Chavez Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez recognized the Russian occupied Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia today as “independent states” during a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow.

"Venezuela joins in recognizing the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states," Chavez said. "We will recognize these two republics starting today."

Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh expressed his thanks to Chavez for recognizing the two republics.

"I would like to express my gratitude on behalf of the people of Abkhazia to the leader of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, for recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," he said Thursday, Interfax reported. "We intend to develop close economic and political ties with Venezuela."

Medvedev praised Chavez's move. "Thank you, Hugo. Russia has always supported a country's sovereign right to recognize or not recognize a state's independence."But of course we are not indifferent to the fate of these two states. We're very grateful."

Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Nalbandov downplayed Chavez’s announcement and stated: "Russia has been trying for a year to provide these puppet regimes with legitimacy," Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Nalbandov told Reuters. "These attempts have been in vain."
"It should be clear to the Russian side that such actions won't add legitimacy to these puppet regimes."

The Russian daily Kommersant daily reported Thursday that Russia would seek to find more supporters for its stance on Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Latin America.
"After the recognition by Nicaragua, the most promising region from this perspective is Latin America," a Russian foreign ministry source told Kommersant.

Protecting the “citizens” of Russia

by Tammy Lynch

On Wednesday, Russia’s Duma passed in its first reading a significant change to its Law on Defense. The change, which must pass two more readings in the Duma, would allow the country to use its armed forces to “protect its citizens” outside of its borders. It is unclear what “protect” means. Previously, the Law on Defense only allowed Russia’s armed forces to be used outside of Russia for combating terrorist activity and implementing international treaties. The vague wording of this new provision has led to speculation in Ukraine that Russia is creating a legal pretext for intervention of some sort in the country’s autonomous region of Crimea.

Ukrainian officials have complained for months of attempts to distribute large quantities of Russian passports in the region, although it is difficult to prove these allegations. These passports theoretically would allow Russia to claim the need to “protect” its “citizens” against some form of Ukrainian “aggression.” This (again theoretically) would initiate the use of armed forces – even though most of these “citizens” have always lived on Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian officials point out that Russia distributed large numbers of passports in the Georgian separatist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia before sending forces deep into Georgian territory to “protect” these same “citizens”

This change to the Law on Defense would bring Russia’s legislation in line with action already taken in Georgia, as explained by Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov. "The situation that we had in August last year - I am talking about the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and Russian citizens who live in Southern Ossetia,” he said, “”has highlighted the need to adjust the law.” Georgia hotly disputes that Russian “citizens” were in danger.

Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko immediately reacted to the Duma action by ordering a “readiness check” of all Ukrainian military units. The method of conducting this examination wasn’t specified. But although it will not be completed until 30 September, the results of the exam are easy to predict – failure. The country’s underfunded military is short on new equipment, manpower, parts and fuel.

Still, even government critics appear bullish about Ukraine’s potential to repel a Russian incursion – largely because Russia’s military is "also" underfunded. "In the event of a military conflict in Ukraine, Russia will need many more resources (than in Georgia) and it does not have such resources today," Mykola Sinhurovskyi said.

But the fact that Russian military intervention in Ukraine is being discussed signals what may be the highest level of tension between the two countries since the early to mid 1990s.

This tension (which appears only to exist at the highest government levels) can be blamed on a number of issues, including President Yushchenko’s focus on Russia and the divided leadership in both countries. But, more than anything, both Russia and Ukraine are preparing for the upcoming Ukrainian presidential election – both exploiting tensions to develop an advantage that can be used later. In the process, worrying precedents involving military troops are being set.

So far, there has been little international response to Russia’s new defense provision. Given the recent dismissive tone toward Georgian complaints, a significant response is unlikely. This means that both sides will be left to their own (potentially dangerous) devices – at least until the election.

The “Arctic Sea” Caper - a Russian Cover-up?

The mysterious adventures of the freighter “Arctic Sea” has taken on new dimensions. The Russian Security Service, the FSB, reported on September 8 that there was no illegal cargo on board the ship; only the original load of timber.

However, according to the British paper the Telegraph, the Arctic Sea cargo ship that disappeared for almost a month earlier this summer, was carrying weapons to Iran and was being tracked by the Mossad, the Israeli security service.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on September 8, once again denied speculation that the hijacked Finnish freighter Arctic Sea had been smuggling weapons to Iran. Quoted by the Interfax news agency, Lavrov said that speculation that an S-300 air defense system was hidden aboard the freighter's cargo of wood was "groundless and absolutely untrue."

"Russia will closely investigate the ship, with the support of Malta under the flag of which the freighter sailed. Everything will be very transparent," Lavrov said.

There was also speculation that Soviet-era X-55 cruise missiles which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads were among the cargo.

