From Pipelines to the Sidelines: Ukraine’s Uphill Energy Battle

By Jiri Kominek

Fisticuffs, smoke bombs and flying eggs in the Verkhovna Rada on April 27 might make good headlines, however, Ukraine’s politicians fail to see that the real battle ahead in securing national sovereignty will only be won through very difficult sacrifices.



By surrendering national territory to Russia through last week’s 25-year lease extension of a naval base in Sevastopol in exchange for cheaper gas, Ukraine’s leaders have demonstrated once again their pre-occupation with their own well-being instead of placing the country first.

The Financial Times published an op-ed by Tomas Valasek, director for foreign policy and defense at the Center for European Reform in which he criticizes Ukrainian politicians over the years for failing to seize the moment and wean the country off of being one of the biggest gas consumers on the planet.

Thanks to an inability to adopt more energy-efficient housing or heavy industry programs, Ukraine burns 900m USD of gas per month in winter, three times that of neighboring Poland despite the fact that it produces much gas domestically.

In an interview published by Kommersant on April 28, Vaclav Bartuska, the Czech Republic’s Ambassador for energy security issues, said Ukraine produces 20b cubic meters of gas per year which, he argues, would be enough to satisfy household and municipal demand. The remaining 10b cubic meters could be sourced from Central Asian suppliers. This, however, would require changes in Ukraine’s economy, and more importantly in the mindset of Ukrainians themselves – something for which they are not as yet prepared.

Ukrainian politicians have also refused to wean themselves from lining their pockets through non-transparent gas deals involving companies such as the Kuchma-era Eural Trans Gas and RosUkrEnergo, scams with reportedly close links to Gazprom and the Kremlin.

As one E.U. diplomat told Ukrainian government representatives during a shuttle diplomacy initiative during the last gas crisis in January 2009, “you are stealing too much too quickly”.

Another E.U. diplomat quipped over how difficult he found it to take the Ukrainian side of the argument seriously during the January 2009 gas crisis, after listening to members of Tymoshenko’s government explain their country’s financial plight while observing that all were wearing luxury-brand wristwatches “with the cheapest model in the room worth 50,000 USD”.

Tomas Valasek aargues that the European Union offered to help Ukraine deal with its seemingly endless gas problems by bringing a number of financial institutions to the table including the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank, to help gas-sector reforms.

Yulia Tymoshenko, then-prime minister, rejected the offer since she would have to increase gas prices at a time when she was running for the country’s presidency.

The offer remains, yet the current government appears content to enter into short-term-gain-for-long-term concession deals with Russia.

Ukraine’s foreign minister Konstyantyn Hryshchenko is touting all the economic benefits that will accompany the Black Sea fleet lease extension-for-gas deal including further cooperation in the nuclear energy sector, closer integration of Antonov aircraft maker with Russia’s state-owned United Aircraft Corporation, and future maintenance contracts for Ukrainian shipyards in the Crimea.

Ukraine’s shipyards stand to benefit by pure default since the rusting vessels of the Black Sea fleet are in such dire need of overhauls they would not be able to circumnavigate their way round the Atlantic coast of Europe to Russian naval facilities in the Baltic without sinking.

“We are witnessing a turning back of the clock five years to the Kuchma era with Russia seeking closer economic integration with Ukraine and other former Soviet satellites into an economic bloc that Moscow hopes will somehow act as a counterweight to the E.U.”, said Prague-based analyst Ondrej Soukup.

It remains to be seen how much Viktor Yanukovych will be willing to bend further eastward as Moscow continues to pressure him to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Although two years ago Yanukovych promised, if elected, to recognize Russia's latest de facto territorial acquisitions, throughout the past six months, he’s instead gone rather quiet over the matter.

All of this could be irrelevant, however, after 2013 when Russia completes the first stage of the Nordstream gas pipeline which will relegate Ukraine to the sidelines as a transit state for gas shipments, considerably diminishing its bargaining position.

