country need complete reformation” (OSCE, February 2015). 

The study, conducted jointly by the OSCE and local researchers, examined the situation in 70 different units throughout Kyrgyzstan, in the most comprehensive survey ever undertaken of conditions in the uniformed services of that country. Twenty-two of the units were in the army, thirty-four in the border guards service, six were in the national guard and penal guard services, and two were in the emergency services ministry. In all, 1,115 servicemen were interviewed. And while the OSCE study naturally focused on the human rights dimension, its portrait of an army in disarray cannot fail to concern anyone worried about whether Kyrgyzstan will be able to withstand the obvious challenges it now faces.

In presenting the report, Sergey Kapinos, the head of the OSCE Center in Bishkek, said bluntly that the uniformed services of Kyrgyzstan will not be able to fulfill their military tasks if they do not respect the rights of servicemen. The problems of these services, he continues, involve not only dedovshchina (“the mistreatment of junior soldiers by their seniors”) but also, and importantly, inadequate support for all those serving their country and the fact that “experienced military personnel are becoming ever fewer” and are not being replaced by a new generation.  Kapinos suggested that the military has made some efforts in the right direction but that both it and the government need to do far more.

The attitude toward, or at least the ability of the Kyrgyzstani state to support, its military is reflected in the fact that sergeants receive only $163–193 a month and that the most senior commanders receive less than $409 a month.  Border guards are paid a little more, but not much. And perhaps the most damning finding of all: the Kyrgyzstani army currently spends a dollar a day to feed its soldiers, 40 cents less than the country’s jails spend on feeding prisoners.

The situation may be even worse than the OSCE study suggests: According to one of those who conducted the survey, many units returned all of their questionnaires without filling them in, apparently out of fear that those above them would punish their members for answers the regime would not approve of. The only bright spot, he said, is that the General Staff of the Armed Forces explicitly said that it would like the team to travel to all units to explain the rights soldiers are supposed to have and that they would welcome more such surveys in the future.

The OSCE also reported that 94.6 percent of the soldiers in the army were ethnic Kyrgyz, vastly more than the 64 percent of the population they form.  That means that the non-Kyrgyz, including Russians and Uzbeks, are distinctly underrepresented, yet another reason to worry about the military’s capacity to do its job.