Mikhail Voitenko, editor of the online “Sovfracht Marine Bulletin” was among the earliest “and most outspoken of those casting doubt on the official version, questioning why pirates would risk seizing a relatively inexpensive cargo in one of Europe's busiest shipping lanes.”

RFE/RL reported that on September 2, "Voitenko left Russia on the first flight to Istanbul after receiving a nighttime telephone call advising him to leave. He's declined to identify the callers, but told news agencies they were "serious people," and hinted they were from the special services. He said the callers told him people involved in the case were furious at him for speaking publicly.

Why Are the Russians Digging Tunnels in Abkhazia?

by Giorgi Kvelashvili


Following Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s visit to the occupied Georgian province of Abkhazia in late August 2008, the Kremlin appears to be intensifying its military preparations in the South Caucasus.

On September 4, Georgian newspapers and TV channels reported that “the Russian occupation forces have been engaged for two months in constructing a one-kilometer-long tunnel deep in the Ochamchire district. Allegedly, the construction is highly secretive, only Russian military are employed and the local residents are not even allowed to approach the construction site. The Russians will use the tunnel to deploy military equipment and munitions.”

Television station Rustavi 2 showed footage of the tunnel construction “clandestinely taken on a cell phone by a Sokhumi resident.” According to Rustavi 2’ “the Russian occupation forces have been engaged for two months in construction work and that 700 meters have already been dug through the mountains near the town of Tkvarcheli".

Georgian Public Broadcasting (GPB) reported that it is not one but several tunnels that the Russians are constructing near the towns of Ochamchire, Gulripshi and Tkvarcheli in the central and southern zones of occupation. The Russian military in some places are enlarging already existing tunnels leading to abandoned coal mines for “serious military purposes”.

The Georgian government has not commented on the Kremlin’s new construction activities and the Russian and Western media have not reported the story. It is difficult to speculate on the purpose of the tunnels, but the secretiveness of the construction leaves ample room for guessing.

Dr. Nodar Natadze, a Georgian scholar and a former member of the Georgian Parliament whose Popular Front played an important role in Georgia’s national liberation movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s thinks that the significance of the tunnels for the Russians cannot be overestimated.

On September 5, he gave an interview to iTV.ge, in which he presented two possible reasons for their construction.

“Russia is digging the tunnels in Abkhazia to deploy powerful, possibly, nuclear missiles there.” He based this assumption on the fact that “Russian naval forces are extremely weak in the Black Sea, having only one modern missile launcher Moskva.” Given this disadvantage, “Moscow would like to increase its offensive potential by deploying missiles along the Black Sea coast.”

Abkhazia’s geostrategic location, in Dr. Natadze’s words, is the primary reason why the Kremlin would like to use it as a missile base in addition to the North Caucasus where Russia already has missiles.

The second hypothesis Dr. Natadze mentioned was that the Russians might need “to use the tunnels to bury their nuclear waste.”

The international community has been largely silent about Russia’s illegal activities in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Although there is an EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and its monitors are entitled under their mandate “to cover the entire territory of Georgia,” they are denied the opportunity by Russia to enter the occupied territories.

Given the prerogatives allowed by the mandate to monitor “the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian armed forces to the positions held prior to the outbreak of [August 2008] hostilities” and “to contribute to the stabilization and normalization of the situation in the areas affected by the war”, the EUMM and Brussels have the right to demand from the Russian side unfettered access to monitor the situation in the Georgian territories currently held by Russia, including Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

If the Russians are indeed constructing tunnels for highly sensitive military deployments which could potentially alter the military balance in the South Caucasus, this should concern not only Georgia, but the entire international community, especially the United States and the European Union, which should express their concern and demand an explanation from Moscow.

The Putin-Medvedev Brawl over Gazprom: Will Europe Suffer?

by Roman Kupchinsky

With the Fall/Winter heating season in Europe rapidly approaching, there are indications that a vicious fight has begun between the apparatus of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s entrenched loyalists over control of Gazprom, the giant Russian state-owned gas company.

The victor will have a major say in determining Russia’s energy policy towards Europe in the coming years as well as gaining control over the financial resources of Gazprom, a vital asset in future political campaigns.

The first public indications that a fight had begun in Moscow came on September 1 when Putin met with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in Poland and agreed to release Ukraine from the key provision of the “take or pay” gas contract signed in January 2009 – that Ukraine would have to pay for the gas it had promised to buy but did not take from Gazprom.

Tymoshenko stated that in 2010, Naftohaz Ukraine, the state oil and gas monopoly, would only purchase 25 billion cubic meters of gas (bcm) from Russia instead of the 52 bcm contracted for under the long term contract. In 2009 Ukraine was obligated to buy 40 bcm but only needed 33 bcm for its domestic consumption.

Tymoshenko was reported by the Moscow Times as saying that “In my view, one can say we removed all gas problems, or at least are firmly on the way to having no problems about the issue,” she said. “I am always delighted to have our meetings and I know that they always result in real actions.”