Moscow Keeps Pushing for ‘Regime Change’ in Georgia

By Giorgi Kvelashvili

A peaceful transfer of power in Ukraine from Viktor Yushchenko to Viktor Yanukovych was widely hailed as the ultimate triumph of democracy in the post-Soviet country. But the speed at which the highly significant treaty on the extension of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s stay on Ukrainian soil was negotiated, signed and ratified casts doubt on the democratic nature of the new leadership in Kiev. It also shows the Kremlin’s unquenchable desire to push forward its sphere of influence agenda amid Washington’s preoccupation with Afghanistan and Iran and the window of opportunity President Obama’s Russia “reset” policy, Europe’s enlargement ‘fatigue’ and the world financial crisis so fortuitously present to Moscow.

The promptness with which Yanukovych acquiesced to Russia’s demands is a response that would likely be encouraged in other post-Soviet countries as well. For those who fail to cooperate, apparently, there is a “Kyrgyz scenario” pending as a sword of Damocles. Russia’s propaganda machine has already started to contemplate on “theoretical” feasibility and “practical” utility of the Ukraine and Kyrgyz scenarios across the region that the Kremlin calls “near abroad.” To show how those two “options” could interact in Moscow’s strategic designs, Regnum, a Russian news agency on the Internet, has dedicated a special article, entitled “Bishkek Night as the Turning Point for the Post-Soviet Space.”

Ex-prime minister Zurab Noghaideli, who now champions the pro-Kremlin cause in Georgia, was quick to discern the ‘reality’ with which a reemerging Russia leaves the post-Soviet space. He has already threatened that the “Bishkek scenario” will be repeated in Tbilisi if the upcoming local elections in Georgia “are rigged,” which is a euphemism for a loss by his political party. While the opinion polls show that Noghaideli and his allies are supported by no more than 9% of the Georgian public, they are conducting their election campaign under the slogan “It’s already falsified,” putting their signs at subway stations, government buildings, apartment houses and construction sites in the Georgian capital.

Noghaideli’s actions and verbal statements have long been barely legal. On April 28 he announced, “no one should think that we will go to our homes if the elections are falsified. We will overthrow this government in an uprising.” Commenting on Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili’s interview to Russia’s Kommersant newspaper in which he predicted that the pro-Russian forces “will be defeated” in the local elections, Noghaideli warned on April 7 against “ballot fraud” and menacingly said “This may cost [Merabishvili] his life.” On April 8, Noghaideli and a few dozen of his party activists were trying to break into one of the printing houses in Tbilisi. Although several of them were briefly detained for “misconduct,” no criminal charges were filed by Tbilisi police.

On April 23-24 a controversial Russian businessman of Georgian origin, Alexander Ebralidze, using his ties with the Kremlin, organized a lavishly funded “Congress of Peoples of Georgia” in Saint Petersburg. Noghaideli’s party associates Koba Davitashvili and Kakha Kukava used the occasion to fly to Russia to participate in the gathering and to deepen contacts with Russia’s political establishment. On April 28 they met with Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the Russian ultranationalist and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, who chairs a large faction in Russia’s legislative organ, the State Duma. Lecturing the Georgian guests on the merits of “Russo-Georgian friendship,” Zhirinovsky refused to shake their hands and angrily told them, “Do you know why we stood by the Abkhaz and Ossetians? Because they say only good things about Russia…If Tbilisi said good things about Russia, the Russians, [and] the Russian army, there would be no problem [between us].”



Going back to the “Ukraine vs. Kyrgyzstan scenarios,” on April 28 Noghaideli showed his understanding of how those two developments could interact in Georgian reality. “If Ukraine decides to recognize [Abkhazia and ‘South Ossetia’],” he said, “then our goal should be to overthrow the [Georgian] government.” Pretty related to this pronouncement was the earlier statement he made on Georgian Public Broadcaster’s popular political show on March 7. To the journalist’s question on what he would do if Russia once again invaded Georgia, Noghaideli responded that the first thing he would do would be “to start liberating Georgia from [Georgian President] Saakashvili’s regime.”



