By Matthew Czekaj
The votes are in and the
results have been announced: for the first time in its 20-year history as a
post-Soviet state, Azerbaijan
will sit as a non-permanent member on the UN
Security Council. After 17 rounds of voting in the General Assembly, Azerbaijan
was able to obtain the necessary support of two thirds of member countries,
thus taking over the Security Council seat – traditionally reserved for an
Eastern European country – being vacated
by Bosnia-Herzegovina on December 31. In the last round of secret ballots cast,
Azerbaijan received 155
votes, while the other contenders vying for the seat, Slovenia and Hungary, received 13 and one vote,
respectively. Azerbaijan
will sit on the UN’s highest body from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2013.
The final vote came as a
disappointment for Hungary,
which hoped that its diplomatic
actions during the Libyan civil war would win it greater international
support. When fighting grew most intense in the North African country, the
Hungarian Embassy in Tripoli
was one of the few foreign diplomatic representations that did not close for
security reasons during the entire Libyan revolution. Budapest
maintained a presence in Libya
long after US, British and French diplomats left. Despite the “great security
risk” they worked under, Hungarian embassy employees became diplomats of “last
resort” for around 50 governments seeking access to Libya during
the seven-month conflict.
The Central European state
served as the rotating presidency of the EU Council of Ministers when the
Libyan uprising erupted, and felt it was its duty to remain on the ground
amidst the conflict. As the pro-Gaddafi forces clashed with the rebels,
Hungarian diplomats aided in the release of Western journalists held prisoner
during the fighting, as well as in helping Western citizens escape Libya. They
also sought to be a “bridge” between the two warring Libyan factions. Their
efforts were recognized both by the locals in Tripoli (who renamed the street
on which the Hungarian Embassy stood “Hungarian Street”) as well as the United
States government, which sent a formal letter of gratitude from Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton to Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi (Bloomberg,
October 18; Wall
Street Journal, October 19).
Budapest hoped that Washington’s open
gratitude would put it over the top in its candidacy to the Security Council.
But, its record in North Africa was not enough
to generate the needed votes (Bloomberg,
October 18). Consequently, over the next two-year term, Baku will have the responsibility to debate
and vote on matters of international security, war and peace in the world’s
highest international forum. It remains to be seen whether this South Caucasian
country, which has been locked in a frozen conflict with Armenia over the break-away territory of Upper Karabakh
for two decades, will attempt to use its new influence to bring the regional
issue to the Security Council. The Armenian side claims to be “unfazed” by the
Azeri Security Council seat. Yet, it is certain that Yerevan
will now be stepping up its lobbying pressure to ensure that Upper Karabakh –
or at least Azerbaijan’s
preferred solution to it – stays off of the UN agenda over the next two years.
By Matthew Czekaj
Though little noticed in
the press, Serb-EU relations reached a new milestone, recently. On September
23, Serbian Secretary of State for Defence Tanja Miščević announced
at a conference on Serbia’s
EU integration that around November 10, her country would send Serbian officers
to take part in the European Union’s anti-piracy mission to Somalia – Operation “Atalanta.”
According to Miščević, Serbian officers will participate on board a French
naval vessel attached to the Atalanta mission. In addition, Serb military
personnel will assist in training Somali security forces as part of the EU
Training Mission in Uganda.
Belgrade’s military cooperation with Paris
in Uganda
and off the Horn of Africa is the result of a Serb-French diplomatic breakthrough,
which culminated in early April of this year. In the first visit
of a Serbian Head of State to Paris in about a
century, Serb President Boris Tadić and his French counterpart Nicholas Sarkozy
signed a strategic partnership agreement cementing France’s
support for Serbia’s
European integration. In addition to political, economic, and cultural cooperation, the two
governments also agreed to defense collaboration and military exchanges as well
as discussed joint
action in the Atalanta and the EUTM mission Somalia
– Uganda.
Serbia’s participation
in EU military campaigns was made possible by the Balkan country’s formal
acceptance on May 26, of the EU’s security procedures for the exchange and
protection of classified information, and an official agreement reached between
Brussels and Belgrade on June 8, to cooperate in military
and civilian missions.
Exact numbers of Serbian
soldiers taking part in the EU missions in and off the coast of Africa were not
cited in any English-language media sources, and the Serbian Embassy in Washington, DC
had not responded before this article was posted. However, the level of Serb
participation is likely to remain small. Only a handful of Serbian military
personnel are deployed
in multinational peacekeeping missions abroad, and the largest contingent
currently in place is composed of 45 troops and individuals serving in the United
Nations (UN) peace mission to Cyprus.
Nevertheless, the Serb-EU military relationship is groundbreaking for another
reason: namely, it represents the first time that Serbia
has participated in a European led mission abroad; all of Serbia’s
previous multinational peacekeeping contributions served under UN missions.
Though an aspiring EU
member, Serbia
is under no obligation to take part in the EU’s Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP) missions. Its voluntary involvement is a clear effort by Belgrade to associate itself more closely and
significantly with Brussels.
The EU and its Member States (MS) share this sentiment. EU foreign affairs
chief, Catherine Ashton noted that Serbia’s
participation in CSDP efforts is “a step that will bring Serbia closer to the Union”
and “a clear sign of mutual trust” (EurActiv,
September 30). These remarks were echoed
by the British and German ambassadors to Serbia. That is not to say that Belgrade has changed its
attitude toward the other major Euro-Atlantic security organization – NATO. Serbia still
considers the North Atlantic Alliance a threat,
and has no interest in joining, currently bound by a resolution mandating the
country’s neutrality toward all military alliances (EurActiv,
September 30). Nevertheless, closer EU-Serbia ties are important to Belgrade in all areas,
including the military.
Serbia’s willingness to play by Europe’s
rules seems to have paid off. On October 12, the European
Commission recommended that Serbia
receive official candidate status, citing positive reforms taken over the past
decade in political and economic spheres. The EU Council of Ministers will
formally vote on Serbia’s
status in December. Yet, the EU refused
to offer a date to begin accession talks until Serbia improved its relations with
Kosovo. Indeed, the issue of Serbia’s
conflict with Kosovo,
which it still considers a break-away province, will likely prove to be a major
stumbling block in Serbia’s
future accession negotiations with the EU. And the issue has been compounded in
recent months by the violence
that has been occurring on the Serb-Kosovar border.
Though
the European Union is far from unified in its stance vis-à-vis Kosovo,
enlargement fatigue following Bulgaria and Romania’s entry as well as ongoing financial
woes are likely to encourage some EU members to use Kosovo as an excuse to keep
Serbia out for now. The presence of Serb military personnel accompanying French
forces in the Indian Ocean is a significant outcome for Serbia, which has been trying to improve
the international image
of its armed forces. Yet, its participation in EU missions abroad is unlikely
to completely smooth Serbia’s
rocky and winding road toward European membership.