As part of the agreement, Putin agreed to have Gazprom drop a law suit against Naftohaz by RosUkrEnergo, a Swiss gas trader 50 percent owned by Gazprom, for $600 million in late payment penalty charges.

Soon after the Putin-Tymoshenko agreement was announced, Ukraine raised the transit fee for Russian gas to Europe in 2010 from $1.7 per one thousand cubic meters/100 kilometers to $2.7 and asked that Gazprom pay this bill in advance.

On September 7 Medvedev met with Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller and instructed him not to make this payment. “We need to act in accordance with the agreement which was signed on January 19 (2009). We do not need to dream up anything new. We also face difficult times,” Medvedev stated.

Medvedev’s comment that Gazprom must act in accordance with the existing contract was a direct attack on Putin who a week earlier had pledged to by-pass its fundamental clauses.

As soon as the Putin-Miller meeting ended, Gazprom spokesmen were reported by Kommersant as saying that Ukraine had the right to ask for changes in the existing contract, but that this does not obligate Gazprom to act on them and Gazprom has the right to penalize Ukraine for breaking the contract. This response might indicate that Gazprom management is looking to break its umbilical cord to Putin and switch its loyalty to Medvedev.

Another event which could shed light on the Putin-Medvedev fight began on September 7 when a Moscow court began a new trial in the case of Vladimir Nekrasov, the owner of the now bankrupt chain of cosmetic stores Arbat Prestige and Semyon Mogilevich, an alleged Russian organized crime leader suspected of links to RosUkrEnergo. According to sources in Moscow, Medvedev’s supporters are anxious to show that Mogilevich and organized crime were linked to Gazprom in their efforts to discredit Alexei Miller and Vladimir Putin and take control of Gazprom.

To make matters worse, on August 31, the representative of the IMF in Ukraine, Max Alier, threatened to break off all cooperation with Ukraine if the government led by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko reneged on meeting its commitment to raise domestic gas prices. The first price increase (20 percent) for household users was scheduled to go into effect on September 1, 2009; however, this apparently did not take place and the vast government subsidies for gas remain in place as European frustration with Ukraine grows.

Putin’s new willingness to suddenly meet Ukrainian gas needs is in direct contrast to Medvedev’s new anti-Ukrainian hard line and seems to be part of Putin’s counter-attack in order to preserve the Gazprom Empire for himself and his clan of siloviki.

This does not bode well for anyone. The Medvedev-Putin fight, which boils down to which camp will control billions of dollars of Gazprom's assets,is an internal Russian inter-clan battle with enormous consequences for European energy security.

The European Union could wind up the big loser in this battle. If the Ukrainian-Russian conflict over the future of the January 2009 contract is not resolved soon, Ukraine might be hard pressed to meet its transit commitments of Russian gas to the EU in early 2010.

Will Moldova’s New Coalition Succeed?

by Tammy Lynch

On August 28, Moldova’s brand new parliament elected a brand new speaker – Liberal Party head Mihai Ghimpu. The 58-year-old Ghimpu has been the head of the Chisinau City Council since 2007.

Ghimpu’s election comes on the heels of an opposition victory in the July 29 snap parliamentary elections and the subsequent creation of a majority coalition christened the Alliance for European Integration (AEI).

The AEI favors closer relations with the European Union, particularly with regard to lessoning visa requirements for Moldovans. Both sides also understand that the ongoing issue of smuggling through the separatist republic of Transnistria must be addressed. Finally, the AEI is interested in negotiating with the IMF for assistance.

Before moving forward with EU or IMF talks, however, the AEI must prove itself domestically. This Alliance is the most recent of many; earlier versions have failed. Over the last eight years, under a succession of Communist Party governments, opposition strides were quickly eliminated by infighting, capitulation to the ruling party and political ambition.

In fact, until this year, the work of Moldova’s “democrats” generally has been disappointing. Moldova has become the poorest country in Europe with a population where 1/3 of its citizens are believed to work abroad.

But, just maybe, this year will be different.

The country’s opposition appears to have received a major shove from “the people,” who viewed 5 April parliamentary elections as fraudulent and rose up in protest. The uprisings began a series of moves that ended in the AEI. The protests also appear to have struck fear into the Communist Party for the first time, forcing fairer repeat elections.

The 29 July elections gave the “opposition” 53 of 101 seats and the right to form the government – should the four opposition parties be able to work together.

The election of Ghimpu and a series of well-coordinated statements provide glimmers of hope that the parties may be able to do just that. But, the hard work is just starting.

While the majority coalition has enough votes to name a speaker and prime minister, it will need additional votes from eight Communists to replace Communist President Vladimir Voronin. In Moldova’s parliamentary system, the president is elected by 61 votes.