Last spring the pro-Russian opposition forces’ push to oust President Saakashvili’s liberal government in three-month-long protests ended in a complete fiasco. Unlike past events though, the Kremlin now openly supports its proxies in Georgia; Ukraine is led by a pro-Moscow president; and there is a bloody “Kyrgyz scenario” to present an “alternative” to those who would not cooperate voluntarily. On top of this, at least from the Georgian standpoint, the West is even more aloof from the post-Soviet space than it was a year ago. That is why Georgia now depends almost solely on itself to cope with the problems of immense proportion.

Kazakhstan’s dual role in Kyrgyzstan’s politics

By Erica Marat

Kyrgyzstan’s borders with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have remained closed since the April 7 unrest, forcing local businesses to slow down their activity. Despite Kazakhstan’s initial support of Kyrgyzstan’s provisional government, Astana remains reluctant to reopen borders with Kyrgyzstan. The border between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is vital for economic exchange. Local businessmen claim millions of dollars in losses due to the sealed border. The provisional government’s temporary ban on certain business transactions to prevent illegal deals further hurt the country’s economy.

Astana’s strict border policy shows how Kyrgyzstan today deals with two versions of Kazakhstan: one, as Chair of OSCE and another, as a neighbor on whom it depends economically. It is possible that Kazakhstan’s decision to continue to block the border is made in its role as an influential neighbor. The Kazakh government claims that the situation still needs to normalize before the border is opened again. Despite numerous pleas by Kyrgyz politicians, Astana gave no specific indication about what it considers to be a normalized situation to have the border unsealed.

In the meantime, helping the provisional government to expel deposed president Kurmanbek Bakiyev to ensure stability in the country was done by the Kazakhstan-OSCE Chair. It was the OSCE Chair who sent military aircraft to Jalalabad to transport Bakiyev and his family from their hometown to Kazakh territory, and who later sent the fallen leader further to Belarus.

What role Kazakhstan will choose in the coming months, when Kyrgyzstan is to hold referendum and parliamentary elections, remains to be seen. As the OSCE Chair, Kazakhstan is to voice the final judgment as to whether the elections were a regional breakthrough or signified another failure for Kyrgyzstan’s attempt to change. Not having had its own experience in holding free and fair elections before, Kazakhstan might leave unnoticed some of the irregularities in the course of elections. As Central Asia’s biggest state, however, Kazakhstan is determined to be the one to set a political and economic example in the region.

Overall, none of the Central Asian leaders are interested in seeing positive change in Kyrgyzstan where presidents are ousted under the pressure of angry crowds. Although Bakiyev was despised by his regional counterparts, seeing removal of his regime turning into a success story in Bishkek is not in their best interest.

If Kyrgyzstan indeed succeeds holding free and fair elections, it will set an important precedent for the region and invigorate political opposition and the NGO community. However, a weak Kyrgyzstan, where the rulers are dependent on bigger neighbors, is a convenient subject of mockery for leaders like Islam Karimov and Emomali Rakhnom. Both are determined to prevent similar unrest at home.

Against this background, none of the members of the provisional government have to date offered viable economic policies. While the provisional government is concerned with gaining legitimacy, the economic decline will be the next important challenge before and after October elections.

PACE’s Reputation is at Stake

By Giorgi Kvelashvili

On April 20, 2010 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s (PACE) David Wilshire met with Boris Chochev, one of the leaders of the Russian occupational regime in Georgia’s Tskhinvali region. The meeting took place in Moscow at the “embassy of the Republic of South Ossetia.” While Wilshire is a British national, he is a member of PACE’s Monitoring Committee and together with his Hungarian counterpart Mátyás Eörsi is preparing the document entitled “The Humanitarian Consequences of the War between Georgia and Russia: Implementation to Resolutions 1633 (2008), 1648 (2009) and 1664 (2009)” for the organization’s spring session on April 26-30.

Wilshire’s meeting with Chochiev without Georgia’s formal consent invoked strong criticism in Tbilisi and Georgia’s ministry of foreign affairs issued a special statement condemning the European diplomat’s “deplorable” move. The ministry’s statement underlined that this is the first time “when an official representative of the international organization holds the meeting in the premises of the ‘embassy’ of the proxy regimes”, and accused Wilshire of violating “the main principles of international law.”