To deal with this deficiency, Ghimpu announced that the coalition had agreed to nominate former Communist Speaker of Parliament Marian Lupo as president. Lupo resigned from the Party only after the April protests. However, before joining the Communists, he headed the EU’s TACIS program. In August, he claimed that Communist discipline was forced “by repressive measures and fear.”

As if to prove Lupo correct, in response to the election of the speaker, the Communist Party’s leadership insisted all members boycott parliament. This tactic undermines Lupo’s attempts to split the party.

But President Voronin understands the boycott can’t go on forever. This week, he announced his impending resignation – which will happen sometime in the future. He also pointedly threatened one of the coalition leaders: “We will find other ways to deal with you.”

So now the questions become - How far with Voronin go to keep his MPs in line? What will Lupo do to find those eight votes? And after a history of giving in, will the opposition finally hold together?

Georgia's Efforts to Protect Its Territorial Waters

by Giorgi Kvelashvili

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly incensed at Georgia’s efforts to protect the sovereignty of its territorial waters in the Black Sea. Over the past few days representatives of the Moscow-sponsored government in the occupied territory of Georgia’s Abkhazia region have ratcheted up their rhetoric against Tbilisi, condemning the latter for seizing vessels illegally sailing to and from Abkhazia.

According to the Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy, “the foreign minister” of Abkhazia, Sergei Shamba, stated that “the situation…needs to be addressed…Just over the past few days there have been four cases…of seizures [of vessels). He stressed that “the participation of Russian border guards to protect the Abkhaz territorial waters will be in compliance with the agreement reached with the Russian Federation.” Ekho Moskvy also announced that Russia “will provide security for the vessels present in the territorial waters of Abkhazia.”

Tbilisi calls the Russian decision “piracy,” although, according to the State Minister for Reintegration of Georgia, Temur Yakobashvili, “Georgia is not going to sink Russian ships” and “will instead use international mechanisms” to deal with illegal Russian actions. The Georgian TV station, Rustavi 2, reported on August 29 a statement by the Deputy Chief of the Border Defense Service of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant-General Evgeny Inchin, in which he expressed his outrage at “Georgia’s aggressive moves on the sea” and promised that Russia will take “appropriate measures".

In regard to the specific measures to be taken by the FSB – under whose authority the Russian border protection service falls – the Russian news agency RIA Novosti said that “the Russian and Abkhaz border guards will be equipped with special motor boats to deal with their tasks”.

According to various Russian sources, FSB officers do not conceal that Russia’s decision to boost its military presence along the Abkhazia sea coast “should be viewed in conjunction with other measures implemented by Moscow in the run-up to the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014".

A new ‘sea phase’ of confrontation between Russia and Georgia comes as Tbilisi is desperately trying to increase its defensive capabilities one year after the Russian military aggression that was followed by a Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 and the occupation of Georgian territories in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Protection of its territorial waters has been one of Georgia’s top priorities and Tbilisi has indeed seized dozens of ships trying to illegally access Georgian ports along the Abkhazia coast.

When President Saakashvili was introducing the new defense minister Bacho Akhalaia on August 28, he said that “he is not fully satisfied with the preparedness of the Georgian armed forces to contain our very aggressive neighbor.” At the same time the Georgian president lauded Bacho Akhalaia’s organizational skills when during the past few months as deputy defense minister he helped “establish the lines of military fortifications around Tbilisi,” and thanks to his “personal efforts,” “these defense lines are now set in place”.

President Saakashvili also noted that “reforms aimed at bringing Georgia up to NATO standards will continue.” On his part, Mr. Akhalaia said at his first press conference as defense minister that his priorities will be the modernization of the Georgian army, maintenance of peace and integration into NATO.

As Russia continues to boost its military presence in Abkhazia and naval capabilities in Georgian territorial waters, the major priority of the Georgian government is the defense of the capital Tbilisi.

With Russian forces ominously stationed just a few dozen kilometers from the Georgian capital in the region of Tskhinvali, the emphasis on the security of Tbilisi makes perfect sense. On the other hand, President Saakashvili’s government is being urged by supporters to increase international efforts to force Russia to comply with its international obligations, including those related to the safety of navigation and the inviolability of territorial waters.

Signs that Russia might perpetrate illegal actions close to Sochi, which will host the 2014 Winter Olympics, have put pressure on Tbilisi to bring the issue to the attention of the International Olympic Committee.

Furthermore, the Georgian government, according to observers, has to increase pressure on the European Union, the guarantor of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia, to apply more pressure on the Kremlin to comply with the terms of the agreement and withdraw its forces from the occupied Georgian territories.

Moscow’s aggressiveness could take an upward trajectory if it is convinced that the international community ignores or condones its actions. Checking the possible reaction of the West has always been a part of Russia’s operating procedures when it intends to escalate any provocation against its neighbors.