No reputable nation or international organization has ever recognized the independence of “South Ossetia” or Abkhazia – another Georgian province also under Russian occupation. PACE in its previous resolutions unambiguously demanded that the Russian Federation fully respect the August 2008 ceasefire agreement and withdraw its illegal recognition of Georgia’s two sovereign territories.

PACE Resolution 1633 (2008) specifically “condemns the recognition by Russia of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a violation of international law and Council of Europe statutory principles….reaffirms [the Assembly’s] attachment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and calls on Russia to withdraw its recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and respect fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as the inviolability of its frontiers.”

Besides, the same resolution as well as PACE’s other documents related to Russia’s invasion of Georgia “call on the Russian authorities to allow observers from both the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to have access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are under the de facto control of Russia…and to withdraw [the Russian] troops to positions ex ante the conflict.”

Thus the PACE resolution put forward very specific conditions to the Russian Federation. Withdrawal of the Russian troops to the prewar positions, full deployment of European Union and OSCE observers into the Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia and withdrawal by Russia of the recognition of independence of “South Ossetia” and Abkhazia have been named as “minimum conditions for a meaningful dialogue.” Moscow has neglected all of them.

David Wilshire’s disrespect for Georgia’s sovereignty comes at a time when the Kremlin is particularly intensifying its diplomatic maneuvering in the run-up to PACE’s spring session. What Moscow apparently wants to achieve is a milder tone in the new resolution toward its illegal actions in the occupied Georgian lands and a better diplomatic position to further its already unbearably heavy pressure on Tbilisi.

Before the infamous Wilshire-Chochiev meeting took place, Russia’s foreign ministry engaged in several diplomatic talks with European representatives to specifically discuss the “Georgia question” as well as the report Eörsi and Wilshire are preparing for PACE. Foreign Minister Lavrov himself met with Wilshire on April 20 and called on him “to take into consideration the new political and legal realities in the region,” which in Moscow’s diplomatic jargon means recognizing Russia’s sphere of influence to the detriment of Georgia’s sovereignty. On April 16, Lavrov’s deputy Grigory Karasin held a meeting with the French Ambassador in Moscow Jean de Gliniasty and among other topics “Russia’s position on Transcaucasia issues was also discussed.” The same day Karasin spoke by phone to Pierre Morel, the Special Representative of the European Union. The two again discussed “the conditions in Transcaucasia.”

Lavrov plans to participate in PACE’s spring session as “a special guest” on April 29 and, as reported by Russia’s foreign ministry, he will focus on “the necessity of new security structures,” the issues related to the 65th anniversary of the end of WWII and the dangers posed by “attempts to falsify the history.”

Meanwhile, Chairman of Georgian Parliament David Bakradze warned recently that “Europe’s prestige and honor” would be seriously damaged if PACE fails to once again unequivocally demand from Russia to fulfill all of its obligations under international law. The Georgian Parliament has in addition appealed to the international community to recognize Russia as an occupying power in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

As the Council of Europe’s event is approaching, Russia plans to conduct large-scale military exercises with the participation of Russian aviation in Abkhazia where no European observers are allowed and where Moscow’s actions go totally unchecked.

Kyrgyzstan -- Not a Failing State

By Erica Marat

Two weeks after the regime change, Kyrgyzstan continues to be unstable. Five more people died in the unrest in Bishkek last Monday, unrest that was reportedly instigated by former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s supporters. Kyrgyzstan’s provisional government has ordered use of force against anyone seeking to provoke conflict.

To date the provisional government has been unable to establish adequate control over the police forces. The interim head of government Roza Otunbayeva has yet to find an efficient head for the Ministry of Interior who would be able to discipline the police and pursue democratic reform. Given that Kurmanbek Bakiyev has announced from Minsk that he refuses to give up, the chaos is likely to continue in Kyrgyzstan.

Against this background, pundits rush to see Kyrgyzstan as a failed or a failing state. They argue that the country is split into north and south, and the possibility of a civil conflict is imminent. While it is true that state institutions are weak in Kyrgyzstan and the provisional government has already made numerous mistakes, positive changes introduced by the government should not be underestimated.

The Otunbayeva government has appointed prominent NGO leader to head the Central Elections Commission. Her government has also formed a special Constitutional Council to stage public debates on the new Constitution. This marks a comeback of the NGO community into public life – some of Kyrgyzstan’s major achievements to date.

Importantly, it is in the interest of the new leadership to conduct free and fair elections as one of the conditions for legitimizing itself. Never before in the country had several formidable political parties competed among themselves to reach a common goal: international recognition. The government announced that the referendum on the new constitution is to take place on June 27 and parliamentary elections on October 10th.

These experiences are vital for the country. Even if the current leadership eventually fails to fulfill some of its promises, there will still be powerful reference points to experiments with democracy in the post-Soviet period. This is something neighboring Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, still lack. Kyrgyzstan’s ongoing change is therefore a lesson for both its citizens and its neighbors.

Calling Kyrgyzstan a faltering state is to ignore the efforts of civil society leaders and the few in the provisional government who fearlessly challenged Bakiyev’s brutal regime. The next six months will likely be chaotic for Kyrgyzstan. Unrest will be caused both by the new government’s ineffective policies and brought by former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

But instead of writing Kyrgyzstan off as a failing state, experts should focus on the failures of the international community to support democratic change in the country. While supporting Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the U.S. government ignored the sentiments of political opposition and NGO community. The European Union began prioritizing Central Asia in its foreign policy only few years ago. Kyrgyz civil society has the potential to contribute to democratic reform in the country. But it needs the assurance of the international community that its efforts will be supported.

New Partnerships and Old Tricks

By Jiri Kominek

The April 21 agreement signed by Russia and Ukraine in which the former will be allowed to base its Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol for another 25 years and in which the latter has secured a much-needed discount on gas shipments probably has both sides thinking they got the better end of the deal.

Viktor Yanukovych and his camp can breathe easier since the agreement with Russia guarantees Ukraine will get a 30 percent discount on imported gas. Without the discount Kyiv would not be able to restrain its budget deficit below 6 percent of GDP since it would have to continue subsidizing gas sold to households who would otherwise not be able to afford the current rate of 330 USD per 1000 cubic meters.

With the price down, and the need for subsidies gone, Ukraine will be able to secure another 12bn USD loan over the next two and a half years from the IMF to help refloat an economy that shrank over 15 percent in 2009 as a result of the global recession.

“Although the economy was hit hard last year, heavy industry in the Eastern part of Ukraine where Yanukovych’s support base is located is beginning to show signs of recovery and the current USD330 rate being charged would not sustain any growth since the rate is higher than what Russia currently charges Germany”, said Prague-based Russia analyst Ondrej Soukup.

For Russia, the agreement means the Black Sea Fleet can continue to call Crimea its home port for another 25 years until 2042. Historical claims to the port facility and feelings that the Kremlin can continue to maintain a physical presence in what amounts to a former colony aside, there is no way Russia could relocate the fleet to a new facility in Novorossiysk had Kyiv insisted on upholding the 2017 deadline when the current lease expires.

The costs and technical challenges of building the new facility are far too great, and besides, the most elite elements of Russia’s civil engineering and construction capacity are preoccupied preparing for the Sochi 2014 winter Olympic Games.

Brussels can also breathe easier since the new deal will reduce the likelihood of gas cut-offs during the peak of winter when a cash-starved Ukraine, unable to pay Gazprom’s exorbitant rates, resorted to diverting. supplies destined for the E.U. in order to keep the country’s economy and people from freezing over.

Yanukovych‘s foreign policy advisor Leonid Kozhara said at the end of March that bringing Ukraine close to the EU continues to be the number one priority of the current administration.

For analysts familiar with the people who have accompanied Yanukovych into the corridors of power, however, there is an unmistakeable feeling of deja vous harking back to the days of former Urkainian President Leonid Kuchma when those around him benefited the most from a very non-transparent gas trade and other business activities.

“We could be seeing a throwback to the Kuchma era where the current government seeks to cut deals with all neighbors in an effort to keep everyone happy while its members continue to enrich themselves at the expense of the nation’s welfare”, said Soukup.

Success of Georgia’s Police Reform Is a Function of Sovereignty

By Giorgi Kvelashvili

In his April 15, 2010 article in Foreign Policy, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili wrote about the significant progress his country has made in nation-building and consolidation of a liberal democracy. In the piece entitled “Failed No Longer,” Saakashvili touched upon almost all aspects of Georgia’s internal development, foreign policy priorities, security issues, international engagement and, of course, the hurdles erected by Russia’s current leadership to obstruct Georgia’s freedom of choice.

The article appeared at a time when a high-profile Nuclear Security Summit, hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama, was taking place in Washington, DC in which the Georgian president was a participant. That was the reason why analysts working on Georgia-related issues paid particular attention to the part of the article that mentioned Georgia’s efforts to “break up numerous uranium smuggling attempts.”

But there was at least one revelation in President Saakashvili’s publication that also deserves due consideration and analysis. “Very early in my presidency,” Saakashvili wrote “then Russian President Vladimir Putin called me to say that he would be ready to accept our new Georgian regime, as long as … he could name our ministers of interior and foreign affairs.” Apparently, this conversation took place sometime in early 2004, shortly after the Rose Revolution – a peaceful popular protest in which the corrupt regime of Eduard Shevardnadze was ousted and liberal reformers led by U.S.-educated Saakashvili came to power.

It is not the first time that President Saakashvili openly talked about his phone conversation with Putin. Speaking to the Georgian public and media he had mentioned the Russian leader’s ‘offer’ before but, arguably, he never spoke of this in the international press.

Georgia’s de-Sovietization has been manifested in several directions but a comprehensive police reform has been by far the most illustrative example. Although the reforms carried out in the education, justice, economic and the public service systems are no less significant, the transformation that the Georgian police have undergone under Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili truly leaves nothing to remind of the Soviet past or Russia’s present. Instead of a Soviet-styled force having almost no public support and deeply marred in corruption some six years ago, now Georgia has a police trusted by 81% of the public, according to the opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) nearly one month ago. For comparison, the same survey gives 57% to the Georgian president’s administration and 56% to the government.

Any westerner traveling across the countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union would say that police both in form and function are almost identical in all of them – except for the Baltic nations and Georgia – and have little semblance of what police really represent in the West. Russia and most of the post-Soviet states still even officially call their police force a militia (militsia) as in the old-Soviet times and their uniforms have only slightly changed if at all.

In Russia’s public discourse, interest toward Georgia’s police reform has been coupled with even bigger fascination with Georgian Minister Merabishvili’s persona and “sovereign rights.” He has been interviewed by Russian journalists more often than ever before and his laconic expressions have been broadly debated in the Russian press. One might even argue that a Merabishvili myth is being created in Russia, drawing on enigma and suspicion similar to those attached to Pyotr Stolypin, Russia’s reformist minister of the interior and then-prime minister under Tsar Nicolas II at the beginning of the 20th century.

On March 29, one of Russia’s widely-read newspapers, Kommersant, broadly covered Georgia’s police reform conveying to Russian readers the success story of Georgia’s Western-style, “top-notch” and “high-tech” law enforcement agency. The online edition of the newspaper even put out the musical advertisement that Georgian police use to recruit young officers.



Russians have reason to look to the Georgian police for inspiration and as a blueprint for comprehensive reform. According to Kommersant, only 22% of Russians trust their police, a force which is considered by the public as corrupt and inefficient. In his recent article published on April 4, Stephen Sestanovich, an influential Russia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations wrote on the merits of Georgia’s police transformation and advised Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to follow suit. “Only one political leader in any post-Soviet state has ever attempted this kind of institutional upheaval, and the comparison is an ironic one for Medvedev. For that leader is … Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, who soon after becoming president in 2004 fired more than 80% of the country’s police officers…But however awkward the parallel may be, there are lessons in it for Medvedev. Saakashvili’s reform succeeded precisely because it was so radical.”

Let’s imagine that Georgia had had a Putin-appointed minister of internal affairs. Not only would that have meant the lack of even basic internal sovereignty, but would also have ruled out the possibility of any reform. That is how sovereignty and modernization are intertwined in Georgian reality and that is why Putin so vigorously opposes both.